Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts

Friday, February 01, 2013

Australia’s carbon market at stake in September election

I'm quoted in the current issue of the Point Carbon ANZ newsletter, regarding the recently announced Australian federal election and Australia's climate policy. The story can be found via the above link; my full response to Stian Reklev is below.


Questions: 
1. In the international climate policy context, what would be the main difference between a Labor win vs a Coalition win?

2a. Is Tony Abbott likely to eliminate the ETS and institute his Direct Action plan instead, and can it easily be done?
2b. If Abbott does, how would this impact Australia’s domestic emissions profile?

3. If Abbott wins, would that mean Australia disappearing from the scene as one of the main advocates for an international carbon market?

Answers:
The Coalition’s lack of detailed policies make their actions difficult to predict, but it’s unlikely that a Coalition government would continue Australia’s recent run of strong international climate action advocacy, especially as far as international carbon markets are concerned.

While both Labor and the Coalition support international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as the Kyoto protocol, only Labor has recently supported joint global action to establish emissions trading schemes. Members of the Coalition have repeatedly been less than favourable toward foreign efforts to reduce or offset emissions. See e.g.
  • “in countries or organisations with less developed and less scrupulous administrative cultures [than Australia] the scope for corruption is obvious ... This is a market based on the non-delivery of an invisible product to no one, and is almost certain to be scammed” (Source)
  • “Australian businesses are going to have to spend more than $3 billion a year purchasing abatements from abroad - and we all know the potential for fraud, the potential for scamming.'' (Source)
  • “If such a sophisticated market as Norway is facing a $5 billion fraud, how will Australians know if that money is actually reducing emissions or is it going into the pockets of criminals? ... We will reduce emissions by 700 million tonnes by purchasing abatement in Australia that will clean up our own environment rather than sending money overseas.” (Source)
  • “[The Prime Minister] must also detail the measures and safeguards which will have to be put in place to ensure that the tens of billions of Australian taxpayer dollars committed to purchasing international carbon credits do not end up in the clutches of the carbon cowboys.” (Source)
  • “We aren’t reducing our emissions, we are just engaging in a massive transfer of wealth from this country to carbon traders overseas.” (Source)
  • “emissions reduction [based on foreign carbon credits] can easily turn out to be a real life version of the emperor’s new clothes” (Source)

While I again flag the lack of detail, the abatement policies suggested by the Coalition, such as direct action, likely wouldn’t offer as much abatement potential as a carbon price, cover as much of Australia’s emissions, and would likely cost more for what they would deliver. The DA and Emissions Reduction Fund at the moment seem to be essentially the same policies that the Coalition took into the last election, and they were heavily criticised at the time for focussing on a very narrow subset of options, not being scalable to achieve larger abatement, and exploiting only the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of emissions reduction while not prompting the deeper changes needed to decarbonise the Australian economy over the long term.

Change in the electricity sector will continue, as it is currently being driven more by the RET than by the carbon price, but the advancement of other low-carbon technologies risk stalling if efforts to provide a coherent regulatory and investment environment, such as through the CEFC, are wound down as promised. Trying instead to advance individual technologies is difficult: research and development of CCS, which the Coalition strongly supports, has been negligible despite the $400 million Global CCS Institute set up under Rudd.

If the Coalition win government in September, and follow their stated promise, they will introduce legislation to repeal the carbon price. This would pass the House of Representatives, but would presumably fail in the Senate where Labor and The Greens will still hold balance of power until at least 1 July 2014, when the senators elected in the 2013 election will take their places. Unless the Coalition win the election in landslide, Labor and The Greens will probably still control the Senate on 1 July 2014, and therefore be able to block the repeal of the carbon price.

To gain control of the Senate, a Coalition government would need to introduce their legislation (after 1 July 2014), have it blocked, wait three months, reintroduce it, and have it blocked a second time before being able to call a double dissolution election. Assuming they manage all this in 2014, Senators elected at that election would take their places on 1 July 2015.

Repealing the carbon price would be an incredibly tortuous process legislatively, for the public, and most of all for the businesses wondering whether they need to account for their liabilities under the existing carbon price, some replacement scheme, or nothing at all.

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Why drop the price floor? Taking a gamble on the EU ETS

I couldn't make much at first  of today's announcement by Greg Combet, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, that Australia was going to link its ETS with the EU ETS – and oh, by the way, we're dropping the price floor.

That Australia and the EU will link their schemes good news, but it's an expected development. Dropping the price floor, on the hand, had been speculated about (notably by the AFR; well done, Marcus Priest), but wasn't part of the original plan.

As I wrote back in May, a price floor has some good things going for it, despite being technically challenging; and as it's only regulation the government has the numbers to pass it even against Rob Oakeshott's opposition. So my initial reaction was that the floor price had been put in the "too hard" basket and the ETS linkage was just used to disguise that announcement somewhat.

I've since heard, however, that dropping the price floor was a condition of the EU agreeing to link the schemes, and Australia replaced it with the restriction of foreign units. This makes more sense.

The EU currently has an oversupply of permits (European Union Allowances; EUAs), and will have for a quite a few years yet, so it would welcome a new source of demand: Australia. (Even if our purchase volumes aren't that great in the scheme of things.) An Australian price floor would not only lessen demand for EUAs, it would also make integrating the schemes more complex.

The price floor, though, was there to stop the Australian market being flooded by cheap foreign permits; to give domestic sources of investment into potential abatement (or offsets) the certainty that they would be able to get at least $15 for their product. What fulfils that role?

Well, we've moved from a price restriction to a (sort-of) quantity restriction. Previously, entities could meet up to 50% of their AU ETS liabilities with foreign units, but the only foreign units decided upon were those from the Kyoto Protocol: CERs, ERUs, and RMUs. The CDM market is currently even more oversupplied than the EUA market, and prices are down, down, down;(1) well below the $15 price floor.

Now, the 50% limit on international units is still there, but only 12.5% (of total liabilities) can be met by Kyoto units. Once that limit is reached, the relevant price domestic permits (ACUs) and offsets (ACCUs) have to compete against is that of EUAs. (Remember that the large amount of free permits – I don't have exact figures, but it's around 30-40% of our cap, I think; leave a comment if you've better info – lowers the effective size of the domestic market, so the 50% international unit cap isn't as strict as it sounds.)

That 12.5% limit suits not only the EU, since the EUAs don't have to compete against the Kyoto units for the other 37.5%, but also suits  those like The Greens who want the carbon price to rise over time: they expect the EUA price to rise over time, pulling ACU/ACCU prices with it. It's not a bad gamble – certainly, I think the chance of EUA prices rising above $15 is higher than that of CDM prices doing so. (Exchange rates play a role in all this as well, but I'm buggered if I know which way they're going.)

Limiting Kyoto units also does a little bit to allay concerns about the additionality of some of those units, though it's a fairly blunt instrument; a quantity control is not a quality control.

That's the policy side of things. On the politics side, the EU ETS integration/no price floor does some interesting things. The lack of an auction price floor and international surrender charge (which together constitute the 'price floor' we've been discussing) could well reduce government revenue from the carbon price; it depends on what the EUA price does.

More interestingly, though, I think the EU integration and lack of a price floor will make the AU ETS appeal more to free market types, especially since at first glance it looks like providing opportunities for cheaper abatement. (You fine readers, of course, know better.) And unless the Liberals want to start slagging off Europeans, they might reign back calling foreign abaters cowboys, scammers, frauds, and criminals.

Yeah, okay, I don't buy that last one, either. But at least the government now have a better response to that.

Finally, integrating more fully with the EU ETS effectively places more responsibility for domestic prices in their hands: if EUA prices go up, so will Australia's prices – sorry, guys, it's out of our hands! (Though we keep the price ceiling, I understand it will be set with reference to the EUA price; so no great limit, there.)

A lot depends on how well the EU can reform its ETS to drive prices back up into its preferred (by almost everyone but Poland) range – but then, that's always been the case.



(1) Come at me, Coles.

Thursday, August 09, 2012

A Comment on the Political Discussion of Electricity Regulations

With her speech to the the Energy Policy Institute of Australia on Tuesday, the Prime Minister Julia Gillard has moved (or at least expanded) the discussion of electricity regulations from the roundtable meetings and conferences of industry, academia, and government to the political arena. Hurrah..?

A few points:

Are there problems with dividend policy, reliability standards, and peak demand? Yes.

Have the incentives in the existing regulations led some states to act in a manner that has unnecessarily raised prices for consumers (and thus led to increased profits for the states)? Very probably.

Has this been going on for several years, including under Labor governments? Yes – but so what?

Reforming energy industry regulations isn't a particularly new issue for the industry itself, energy academics, or government bodies; the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (DRET) has been developing an Energy White Paper for a while now, with associated submissions and consultations. But even if you were to argue that the problems should have been addressed earlier, why shouldn't we address them now?

To suggest, as Oppisition Leader Tony Abbott did this morning, that there can't be a problem with electricity regulations, because otherwise the Federal Government would been telling us this for years, is facile. Opposition energy spokesman Ian Macfarlane might have been closer when he described the PM  as a latecomer, but again – so what?

Let's accept, for the sake of argument, that Julia Gillard's strategy is to a signicant extent motivated by political desires, chiefly to separate the effects of the carbon price from unrelated electricity price rises. If it leads to good energy market reform, I don't care.

I might be disappointed that worthy reforms aren't being undertaken because politicians don't see any votes in it,  but if a political party uses a policy debate to make its opponents look bad while focussing on implementing good policy, then I'm riding that gift horse until it gets distracted and wanders off to chew a Newspoll. (When it gets to the point of using a policy discussion chiefly to attack your opponents rather than actually try and solve any problems – see e.g. asylum seekers – that's a different matter.)

Has the carbon price made electricity prices rise this year? Yes. Yawn. Not that big of a deal. It certainly isn't the primary cause of electricity prices rises over the last few years. Spot the carbon price effect in this graph:

Energy Distribution Prices and Revenue per Customer Over Time


So when Abbott says,
"the problem is not the regulation of power prices. The problem is the carbon tax putting up power prices"
well, the Australian Energy Regulator disagrees on the first bit, and state reports disagree on the last bit.

Regardless of why they've been raised, whose fault they are, and what other problems may be out there as well, can't we just accept that these problems are real and talk about how to fix them? There's no time like the present (especially in politics).

Friday, May 11, 2012

Cross-post: Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

After my previous misadventures with major media, I was pleasantly surprised when Stian Reklev, the chief correspondent for Reuters Point Carbon, asked me to write a comment piece on the Australian ETS price floor mechanism and its effect on the market for international permits. In retrospect, I perhaps lapsed a little too much into 'explainer' mode, but with only 650 words to play with there's only so much analysis you can do – I feel weird not backing statements up with solid argumentation and a few links. Here's the piece, published today in the Carbon Market Australia-New Zealand May newsletter:

Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

From July 2015, the Australian federal government will set the price of the permits in its emissions trading scheme free – within limits. The government intends to introduce a price floor and price ceiling until at least 2017/18, in order to provide certainty and reduce risks for market participants and investors.

This is good news for emission reduction activities whose viability depends on prices several years hence, such as larger, more complex projects. Further, the goal of abatement at least-cost should be balanced against the goal of abating as rapidly as possible; should reaching current targets be cheaper than expected, a floor price can ensure a minimum level of spending on abatement. Several EU countries already have or are considering similar measures, in recognition that adjusting the targets of an ETS in response to price movements often isn’t possible rapidly.

Last December, the government released a discussion paper and called for submission on the price floor, which combines a reserve price for Australian carbon units at auction with an ‘international unit surrender charge’ that ensures international carbon credits cost at least as much as domestic units.

Four options are being considered for the international unit surrender charge, with two main approaches: Options 1 and 2 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price of the international unit when it was purchased; Options 3 and 4 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price when the unit surrendered.

While calculating the surrender charge based on the difference between the buying price and the price floor is intuitively appealing, it has implementation issues ranging from administrative complexity, through estimating firms’ time value of money (to adjust the prices of credits purchased earlier rather than later), to the possibility of firms gaming the system by artificially inflating the price of purchased credits. The government paper also notes that Options 1 and 2 would create a preference for foreign units as “if the international price goes up, [firms] could sell the unit at a profit, purchase another unit at a similar (or the same) price, and pay a lower surrender charge.” (Source)

Option 3 appears the most likely: when firms surrender their international units, a charge is applied based on the difference between the prevailing spot price and the price floor. This is the “purest” option, with minimal government involvement and low administration costs. The risk that the price of units changes between purchasing and surrendering them is borne by the liable firms, though financial markets are expected (e.g. by Westpac (PDF)) to provide hedging products or forward contracts.

The costs of hedging, in addition to the surrender charge, could promote the purchase of domestic units over foreign credits. However, it’s worth noting that, since markets for foreign units will likely exist further forward than domestic units (which will only be auctioned three years in advance, based on current plans), there will be a strong bias toward international credits from firms looking to hedge long-term.

Option 4 is similar to Option 3, though with an option for firms to lock in a surrender charge ahead of time based on a regulator-calculated forward curve. This interesting idea would assist firms who, for reasons of cost, access, or complexity are unlikely to use financial markets’ hedging products. Though adding complexity, it would avoid any bias Option 3 has toward domestic units. However, is it the government’s role to insure traders from carbon price risk?

While an MP who supported the ETS, Rob Oakeshott, has recently spoken out against the price floor, the government has an advantage: the relevant legislation has already been passed, and the remaining details (e.g. the choice of option) can be passed by regulation. Regulation passes automatically unless blocked, so the opposition would need to find a 75-seat majority in the House of Representatives to do so. (Under convention established by Speaker Denison, the Speaker votes against motions in case of a tie.)

Even in the government’s current precarious position, this seems unlikely – the defection of Oakeshott alone would not suffice –, so that, if the government survives long enough to introduce a price floor, it will likely pass.

Martin C. Jones is a researcher at the Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets, UNSW.

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Cross-post: State climate schemes are still worthwhile under a carbon price

My first piece for The Conversation, written in response to recent events:

State climate schemes still worthwhile under a carbon price

In justifying their recent abandonment of state-based climate schemes, the governments of Queensland and Victoria have both claimed that the schemes will be redundant under the federal emissions trading scheme (ETS) that begins in July.¹ Yet this justification is only a smokescreen, as a carbon price can well exist with other environmental and climate schemes.

The goal of putting a price on carbon – more correctly, on greenhouse gases, but “carbon” is shorter – is to reduce the amount of carbon emissions. The flexible nature of an ETS lets the market decide whether this occurs. It reduces the activities that produce carbon or conducts those activities more efficiently.

The industries in which these reductions occur, and the people that are affected by them, can be only broadly selected by the Government. This is the point, since the idea is that the market will do the job more cheaply than if the Government prescribed everything. And the argument that state climate programs within a national ETS can make emissions reduction more expensive is correct.

However, getting the cheapest emissions abatement is not the only possible goal. Another goal might be to target particular geographic or social groups, such as rural areas or low-income households. South Australia’s Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme, for example, aims to reduce household electricity use, but requires a certain proportion of that reduction to occur in disadvantaged households. Energy costs are thus reduced where households are most struggling with them, rather than just where it’s cheapest to do so (which is usually higher-income households). Similar goals could well be pursued through state-based measures complementing a carbon price.

A goal of further policies might be to target areas that don’t respond well or rapidly to price changes, whether because of habit, socially shaped preferences, intrinsic motivation, or market problems. It’s certainly possible that carbon-price-related rises in electricity bills may cause us to go and demand more energy efficient appliances and houses, or at least appliances and houses that can be upgraded when better technology arrives. But these connections are often tenuous and it can make more sense simply to mandate minimum standards, as we already do for safety. (It is considered unacceptable to let the market decide how safe appliances and houses will be based on “price”, i.e. lawsuits.)

Yet the Victorian Government has removed support for precisely such a policy: coal power standards that would have required a certain level of emissions efficiency from new plants, and required them to be ready to install clean coal technology if it became viable.

Scrapping investments in climate-related infrastructure or research and development, as the Queensland Government is doing, only makes sense if you believe that markets always make the best choices. Research, however, is an area where markets commonly do too little, because the benefits of research tend to be shared amongst many (including competitors) rather than just the researching organisation itself.

Strategic government investment in technology can make it viable years before the market would deliver a similar result. A prime example is Germany’s highly advanced solar power industry, which it developed with subsidies despite being covered by the EU ETS. And while it’s unclear how well Germany’s bolstered solar industry will survive long-term against its rivals from China, it is inarguable that the solar industry made Germany’s power supply robust to the kind of shock that saw its nuclear reactors shut down after the disaster in Fukushima.

This robustness – the ability to maintain a minimum level of performance under a range of possible future conditions – was not delivered because of the EU ETS: it came from additional, smaller-scale policy. And while it may involve some amount of duplication, such robustness is valuable when unforeseen events occur; what if, against all expectation, the constitutional challenge to the Clean Energy Future legislation were to succeed? Achieving our environmental goals would be significantly easier if states still had their individual programs.

These are just a handful of reasons why complementary environmental and climate policies could be worth pursuing, even at a state level, under a national carbon price. There are more. And I do not claim that all policies will be worth it: complementary policies should be evaluated under frameworks such as the one recently published by Denniss, Grudnoff, & Macintosh.

If the Queensland and Victorian Governments had justified abandoning their climate programs based on such an evaluation, it would be easier to believe their faith in a “carbon tax”. And, to be fair, Victoria did conduct a review (PDF) that found no compelling case for a state-based emissions reduction target under a national carbon scheme. But the review also found other Victorian climate programs are worth keeping, and that the merits of state emissions target should be reviewed if the national scheme is altered or repealed.

The reason that state governments are backpedalling on climate policies isn’t because they believe that the “carbon tax” will solve all our environmental problems: this is a smokescreen. The reason is that they don’t share the goals that the federal legislation pursues, of reducing carbon pollution, encouraging renewable energy generation, and “future-proofing” the economy. For if they did, there are plenty of state climate schemes that would still be worthwhile.

¹ Readers may be more familiar with the incorrect, though widespread term, “carbon tax”. More on that here.

[UPDATE 30/03]
Green industry newsletter Climate Spectator republished the article today :-)

Monday, January 02, 2012

The fundamental question on asylum seekers

Australia's dog of a policy on asylum seekers – at least, those arriving by boat – appears set to be a continued topic of political discussion this year, so I'd like to echo the sentiments of Guy Rundle as expressed just before Christmas:

The Australian asylum seeker discussion is wrongly framed. As signatories to the Refugee Convention, we have a categorical moral imperative to allow any potential refugees that reach our shores to claim asylum; this is their right.
However, the policy debate revolves around whether we can "wholly negate someone’s rights (that we have explicitly promised them), in a situation where their life and freedom will be wholly annihilated indefinitely, all as a strategy for dissuading unknown future persons from making a possibly perilous journey.

By that definition we are using the 'deterrent' — the people locked up for years on Manus, Nauru, in Malaysia, or god knows where — as a means to a utilitarian end. It is a clear use of human beings in their totality, as means to other ends, and cannot in any sense ground a moral policy."

We are "negating the irreducible moral base with a utilitarian argument based on unknowable contingencies and outcomes that cannot be guaranteed".

Our role should be "to stand up for what we believe to be irreducibly right — right not by emotion, but by well-argued reason from fundamental principles, capable of debate — and seek to repeatedly make those issues clear as they are ceaselessly covered over by, well by notions like 'offshore processing'. Making those issues clear would be done by making clear the fundamental political question that no politician will put — are we going to stay within the Convention, or are we not? Surely anyone who wants an honest debate and decision would want that question to rise to the surface.

Either we stay with the Convention, and honour its obligations – and further obligations that arise from those — or we repudiate it. Putting the question thus is first of all, simply honest — but I suspect it would also make clear to people eager to impose desert prisons etc, exactly what they are repudiating, about themselves as much as anything.

That seems to be the only moral approach of any honest commentator from any side regarding the issue."

Our current discussion is not about how to adhere to our committment: it's about the methods in which we intent to break it. A sad state of affairs.

Tuesday, November 08, 2011

Australian Carbon Price Legislation passed

The Senate has just passed the primary piece of legislation for the carbon pricing mechanism.

Well done, Australia :-)

Thursday, November 03, 2011

IETA GHG Market Report 2011

A little over a month ago I alluded to an article I co-authored for the International Emissions Trading Association's (IETA) annual report on Greenhouse Gas Markets. That IETA GHG Market Report 2011 has now been published, and our article forms the very first chapter – hurrah!

It's too early to say whether this counts as a proper peer-reviewed publication or not – there was peer review, but other criteria come into play, as well –, but this is a nice little feather in my cap, regardless :-)

Friday, October 14, 2011

Polling in Australia

Excellent political blogger and numbers man Scott Steel (aka Possum Comitatus) lays down some "polling reality 101" in a series of tweets:
There are 5 types of pollsters for politics in Australia:
  1. Firstly, those with an exceptional online panel are good. They are very rare (EMC).
  2. Face to face suffers from stated vs revealed preference issues because of F2F intimacy and sample selection bias. Not so good.
  3. Phone polls come in 3 levels.
    Commercial pollsters (Newspoll, Nieslen etc) which are the least accurate. OK, but....
  4. Next comes those with access to the Integrated Public Number Database (requires polling "on behalf" of elected representatives).
  5. Finally there are those that have access to the IPND *and* capability to wash against the electoral roll. The most accurate.
So while Nielsen, Newspoll etc are good - they do the best they can by using a very limited base for selecting phone numbers. Unfortunately, most of the questions commercial pollsters ask, while interesting, ell us very very little about political preference behaviour. Which unfortunately also means that most of the commentary you read about polling (especially issues) and what it "means" is just horseshit.
You've been told.

(Source: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9])

Friday, September 23, 2011

Taxing My Patience

The think-thank Per Capita released a report during the week, in which they surveyed Australians' Public Attitudes towards Taxation and Government Expenditure. I posted a section of it to Twitter and Facebook:
OECD countries whose taxes are higher than Australia's (as percentage of GDP): everyone except Korea, USA, Turkey, Chile, Mexico – so 26 of 33.
Proportion of Australians who correctly identified us as a low-taxing, small-government nation: 4%
One of my friends reposted it, where it received the following comment.
And isn't it great that we are, given that the low taxing, small govt and more importantly no debt govt is what got us through the gfc then why are we reverting? Now we have huge debt which if swans magic 3bn surplus ever comes to fruition will take 50 years to repay. A govt which is not only increasing taxes, but burning through out savings (I.e. Selling down the future fund). The most annoying one is the mining tax that will simply be burned up in consolidated revenue rather than a sovereign wealth fund. Or the carbon tax that will effectively make 9 out of 10 house holds welfare recipients without taking a single gram of carbon out of the air (globally), but will cost jobs. So if we are a financially sound low taxing small govt country then it has fuck all to do with worlds greatest treasurer swan [MCJ: Wayne Swan recently received an award from Euromoney magazine as being Finance Minisiter of the Year] and the rest of his rabble, and more to do with their fiscally responsible predecessor.
This sort of stuff is crap I hear all the time, and I was feeling a little cranky this morning, so I couldn't help but respond.
The statement that a "no debt" Government got us through the GFC is complete rubbish. What got us through was prompt, sizeable, and well-targeted stimulus spending, reasonably strong institutions, and a bit of luck.

Australia's "huge debt" is also a falsehood. Australia Government Debt as a % of GDP in 2010 – the latest figures from the OECD database stats.oecd.org – is 11.0%. The only developed countries with lower proportions of debt are Estonia, and Chile. Here's what that looks like:

Which taxes are we increasing? The Government wants to lower the corporate tax rate. It's increasing the personal income tax-free threshold – less tax paid there. Even with the increased monetary costs of carbon price, consumers will come out ahead – particularly if you take into account the (non-monetary) environmental costs that we were bearing, are bearing, and will bear because the externalities embodied in CO2-e emissions have not been adequately priced.

Resource extraction will attract a new tax (the MRRT), which will affect Australian consumers roughly jot in terms of our extra costs, but deliver us billions in revenue. (The original, if terribly named, RSPT was even better, but that's politics for you.)

I don't know what you mean by "burning through our savings" in relation to the Future Fund, since (even when they ran a deficit) Labor still made contributions to the Fund, and I'm not aware of any attempts to sell the Fund or tap it for recurrent expenditure.

You decry 9 out of 10 household becoming "welfare recipients" due to compensation for the emissions trading scheme. What rank stupidity: the compensation is a higher tax-free threshold. If a tax-free threshold is "welfare", every single earner of income is a welfare recipient.

Your characterisation of the ineffectiveness of carbon pricing is similarly misguided. Emissions trading has been proven to have reduced emissions, and your statement is only true in the sense that emissions will continue to rise (in the near future). Well, yes, but they'll rise less than they would otherwise have. And if you don't think that's good enough, well, perhaps you'd better stop eating, because eating doesn't stop ageing, either: it just slows the rate at which you're dying. Alternatively, pick up a maths textbook and relearn second derivatives.

Monday, September 19, 2011

Limited foresight

Back in January, a friend asked me to tell him, in 240 characters or less, what was going on with Australia's climate policy. Here's my response:
Australia has a Multiparty Climate Change Committee, which will probably receive excellent submissions and throw them out in favour of a hacked-together update of the CPRS that gets the backing of the Greens and Indies sometime this year.
I give myself 7/10 on this one. The MPCCC has turned out a proposal that is based on the CPRS, but the updates are greater than I was expecting. However, there is still a bit of a piece-meal character about the Clean Energy Future proposal e.g. the exclusion of petrol, paying power stations to shut down.

[UPDATE]
The same friend has challenged me to update my prediction, again within 240 characters. Here goes:
The ETS will pass before 2012, with minor tinkering possible but unlikely. The other CEF policies will pass by mid 2012, so long as Labor hasn't imploded over something else by then. Debate will turn to complementary policies (e.g. RET)
He gave me 7/10 on my first prediction, too, btw.

Sunday, August 07, 2011

Cross-post: Implicit visions of Australia's future

I'm a few days putting this up here, but on Thursday I had another article published at New Matilda. They called it "Finally! Climate Policies Explained", but I wasn't actually trying to write an 'explainer' piece; instead, I was inspired by an article by Fergus Green to ponder the differences between what Australian political parties are saying about climate change and what they're doing. (Subsequent Twitter discussions between Fergus, Declan Kuch and myself also provided several ideas.)

The link to Fergus' article didn't make the NM editing cut, but I've restored it in my version, below (as well as one or two other bits I thought worth keeping, even if it does make the article slightly clunkier.)

What are the visions of Australia’s future reflected in our parties’ policies?

When the Government released its climate change package on July 10, it was under the moniker of a “Clean Energy Future”. This is, ostensibly, a fairly clear vision for where Labor sees Australia in 2050 and beyond. However, as Fergus Green rightly points out, the package is a mish-mash of measures that don’t deliver clear policy signals to achieve this clean energy future. While this is partially a result of the multi-party committee that spawned the package, the rhetoric the Government employs is ambiguous as to precisely what sort of society they see Australia moving toward.

But where are we really going with all this? If the world follows the suggestions of science and reduces CO2-e emissions to constrain dangerous climate change, what place is this future do our parties foresee?

There are five basic possibilities, relating to our emissions levels relative to our global entitlement and how we approach any excess/shortfall:
  1. Australia emits less than its global entitlement of CO2-e, and exports its remainder.(1)
  2. As above, but we don’t export the remainder.
  3. Australia emits at or about its share of CO2-e – a balanced carbon budget, if you like.
  4. Australia emits more than its global share of CO2-e, and offsets the difference by importing allowances/offsets from other countries.
  5. As above, but we don’t import (enough) to cover our excess emissions.
Note that these are possibilities for some stabilised-emissions future (2050 and beyond), without defining the transition path there-to.

Both the approach to calculating Australia’s right to CO2-e emissions and the position vis-à-vis offsetting domestic emissions internationally are predominantly moral decisions, even if they are underpinned by science, economics, law, and so on.

Following the argument that each person should have an equal right to the use of the global environment, which seems a sensible and equitable approach, Australia’s entitlement to emit CO2-e should be based our share of the global population. (Perhaps a little less, if you take our disproportionate historical use of the atmosphere into consideration.)

The 2011 Garnaut Review estimated that global per capita emissions would need to fall to less than two tonnes of CO2-e per year to stop CO2-e concentrations rising altogether, with even lower levels required to reduce concentrations. One to two tonnes of CO2-e per person per year seems a ballpark figure for our entitlement, then.

Offsetting domestic emissions internationally should, scientifically, be a non-issue: if the processes are of equal quality, arguing about whether Australian emissions should be offset by projects in Australia or Borneo is equivalent to arguing over offsetting in Queensland versus Tasmania; the climate responds equally well to both. And while the processes to offset emissions in Australia and Borneo are not of the same quality, we can restrict the import of foreign offsets to those that meet the relevant standards of additionality, verifiability, and so forth. This would be little different, in principle, to Australia’s importing of foodstuffs or consumer goods only from foreign companies certified to have a certain quality standard of production.

Where quality is equal, it would seem most efficient to choose the lowest cost abatement, which will probably not be in Australia. Investing in higher-cost domestic options, however, could establish new industries that prove more efficient in the long run, similar to the way Germany is fostering its solar and wind power industries. While Australia will end up importing some of our future offset and abatement technology – we simply aren’t large enough to develop everything ourselves –, a strong local market might have kept talents such as Dr. Zhongreng Shi or David Mills in Australia rather than watch them found their solar PV companies in China and the USA, respectively.

There are also the arguments that Australia should not achieve its entire net emissions reduction by shifting the work overseas. One argument involves equity: if foreign offsets are sold through intermediaries, is the money going to the end producers or the intermediaries? If it’s the intermediaries, would we prefer the money went to Australians, instead?  Another argument is that countries have an ethical responsibility to abate their own emissions (PDF). Such arguments for domestic abatement are broadly accepted (see Article 6(d) of the Kyoto Protocol, for example), though to varying degrees.

So: how do the climate policies of Australia’s political parties fit into the above framework?

Vision 1 – Low Emissions, Exporting Surplus

This is the vision of The Greens, and the clearest of the major parties. A goal of The Greens’ climate change policy is “to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as is feasible and by no later than 2050”. Emitting zero is obviously less than our entitlement, which leaves the question of trading our surplus allowances/abatement. Since The Greens are comfortable with the MPCCC proposal of importing up to 50% of permits required under the ETS – though only, they stress, permits of the highest quality that do not replace serious domestic action –, they would presumably also be comfortable exporting any surplus we might have. (Assuming, of course, that our own abatement is of the highest quality!)

Part of The Greens’ vision is a low-impact lifestyle: less energy use, less driving, less flying, more public transport use, less logging, etc. Such lifestyle change might not be absolutely necessary to reach a low-emissions scenario, but it would certainly be more difficult without it.

Vision 2 – Low Emissions, Not Exporting Surplus

While a part of the environmental movement (and The Greens) might be against Australia enabling the emissions of other countries – similar to current calls to stop fossil fuel exports –, this scenario is unrealistic. It would require explicitly rejecting a potentially quite large revenue stream, which Australian businesses are famously vociferous opposed to, and a significant change in public attitudes toward actions that might be primarily symbolic.

In particular, if Australia achieves low net emissions via plentiful offset generation rather than low gross emissions, it would be radical to ban the generating companies from selling their offsets overseas. To a certain extent, this vision seeks to impose a lifestyle choice upon other countries by limiting their options – such a vision is not always wrong (most people would be happy limiting certain countries’ access to nuclear weapons, for example), but it is controversial.

Vision 3 – Medium Emissions, Balanced Over Cycle

The use of the term “balanced” here is deliberate: this future sees Australia emitting at or about its share of global CO2-e emissions, trading allowances as and when economic or natural fluctuations require us to, but striving to maintain a roughly equal quantity of CO2-e imports and exports over time. Unlike other budgets, however, there is no pressing need that this one sum to zero over time; that would purely be a matter of preference.

Vision 4 – High Emissions, With Imported Offsets/Allowances

This is the ALP’s position – probably. It’s difficult to tell. Labor’s rhetoric has been about cutting pollution, supporting jobs, remaining competitive, increasing efficiency, and moving toward clean energy. These are all laudable goals, but jobs and competition have little to do with the climate and it’s unclear how clean the ALP’s energy future is, exactly. The Government’s long-term target of 80% reduction of CO2-e emissions versus 2000 levels by 2050 is one of the more concrete figures, but will still almost certainly lead to a future Australia that emits more than its global share.

Climate protection is not part of Labor’s core ideals. Though it’s not said so explicitly, implicit in the ALP’s rhetoric about maintaining our standard of living and its stance toward imported emissions (80% of required permits allowed under the CPRS; 50% under the current proposal) is a vision of an Australia that uses its wealth to pay other (poorer) nations to offset higher domestic consumption of CO2-e. Labor might be interested fuelling our current consumption model differently, but it’s not particularly interested in changing the style in which we live as The Greens are; the choice is for “cheaper, rather than deeper” action, to borrow a phrase.

Vision 5 – High Emissions, Without Imports

It seems harsh to ascribe this vision to the entirety of the Liberal and National parties, as it is certainly not shared by all their members. Under the current leadership, however, this is the Coalition’s vision. Its direct action plan is nonsense and won’t achieve 5% emissions reductions by 2020 under the proposed spending cap, while Liberal policy documents don’t even include a target for 2050 or beyond.

Though a theoretical commitment to 100% domestic action sounds very responsible, Tony Abbott’s tendency to frame his public opinion on climate change based largely on the views of his audience at the time (contravening common sense, his own history, and physics along the way) makes the idea that he has an underlying commitment to significant action roughly as likely as Alan Jones having an underlying commitment to fair and balanced reporting.

Between the, let’s call it ‘intellectual flexibility’ of Tony Abbott and his Shadow Minister for Climate Action, Greg Hunt, so long as no Australian is monetarily worse off – never mind the environmental costs, or the rest of the world – it seems the L/NP vision is to plant some fig trees for their metaphorical leaves and let someone else sort out the problem.


The examples here are not definitive of each category. Malcolm Turnbull’s vision, for example, sees lower emissions than Tony Abbot’s and could share a category with The Greens or the ALP, but differs from theirs in its greater emphasis on carbon capture and storage technologies, as well as a more explicit recognition of the need to manage risk and uncertainty. Similarly, Paul Frijters’ “Give up, or hope for a technological miracle” stance would fall into the same category as the Coaltion vision, though he expressly rejects their direct action policy. (And the ALP’s policy, too, to be fair.)

Which type of future you prefer is entirely your choice. But don’t kid yourself: the Coalition (under Abbott) aren’t really interested in a low-carbon economy; the ALP would like a low-carbon economy, but only where it’s not too difficult; and the Greens sincerely want a zero-carbon economy, but will want to change your lifestyle to achieve that. It’d be nice if they said it – but most voters only want so much honesty from their politicians.

(1) This needn’t be an allowance as under a global emissions trading scheme with binding national targets and permit allocations, but could simply be a level of domestic CO2-e offsetting in excess of the local demand that’s then traded abroad.

Tuesday, July 05, 2011

Cross-Post: Carbon Pricing: The Big Picture

I'm a regular reader of the left-leaning Crikey online newspaper, and something Bernard Keane wrote a few weeks ago got me thinking about what the end goal of climate change policy was. Back in February I'd had a look at how much each person's yearly carbon allowance was in the context of offsetting my own flight emissions, and wanted to combine that with a basic suggestion on how to assess the quality of Australia's upcoming carbon pricing framework. It started out as a blog post, but as I got into it I thought it might be interesting to a larger audience. So I sent it to Crikey, and today they published it!

Carbon Pricing: The Big Picture

With the details of the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee’s (MPCCC) carbon price proposal almost fully fleshed out, it is worth reminding ourselves of the broader context in which this policy should be assessed.

The starting point – and simultaneously the final metric of assessment – is the state of the Earth’s climate. We can have the most well-designed, democratic, efficient, no-loser everyone-gets-a-pony policies in place – if the climate goes to pot, we’ve lost.

The ultimate goal, according to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is to “stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” which was further specified in the Copenhagen Accord to recognise “the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius” from pre-industrial levels. The most commonly accepted atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gasses commensurate with a 2°C rise in temperatures is roughly 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon-dioxide equivalent gasses (CO2-e).

This goal is by no means unanimous within the United Nations: countries more vulnerable to climate change (typically small island states) have called for the target to be only 1.5°C of warming (roughly 350 ppm CO2-e). However, the present concentration of CO2-e is 394 ppm, and at the current rate of abatement the world appears more likely to hit 4°C of warming, if not higher.

Regardless, the ultimate goal is to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. In principle, this is very simple: for the level of CO2-e in the atmosphere to remain constant, the inflow should equal the outflow. (The climate system is more complicated than this, involving time lags and higher-order effects, but for our purposes the principle suffices.) The “outflow”, in this case, is the amount of CO2-e that nature absorbs or that breaks down over time (and, possibly, the CO2-e humans are able to remove), while the “inflow” is the sum of naturally-released CO2-e and human emissions. (Skeptical Science has a good overview, as does Wikipedia.)

The global carbon cycle is such that nature can safely absorb a certain amount of human-produced CO2-e, and it’s only human emissions in excess of this level that would cause atmospheric concentrations to rise. Stabilising concentrations thus means reducing worldwide human emissions to this “safe” level, and it would seem equitable that, eventually, each person has the right to emit an equal share of this level.

So what should the global annual per capita allowance of CO2-e be? Australia’s Climate Commission recently estimated that “humanity can emit not more than 1 trillion tonnes of CO2 between 2000 and 2050 to have a probability of about 75% of limiting temperature rise to 2 °C or less [by 2100].” At the current global population of 6.8 billion people, that’s slightly less than three tonnes of CO2-e per person, per year – remembering that this is only to slow the rise in CO2-e concentration to 450 ppm by 2050.

To stop CO2-e concentrations rising altogether, the 2011 Garnaut Review estimated that global per capita emissions would need to fall to less than two tonnes of CO2-e per year (even less if we want to reduce concentrations). Australia, as we well know, is the developed country furthest away from this limit: our 2010 emissions were roughly 25 tCO2-e per capita (excluding land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF)).

No-one is pretending that a domestic carbon price of $20-$30 per tonne will reduce Australian emissions from 25 tCO2-e pa to anywhere near two or three tonnes per year. Even the Greens’ target of reducing Australia’s emissions by 40% on 1990 levels, which Bob Brown recently described as being visible in the current MPCCC proposal only with “a pair of binoculars”, would still result in roughly 12 tCO2-e emissions pa at current population levels and can only be seen as an interim target.

Just as, if not more important than the starting price of any Australian scheme are therefore the structures and institutions the scheme establishes to enable future transformation of our economy: for example, whether future (interim) targets are set by an independent body or the Government of the day; or the manner in which the carbon pricing scheme interacts with other climate policies (a point also raised by Richard Denniss in Crikey).

A balance must be struck between the need to decarbonise the Australian economy and the transitional difficulties that this will bring. Government policy, with the MPCCC’s scheme as its centrepiece, will – and should – be scrutinised on how disruptive the transition will be. But this disruption must be assessed in the long-term context of decreasing our CO2-e production, or else it’s merely politics, not policy.




Some things I left out to get the article closer to the usual 700-800 words:
  • The numbers there aren't etched in stone; they're probabilistic ranges (as you can see from the source material); the bigger point is that our emissions have a long way to decrease.
  • An alternative to decreasing emissions is to increase the amount of CO2-e removed from the atmosphere or speed up its break-down (neither of which humanity is really capable of doing at the moment).
  • One could argue (in my view justifiably) that it would be fairer to assign CO2-e pollution to the countries that consume the goods & services in question, rather than those that produce them. This is of particular importance to Australia, as we export a significant amount of goods that are carbon-intensive in production and for whose emissions we therefore are currently responsible. However, given the torpidity of global climate change negotiations, these accounting rules seem unlikely to change.
  • If the world moves to an allowance of 2 tCO2-e pp pa, that doesn't mean everyone needs to consume that little: rich countries (consumers) will be able to purchase the emissions rights of poorer countries (consumers).
  • Getting to 2 tCO2-e pp pa means continually tightening caps, which means (ceteris paribus) higher prices. Making the transition easier is important, both in terms of switching behaviour and using cleaner production methods.

Friday, June 17, 2011

More "Carbon Pricing Works" pictures

An update on the LOLBolt thing: comments stopped being moderated (and hence published) on Tuesday afternoon, so the count remains at 260-odd. I can only imagine how many more go unpublished. The great Boltian outrage machine has moved on, though – I hope their next target knows to defend themselves.

Other photos from the "Say Yes" rally have popped up on Flickr. The WWF managed to get my sign from the back as well as the front, while another chap cropped me out of the picture entirely:
Say yes sydney rally
(Just imagine what the nutjobs would have made of my "thumb in the pocket" pose.)
Say yes sydney rally

It Works Bitches


There are some nice crowd shots, too:
Sydney Climate Action rally, by Roy Garner

A gorgeous day in the park.

Tuesday, June 07, 2011

LOLBolt vs. Jones

My "carbon pricing works" placard was, as I mentioned yesterday, much-photographed and widely retweeted (over 150 (re)tweets and several thousand views for my photograph). A version posted by @Tadlette made it on to Andrew Bolt's blog – Bolt, if you're unfamiliar with him, is one of Australia's most well-known conservative journalists, climate sceptics, and pin-up boy for the right.
The face that launched two-hundred comments
By the time a friend alerted me the existence of Bolt's post, it had over 200 very nasty comments. I'm going to reproduce some of my favourite ones below, so if you're unsettled by that sort thing please jump down to the bold-text "Response" header (jump):
  • Combet's love child [Greg Combet, Federal Minister for Climate Change]
  • Smug superiority evident on the guy's face
  • My 10 year old daughter has more testosterone than that pathetic dweeb.
  • I wonder if ‘mummy’ also put out his clothes so he can dress himself.  
  • Someone just finished second year economics. No wonder these children are so sure of themselves, they just read a text book. Wait until you have finished third year - you’ll find out more then.  
  • Typical smug know-it-all uni student activist with NO life experience with a theoretical graph to supposedly prove his point  
  • WOW have a look at the smug look on this guy’s face...That’s it the science is settled!! I’M IN!!! And his clothes are more up to date than mine.  
  • Its the way he tilts his head that did it for me. And the grip on that broom handle......he’s done this often......a real pro.  
  • I used to say to my son “Oh to be 19 and know everything” ! 
  • Just another socialist charlatan - this time a microeconomics lackey who thinks plotting imaginary diagrams from his textbook equates to knowing more about the real world than real working Australians do. These tools should all be shipped to Venezuela.  
  • Is that Sheldon? No, he’s super-smart.  
  • Looks to me the homosexual party has hijacked the green party  
  • This reminds me… disturbingly I mite add...of similarities with the hitler youth movement !  Doing as the National Socialists did by brainwashing impressionable fools from a very early age .(climate science taught in schools ) Good to see science graduates could get time off from Mc Donalds to attend.  
  • I bet he’s a lot of fun at dinner parties! 
  • So that’s what stupid looks like 
  • I do like the look of the lad - gormless prat personified. [This is my absolute favourite!]
  • ....it looks like a twit...waddles like a twit....is a twit...ho hum...... 
  • You can tell by his age: all theory, no practice.  
  • Bitches? Who does he think he is? The love child of carbon copy Combet. Or a product of a carbon copy spurn donator..  
  • Ah, yes! The soft smile! The slightly tilted head! The earnest look! The nerdish intensity! The (ho ho ho) graph to ‘prove’ the point! 
  • Must be a Greenie! Or, at least, an undercover member of the GreenHeimeStaatsPolizei!
  • I wounder who’s bitch he is ?  
  • I wonder if this bitch will give the thousands of people out of work a job? I wonder how ‘smart’ he’d look explaining to the families who now have no work, that they are bitches? 
  • He’ll flash his funny sign, jump back into his pollution spluttering Kombi, jump out have a coffee with ‘peers’ who think just like him and tweet his higher state of being using the wireless internet mummy bought him. Then he’ll pay the barista making sure he gets the correct change. After all, when you’re on the dole, you’ve gotta account for every cent.  
  • It’s not even original - http://xkcd.com/54/
  • Hey beta male - got some bad news for you. A sign like that will NOT end your period of abstinence from rumpy pumpy…
There was also a fair bit of repetition of similar points. Several people also attacked the economics of the sign, most poorly, and all missing the point. (There was much better discussion when the Catallaxy Files reposted the image.)

Response 
I couldn't just let all this pass by, of course – no, I had to prod it with a stick:
Dear Bolters,

As the smug, gormless, homosexual (yet unfashionably dressed), know-it-all, nazi, dole-bludging, sexually-frustrated beta-male prat pictured, let me respond:

First of all, thank you all for underestimating my age and experience by up to a decade; it's very flattering to know my thrice-daily moisturising regime (organic products, made from happy plants) has shown such effect, even in the harsh sunlight causing me to squint as I faced one of the multitude of cameras immortalising my courageous attempt to educate the unwashed masses (this was a climate rally, after all).

Secondly, to the (very) few who've picked the economics of the graph with any degree of rigour: by and large, your criticisms are correct. It would be absurd to try and fit a fully-fledged and nuanced economic justification of a multi-instrument response to anthropogenic climate change on a placard, so I didn't even try. Instead, I used a simplistic graph (drawn from memory, rather than a textbook, my pseudo-intellectual superiority complex compels me to note) that would be recognisable to those who understand economics and whose principles could be easily explained to those who hadn't.
Combined with a slogan that slyly references XKCD for all the nerds out there (hold those TI-86s up high!), the phone numbers of impressionable young arts student activists scrawled on the back of my poster in crayon are a testament to my success.

Finally, you're not my target audience, so basically you can all sod off while I cycle (no Kombi; it got trashed at a bush-doof) to my local café and drink chai (much more ethical than coffee) with my socialist, testosterone-free brethren.

But thanks again for saying I look so young!

/MJ
Bolt was good enough to include my comment into his post so it could be seen by all (I say that in seriousness: good on him), and included a link to my Twitter account – I've no idea where he got that, since I didn't include it in my comment (nor supply my full name). As I also tweeted my response, though, it can't have been too difficult to find me.

At that point, I expected a deluge of nasty tweets, but so far that hasn't eventuated. (Well, one economist at the right-wing IPA told me I looked 32, but that's about as intense as the sledging has been so far.) I have received lots of support from more moderate and left-wing tweeters, though, as well as from my friends over Facebook, so that's been nice. Thank you all for that :-)

Where to now? Tadlette objected to Bolt using her photograph in the manner he did, so Bolt removed it from his post with a sarcastic comment. I offered Bolt use of my photo, but so far there's been no response. That post is now one of his "most-commented", though, and because comments on Bolt's blog require moderation there is likely a queue of comments waiting to appear. (Tadlette's photo has almost 4,000 views.) It's pointless to try and engage with his audience, but I'll leave with a few more delightful selections of the messages slung my way (after my response was published):
  • Behold the geek bearing the Tablet of Warmy Wisdom for the multitudes. Bow down and worship Gaia, you unworthy peasants.
  • I think the late Mr Squiggle could have done a more convincing job than this clown. 
  • Martin Jones seems like a good feller even if he is the epitome of your classical greenie nonce with regard to actually having knowledge of anything to do with climate change.
  • He epitomises the sneering, inner city, self-styled progressives who have hijacked the once great Labor Party. [I thought I was a Greenie? But I'm also a fag only there to pick up chicks, so whatever.]
  • Could do with a good steak and an hour in the sun. [Tell me about it.]
  • Being a sceptic, I ponder, could this be the real Martin (looking ten years younger and all), or a non-English speaking backpacker or a wandering art student pulled in as a subterfuge. [All of the above?]
  • Theo (short for Thesaurus as his mate call him) Jones knows that the very best place to pick up chicks is in these gooey “Save the Planet” thingos.

    Monday, June 06, 2011

    Carbon Pricing: it works, bitches!

    As I mentioned last Monday, the week just gone was the National Week of Action by the "Say Yes" campaign, culminating on Sunday with rallies across Australia; 10,000 turned out in Melbourne, 8,000 in Sydney, and a whopping (considering its population) 10,000 in Canberra! (I don't have figures for the other capital cities to hand.)

    I went to the rally in Sydney on a glorious Sunday morning, sporting a the following placard:
    Carbon Pricing: it works, bitches!
    On the back, I'd written:
    PRO CARBON PRICING
    Changing relative prices will
    shift consumption so long as
    any compensation is not delivered
    at the point of purchase.
    Pollution is a cost: price it in!

    The idea had come earlier in the week, when a tweet shown during the ABC Q&A program questioned the point of a carbon tax when the money was given back as compensation. The twit obviously hadn't done any high school economics or listened to the multiple explanations given over the last five years, so I irately tweeted, "One more time: Changing relative prices will shift consumption so long as any compensation is not delivered at the point of purchase."

    The sentiment proved popular, to the extent that one chap suggested putting it on a t-shirt. Fellow economist Matt Cowgill (of "What does the typical Australian earn" fame) opined, "Whack a couple of budget constraints and an indifference curve on the back and it'd be perfect."

    So... I did! On Friday, after work, I knocked up a mock-up (below), which was widely retweeted and got several hundred views when I put it up on Twitter.
    Click for larger version
    Using a cardboard box, old posters, and broken broom handle I'd all grabbed from the recycling centre, I spent a few hours constructing my placard. I think it was worth it – over 40 people took photographs of it at the rally, including a couple of professional photographers. (One was from GetUp!; dunno about the rest.) there was plenty more love from Twitter, one woman did a short video interview with me for her blog (the name of which I've forgotten), and this morning Club Troppo ran a post about it. 
    I'm glad I shaved.

    A few people asked me to explain the graph to them. It's based on some introductory microeconomics, and isn't incredibly complex, but can take a few minutes to understand. Here's a basic run-down:

    The black line represents the maximum combination of polluting and clean goods you can buy. It's your "budget constraint". The budget line is straight because the ratio at which you can exchange those products is fixed by their prices. The black curved line, A, represents a combination of products with which you are equally happy. It's curved because the more you have of one product, the less valuable it becomes, and the ratio at which you are willing to exchange products changes. The "higher" the black line is, the better, and it's highest when you consume at A*. (You can't move the black curve higher, or consume on other points along it, because that's outside what your budget constraint says you can afford.)

    A price on pollution means you can buy fewer polluting products, so the black budget line turns into the red line. When you get compensation, you can keep buying A* if you like, so the red line moves across to become the blue line. They are parallel because the ratio of the prices hasn't changed, just the amount of money you have. As you can see, on the blue budget line you can move to the higher curve B, rather than A, which is obviously better. The highest point is at B*, where you consume fewer polluting products, more clean products, and are better off! 

    Easy.

    Wednesday, April 27, 2011

    My favourite (wonk) things

    For reasons of which I'm not entirely sure, I came up with this little verse yesterday:


    Resource rent taxes, emissions reduction;
    Sovereign wealth funds, NBN construction;
    Henry's review, letting refugees in;
    These are few of my favourite things.

    More public transport and Oz: The Republic;
    Welfare for jobless not middle-class yuppies;
    Euthanasia and plain cigs packaging;
    These are few of my favourite things.

    When the polls bite, when lobbies sting, when I’m feeling sad;
    I’ll simply go on Q&A or Lateline, then I won’t feel so bad.


    My mate Wes then suggested we form The Australian Moderate Party ("The Mods" for short) and enter politics. The advertisement campaigns virtually right themselves.

    Australia's democratic pricing of CO2e

    A comment on the whole "Julia Gillard promised there would be no carbon tax before the election, therefore a carbon tax is undemocratic" tripe:

    The Australian Labor Party has a mandate to price carbon (dioxide and other greenhouse gases) – that we should be able to agree on; it's been part of their policy since pre-2007. We should also be able to agree that the act of putting a price on carbon is a bigger deal than the form that pricing mechanism takes.

    Now, if a majority Labor Government broke its promise on the form of pricing carbon, there might be a strong case to object – but Australia doesn't have a majority Labor Government. As a minority Government, Labor's "mandate" is conditional on what is acceptable to its (informal) coalition partners, the independents and the Greens. This is all perfectly within the bounds of democracy, and is utterly commonplace anywhere that has experience with coalitions (even with the National and Liberal Party coalition on occasion).

    So if you want to price carbon in a particular way, but you won't be able to price carbon at all unless you do it in a different way, is that undemocratic? Not at all – unless you think that the elected representatives of >50% of the voting population agreeing to do something is undemocratic.

    Basically: Gillard's not breaking her promise, because she has no power to keep her promise – but she can keep the most important part of her promise (the act of pricing carbon, if not the form) by compromising and cooperating with others. That, right there, is democracy.

    Tuesday, March 08, 2011

    Cross-post: Give us something to talk about

    In the course of researching the paper I'm currently co-writing at work, I felt that some of the themes – the role of risk and uncertainty in climate change, as well as robust policy responses to them – had not received enough attention in the Australia policy debate and wrote an opinion piece to that effect. It hasn't yet been published – our media office is pitching it to newspapers, who are mulling it over –, but as a result a colleague of mine (@agentdeclan) put me in touch with the editors of New Matilda, who were looking for someone to write a piece on the current (lack of) debate around the newly-released carbon pricing framework and the role of economists in that debate.

    Being a little quicker than newspapers they published it today, and I reproduce it, below.

    There's plenty of talk about the proposed carbon tax but it's short on substance - and at any rate, details are thin on the ground. Martin Jones on the role of economists in this debate
    [The title and teaser are the work of the editors]

    If you were hoping for some policy debate in federal politics last week, you were wasting your time. Since the Multi-Party Committee on Climate Change (MPCCC) announced its Carbon Price Framework (CPF) (PDF), the debate in Parliament has gone around in circles, finding its nadir in the literal rotations performed by Senator Mary Jo Fischer.

    Where once upon a time Oppositions deconstructed Government proposals in detail, building up sustained and intense critical pressure that occasionally culminated in a motion to censure the Prime Minister (the passing of which would traditionally cause a Government to resign), the current mob have virtually ignored the CPF to focus on whether Julia Gillard broke her pre-election promise to put a price on carbon in some form other than a tax. Indeed, they rolled out the censure motions with such regularity last week that the ABC started running a sweepstakes competition to guess when the suspension of standing orders would be called for.

    One problem for the Opposition is that there isn’t very much in the CPF to criticise. The document is five pages long, and lays out a rough timeframe of when the fixed-price period, flexible-price period, and discussions about the latter could occur; what sectors could be covered; and that we couldn’t use international permits during the fixed-price period. That’s pretty much it -- aside from some pleasant language about “economic transformation”, “business certainty”, and “fairness”. As Ben Eltham pointed out last week, this is a much cannier strategy than what the ALP did with the CPRS (or even with the RSPT, which, even though it had the nominal benefit of being a well-constructed piece of policy, still crashed).

    With little to criticise and not much to offer as an alternative, the Opposition resorted to hypothetical scenarios about possible food, petrol, and electricity price rises. They were forced to make assumptions about details that haven’t yet been decided, such as what the price of carbon permits will be, the extent to which the sectors will be covered, and what sort of compensation will be offered. Without these crucial details, however, you could assume pretty much anything about the carbon tax – which the Opposition (and Government in response) duly did, as did much of the media and a plethora of special interest groups (with BlueScope Steel delivering a particularly flagrant example). 

    The thing is, we’ve been here before: we had the same special interest commentary and pseudo-analysis during the debate about the CPRS, but also plenty of more formal modelling and analysis. Some of these modelling and analysis has been updated since then – Ross Garnaut, for example, is currently half-way through releasing the updates to his Review – and newer studies have been added to the body of knowledge we have. The MPCCC carbon price framework has not changed the validity of any of these studies and so, if you paid attention the first time around, there is very little in the current iteration of the debate worth paying attention to from a policy perspective – as opposed to a political perspective.

    More interesting are the frameworks established by these studies, and how the CPF fits into them. These frameworks are the contributions of experts in science, economics, sociology, law, philosophy; each discipline has its own structure, theories, body of knowledge, and a field over which it claims expertise. Sometimes these fields overlap, but more often they are complementary. When communicated well, they enrich public knowledge and enable us to better assess the arguments being put to us.

    The strength of my field, economics, in the climate change debate is in evaluating the suitability of different policy instruments to achieve a stated set of (economic) objectives – for example, under which scenarios taxes are better than quantity controls; how firms and consumers will be affected by particular cost increases; weighing up the economic costs and benefits – through the use of models of human behaviour on a large scale, including the examination of secondary, possibly unintended, effects. Stating that economics is best for economic objectives may seem a little tautological, but, well, everyone is guilty of thinking their field can do it all at one point or another.

    That we don’t have a consistent stated set of objectives or a climate policy philosophy from any party bar the Greens makes the task of the economist more difficult, of course. But, at the moment, anthropogenic climate change is widely accepted by all sides as a problem and the debate concerns the mechanism of the solution, with the CPF bearing more than a passing resemblance to proposals put forward by the Garnaut Review in 2008.

    Any final carbon pricing framework could do much worse than base itself on the Review; it addresses prices, compensation, institutional arrangements, transitions, emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries, enforcement mechanisms, innovation policy, sectoral peculiarities, broad uncertainties, and eventual global agreements, all in the Australian context. A sensible economic analysis of any future climate policy could compare it to the Review’s recommendations (or those of the updated version of the Review, due to be released in May), spot the differences, and question whether they are decisions made within the economic framework or a political framework. Chances are, many of the compensation arrangements we’ll see will not be grounded in economic reasoning – if they are sold as such.

    I have colleagues who believe that politicians’ decision-making processes are governed almost exclusively by the desire to win the next election – and sometimes it is difficult to believe otherwise. With the ALP struggling to clearly outline its core ideals and the Opposition functioning as a party of, well, opposition, their medium- and long-term goals for this country are opaque. But if we step away from the content-free zone of Question Time and offer our politicians frameworks and ideas – be they a more powerful social-justice imperative or the need for a mix of instruments in climate policy (PDF) –, perhaps they’ll take some of them up. Then we’d at least have something worth talking about.