Showing posts with label New Matilda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label New Matilda. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Cross-post: Does it make sense for Australia to restrict its export of fossil fuels?

A friend of mine wrote for the ABC about Australia taking responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions generated by the fossil fuels we export, which inspired me to sit down and sort out my views on the topic. The notion of responsibility is often bound up with the idea of refusing to export fossil fuels – an idea also often ascribed to The Greens, though I wasn't able to find it in their official policies – which is an idea I think silly. After I figured out why I thought I was silly, I put my arguments into an article format, which New Matilda published today:

Who's Responsible For Exported CO2?


By Martin Jones

Once we dig up and sell the coal, are we still responsible for the emissions? 'Stop exporting fossil fuels' isn't a good enough solution when people in developing countries need to eat and build, writes environmental economist Martin Jones


During the Rio+20 sustainable development summit, Fergus Green and Reuben Finighan last week called for Australia to take responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) it enables through its exports of fossil fuels. Is this a good idea? How would we go about it?

Green and Finighan wrote that the Australian federal government should take a broader look at the sustainability of mining, focussing on the product, not just the process; i.e. it should consider the GHG generated by fossil fuels during their whole use cycle, not just the emissions generated during the mining process.

Mining nations such Australia, Green and Finighan argue, should take responsibility for the emissions caused when their exported fossil fuels are burned; assigning responsibility to the importers only makes sense in the context of an enforceable international climate change regime in which all major emitting countries were limiting their domestic emissions in line with science-based objectives.

Australia is certainly a large player in fossil fuels. We have around 9 per cent of the world’s proven coal reserves, and in 2011 were responsible for 5.8 per cent of the world’s production – down 2.2 percentage points on 2010 – making us the world’s third-largest coal producer after China and the USA. [1] 

Not needing nearly as many fossil fuels as China or the USA, we’re the world’s largest coal exporter, accounting for around 27 per cent of global trade [2]  Including liquid natural gas (LNG) exports and accounting for currently planned projects, critics of fossil fuel exports estimate that Australian fossil fuels could be responsible for 9 per cent of global GHG emissions by 2020 – and that’s excluding any domestic emissions. [3]

If Australia takes responsibility for its exported emissions, then presumably we would need to follow the same course as for our domestic emissions and reduce them. How? The most obvious answer is, “stop exporting fossil fuels.”

That’s also a poor answer, though, at least in the short- to mid-term. It’s probably by now common knowledge that mining products are Australia’s largest export earner, and large proportion of these are fossil fuels: as of April 2012, 27.5 per cent of our merchandise exports (by value) came from mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials (primarily fossil fuels). [4]  

And though the mining industry isn’t nearly as large an employer or tax-payer as they’d like us to think – employing 2.3 per cent of the Australian workforce as of this May [5] , and paying 15 per cent of company taxes in 2009-10 [6]  – removing this revenue stream from the Australian economy would be a long and painful process.
(I refer not only to the ‘pain’ of economic transition, but also the pain the mining industry would inflict upon anyone trying to reduce their profits, and the pain Australians would go through listening to it all.)

There are moral problems to consider, too. The Australian Coal Association (ACA) lists China and India as the second- and fourth-largest importers of Australian coal; Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the first-, third-, and fifth-largest, respectively. [7] 

The ACA is not alone in expecting demand for resources from China, India, and other developing countries to increase dramatically in the next decade [8], which means refusing to export fossil fuels would make India or China’s transition to a first-world country longer and/or more expensive. A refusal to export also smacks a little of paternalism; a “we know better” attitude where we don’t trust nations to put our resources to good use.

This may well be a path we’re willing to take. There is a precedent for refusing to export resources to countries that we consider might not use them responsibly: fuels for nuclear weapons, such as uranium. Applied to fossil fuels, one could imagine a stance where Australia refuses to export coal, etc. to countries that haven’t signed sufficient agreements on low-emissions usage.

Where the consequences of the actions we enable are severe enough – burning Australia's fossil fuel reserves would take the world 60 per cent of the way to 2 degrees warming, write Green and Finighan – a degree of unilateral action can be justified.

(Given Australia now looks like exporting uranium to India despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, though, this is a weak precedent. [9]  Nor would I envy the foreign minister who has to sell such a policy to two of the world’s largest economies.)

The bigger moral problem, though, in my opinion, is a policy that would see Australia reduce our export of fossil fuels before reducing our own usage of them. For starters, our exported fuels are generally higher-quality resources that are less polluting than what we use domestically; our coal exports, for example, are almost exclusively black coal, which releases significantly less GHGs than the brown coal used in Australia (especially Victoria) for power generation.

Not only that, our fossil fuels are arguably put to better use by developing countries than they would be in Australia: building infrastructure in China or India, while it may be more carbon-intensive than here, will probably do more to improve the lives of their citizens than using those resources here would improve ours.

By no means do I wish to suggest that Australia should wash its hands of responsibility for the emissions of the resources we export: I welcome Green and Finighan’s call for Australian leadership on this issue. That fairly broad concept, however, involves some tricky questions, some – by no means all – of which I have raised here. I expect Green and Finighan’s upcoming report for Beyond Zero Emissions will address many of them, and I look forward more discussion of this issue in the future.

Thursday, September 29, 2011

Cross-post: Details of the Clean Energy Future package

About a month ago, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) asked one of my directors whether we'd like to prepare an overview of the last in Australian climate change politics for their annual report. Because I spend a lot of time following this sort of stuff and looking over the proposals from the Government, I got to take the lead on this (at least as far as the factual elements were concerned). Even though I'm only a lowly RA, my colleagues kindly decided my efforts were enough to warrant having my name listed first on our article, which I'm quietly pleased about.

After we'd sent our submission off, but before it was published (I think it comes out in October or November [UPDATE] in early November), New Matilda contacted me and asked if I'd like to summarise the details of the Clean Energy Future package – so, pretty much what we'd just done for IETA, but without the political analysis. I'm sometimes a little baffled by the things people ask me to write about, since I imagine they're of limited interest other than to wonks like myself (and wonks will probably have looked at the source material), but since I had the material fresh in my head I assented.

Here it is, then: a summary (at length) of the details of the Clean Energy Future package. I won't hold it against you if you don't read it – it's so long,  in fact, that NM split it into two parts! But if you want an explanation of the scheme, here you go.

Our Clean Energy Future Explained

The Government’s Clean Energy Future is underway, with 18 bills – the Clean Energy Legislative Package  – being introduced to Parliament on September 13th.

The legislation is lengthy and boring, but it’s important: these 18 bills (and a few more to come in the first half of next year) lay the framework for what will be the primary driver of Australia’s attempt to mitigate dangerous anthropogenic climate change – assuming they pass, of course. Ben Eltham has already taken an excellent look at the Clean Energy Future package (henceforth: CEF) for New Matilda. What follows in this article and its sequel is a summary of some of the CEF’s nitty-gritty details.

Much of my summary is based on the CEF package as it was released in July. As far as I’ve been able to tell, not much has changed in the current legislation, but if you spot any discrepancies, please comment.

The Emissions Trading Scheme
The best known, and arguable most important piece of the CEF package is an emissions trading scheme (ETS) which will begin on 1 July, 2012. Under an ETS, parties (generally companies) that emit those greenhouse gases covered by the scheme will be required to surrender permits to the Government equal to their emissions.

The ETS will cover four of the six greenhouse gases counted under the Kyoto Protocol – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and per fluorocarbon emissions from the aluminium sector. The remaining two (hydrofluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride) will face an equivalent carbon price through existing synthetic greenhouse gas legislation. To simplify things, the climate change potential of each greenhouse gas is measured in terms of how much carbon dioxide (CO2) it is equivalent to; hence the references to “CO2-e” (technical) or simply “carbon” (colloquial).

Emitters can purchase permits – officially called “carbon units” – for a tonne of CO2-e from the Government, or other participants in the ETS. During the first three years of the scheme, the price of permits will be fixed, and permits are immediately surrendered to the Government when purchased. This means that in the first phase the ETS will function very similarly to a tax, without actually being one: there is still the ability to trade, albeit at a fixed price. Non-governmental sellers of permits might be companies that have more permits than they need (see Compensation and Assistance, below), or farmers who have generated permits through the Carbon Farming Initiative (see Regulatory Bodies and Complementary Measures, below). For more on the fundamental differences between an emissions trading scheme and a tax, see Carbon Pricing 101.

Permits will cost $23 per tonne of CO2-e when the ETS begins in 2012, and will rise at 5 per cent per year (nominally); $24.15/t in 2013-14 and $25.40/t in 2014-15. From July 1, 2015, the price will be variable, and set by the market. The idea is that, by 2016, the international price of CO2-e will be around $29/t. 
No foreign permits or credits will be accepted during the fixed-price period, and a maximum of 50 per cent of a party’s obligation during the flexible-price period may be sourced internationally. Kyoto Protocol-compliant credits created under the Carbon Farming Initiative can be used for up to 5 per cent of compliance during the fixed price period. (This limit is far higher than then the number of credits the Carbon Farming Initiative is likely to produce.)

From 2015, some international permits will be allowed. These include Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), Emissions Reductions Units (ERUs), Removal Units (RMUs), and other units the Government may allow. The Government’s view is that linking to other credible trading schemes, including the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme, is in Australia’s national interest.

From 2015 to 2018 there will be a price ceiling of $20/t above the international price, and a price floor of $15/t. This is to reduce wild fluctuations and provide some measure of certainty for those who have to factor the price of carbon into their decision-making. These stabilisers will rise by 5 per cent and 4 per cent in real terms, that is, plus inflation, per year, and will be reviewed in 2017 by the Climate Change Authority (CCA). It is unclear which instrument will form the basis of this international price – will it be EU units (EUAs) or New Zealand Units (NZUs) – and to which foreign schemes the Australian ETS will be linked.

During the fixed-price period, permits allocated for free can be traded domestically or returned to the government, but not banked for use in later years. Parties that fail to surrender enough permits in a year will incur fines of 1.3 times the permit price for that year.

In the flexible-price period, an unlimited number of permits can be banked and up to 5 per cent of the current year’s liability can be met by “borrowing” from the next year’s permit vintage. Each year’s vintage of permits will be auctioned in advance by the government, and shortfalls will incur fines which are double the average permit price for that year.

ETS – Targets

Emissions caps – the maximum number of permits, and therefore emissions, permitted within the ETS each year – for the flexible-price period have not yet been decided. The lack of political agreement here is one of the reasons the ETS begins with a fixed price, but the targets will be announced in 2014 and then set five years in advance. Should no emissions cap be set by Parliament, the cap for 2015-16 will default to 38 MtCO2-e less than total emissions in 2012-13. From 2016 the default cap will be 12 MtCO2-e less than the previous year.

To put that into perspective: Treasury’s carbon price modelling estimated Australia’s emissions at 578 MtCO2-e in 2010, growing steadily, and our bipartisan target at around 527 MtCO2-e by 2020. (Non-Treasury estimates have different figures, but similar magnitudes.) The Government’s goal is to reduce Australia’s emissions by 5 per cent on 2000 levels by 2020 (up to 25 per cent depending on global action), and by 80 per cent by 2050 (previously 50 per cent) – but it’s not quite clear from the CEF package precisely how many tonnes of CO2-e that is.

Voluntary action will be taken into account when setting caps – the CCA will determine the methodology – and will be treated as additional, as will renewable electricity purchases through GreenPower. People will be able to make a tax-deductible contribution to a Pledge Fund to retire Australian carbon permits, Kyoto compliant and non-Kyoto compliant Australian Carbon Credit Units, and eligible international units.

ETS – Coverage

The ETS will fully cover emissions from stationary energy, industrial processes, fugitive emissions – which are those from coal mines or from extracting gas – and emissions from some waste. The transport sector will be partially covered: domestic aviation, shipping, rail transport, and non-transport fuels will face lower fuel tax credits or higher fuel excises (unless the companies voluntarily participate in the ETS), while household transport fuels, light vehicle business transport, and off-road fuel use by the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries will be excluded from the ETS. The Government wants to include heavy transport from 2014. (This last was rejected by the regional independent MPs. The Greens would like to include all transport.)

Roughly 60 per cent of Australia’s emissions are thus covered directly by the ETS, and two-thirds are covered indirectly (e.g. through fuel excise changes). Those companies (around 500) with facilities that have direct greenhouse gas emissions of 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e a year or more (excluding emissions from transport fuels and some synthetic greenhouse gases) must join the ETS, while others can join voluntarily. Companies may do this to profit through trading, hedge against risks, or because they would otherwise face costs such as higher fuel excises but see the opportunity to achieve their abatement more cheaply in the open market – which is the point of an ETS. Agricultural emissions, which form roughly 15 per cent of Australia’s total emissions, will be exempt, as will emissions from forestry and land-use change (e.g. conversion of bush into agricultural land).

Who Will Keep it Clean?

Regulatory Bodies and Complementary Measures

An independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) will be established to report publically on the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Beginning in February, 2014, and then every two years, it will examine all aspects of the scheme, including the price floor and ceiling, and recommend targets and emissions caps. The CCA will be made up of nine experts with a particular focus on climate science, economics, climate change mitigation, emissions trading, investment, and business, and will be chaired by Bernie Fraser (formerly head of the Reserve Bank of Australia).

The CCA’s recommendations are not binding on the government of the day, but the government must justify any difference between its legislation and the recommendations.

This is stronger independent regulation than was proposed under Kevin Rudd’s CPRS, and is complemented by a new Clean Energy Regulator and reviews by the Productivity Commission. The Productivity Commission will review industry compensation and assistance, in particular to emissions-intensive and trade-exposed industries, fuel taxation arrangements, and foreign action. The Clean Energy Regulator will combine administration of the ETS, the Carbon Farming Initiative – where farmers generate credits for storing carbon in soil or trees, or reducing/avoiding emissions –, the Renewable Energy Target, and the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System.

To encourage the construction of renewable energy generation, the CEF package will establish a Clean Energy Finance Corporation to invest – via loans or equity – $5 billion in renewable energy technologies, and $5 billion in low-pollution, and energy efficiency technologies which may include renewable energy projects. The Corporation will not invest in carbon capture and storage technology, though this is still supported by existing programs.

The Government will also establish an Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), which will provide grant-based funding for renewable energy projects. ARENA largely brings existing programs together into one organisation – and this should result in more coordinated and consistent operation of these programs. Both ARENA and the Clean Energy Finance Corporation will be independent agencies.

Australia’s Renewable Energy Target remains at 20 per cent by 2020. (Currently 8 per cent of Australia’s electricity is renewable; gas accounts for 16 per cent and coal 75 per cent.) The CEF package includes an Energy Security Fund, which will tender for bids to shut down 2000MW of highly emissions-intensive coal-fired power by 2020. The Fund will also offer transitional assistance of $5.5 billion, in the form of free permits and cash, to coal power generators facing significant asset loss. An Energy Security Council will advise the Government on emerging risks to energy security.

Compensation and Assistance

Simultaneous to the introduction of the ETS on July 1, 2012, personal tax-free thresholds will be trebled to $18,200, rising to $19,400 in 2015. This is designed to fully or over-compensate lower income households (yearly earnings of up to $30,000 for singles) for increased costs resulting from pricing CO2-e, and to partially compensate middle income households ($30-80,000 pa). Marginal tax rates for the new lower brackets will rise, so that those on higher incomes ($80,000 and above) do not pay less tax. The average increase in household costs from pricing CO2-e is expected to be $9.90 per week, with average compensation of $10.10 per week. There are also increases to the Pension, Senior Supplement for self-funded retirees, and Family Tax Benefit.

The ETS is expected to increase electricity prices by 10 per cent during its first year of operation. However, electricity prices have risen rapidly in recent years and are expected to do so in the future, largely in response to network infrastructure investment by operators; these increased prices are being conflated by many – sometimes deliberately – with the future effects of the carbon price.

Many industries covered by the ETS will receive some form of Government assistance. A Jobs and Competitiveness Program ($9.2 billion) will be available for the most emissions-intensive sectors (primarily manufacturing and heavy industry), with a Clean Technology Program ($1.2 billion) for less emissions-intensive sectors, and further programs for small businesses and supply chains. Most assistance will be in the form of free permits, the rest in grants.

Emission-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries will receive:
  • 94.5 per cent of their expected permit requirement for industries with average baseline of at least 2,000 tCO2-e/$m revenue or 6,000t CO2-e/$m value-added
  • 66 per cent of their expected permit requirement for industries with average baseline of at least 1,000 tCO2-e/$m revenue or 3,000t CO2-e/$m value added
  • 50 per cent of their expected permit requirement for the LNG industry
A trade-exposed industry is one whose value of imports and exports to domestic production exceeds 10 per cent, and that demonstrates a lack of capacity to pass through costs due to the potential for international competition.

Baseline for the free permits will be the historic industry average level of emissions per unit of production, and are based on those from the CPRS (including the extra free permits added as a “recession buffer” in 2009). Assistance will reduce 1.3 per cent each year, and be reviewed by the Productivity Commission from 2014-15 onwards with a view to winding assistance back to the levels suggested in the 2011 Garnaut Review.

The CEF package also includes an Energy Security Fund, which will tender for bids to shut down 2000MW of highly emissions-intensive coal-fired power by 2020. The Fund will also offer transitional assistance of AU$5.5 billion, in the form of free permits and cash, to coal power generators facing significant asset loss. An Energy Security Council will advise the Government on emerging risks to energy security.

In addition to the assistance described above, the Government plans to give the coal sector $1.3 billion over six years for “gassy” mines – those with high levels of fugitive emissions. The steel industry will also receive $300 million over five years. This assistance is separate to the CEF package, as not all members of the MPCCC agreed with it.

The CEF is highly likely to pass both Houses of Parliament before the end of the year, and then the next challenge beckons: implementation. I, for one, look forward to it.

These articles draw on material prepared for an upcoming annual report by the International Emissions Trading Association [http://www.ieta.org/].

Sunday, August 07, 2011

Cross-post: Implicit visions of Australia's future

I'm a few days putting this up here, but on Thursday I had another article published at New Matilda. They called it "Finally! Climate Policies Explained", but I wasn't actually trying to write an 'explainer' piece; instead, I was inspired by an article by Fergus Green to ponder the differences between what Australian political parties are saying about climate change and what they're doing. (Subsequent Twitter discussions between Fergus, Declan Kuch and myself also provided several ideas.)

The link to Fergus' article didn't make the NM editing cut, but I've restored it in my version, below (as well as one or two other bits I thought worth keeping, even if it does make the article slightly clunkier.)

What are the visions of Australia’s future reflected in our parties’ policies?

When the Government released its climate change package on July 10, it was under the moniker of a “Clean Energy Future”. This is, ostensibly, a fairly clear vision for where Labor sees Australia in 2050 and beyond. However, as Fergus Green rightly points out, the package is a mish-mash of measures that don’t deliver clear policy signals to achieve this clean energy future. While this is partially a result of the multi-party committee that spawned the package, the rhetoric the Government employs is ambiguous as to precisely what sort of society they see Australia moving toward.

But where are we really going with all this? If the world follows the suggestions of science and reduces CO2-e emissions to constrain dangerous climate change, what place is this future do our parties foresee?

There are five basic possibilities, relating to our emissions levels relative to our global entitlement and how we approach any excess/shortfall:
  1. Australia emits less than its global entitlement of CO2-e, and exports its remainder.(1)
  2. As above, but we don’t export the remainder.
  3. Australia emits at or about its share of CO2-e – a balanced carbon budget, if you like.
  4. Australia emits more than its global share of CO2-e, and offsets the difference by importing allowances/offsets from other countries.
  5. As above, but we don’t import (enough) to cover our excess emissions.
Note that these are possibilities for some stabilised-emissions future (2050 and beyond), without defining the transition path there-to.

Both the approach to calculating Australia’s right to CO2-e emissions and the position vis-à-vis offsetting domestic emissions internationally are predominantly moral decisions, even if they are underpinned by science, economics, law, and so on.

Following the argument that each person should have an equal right to the use of the global environment, which seems a sensible and equitable approach, Australia’s entitlement to emit CO2-e should be based our share of the global population. (Perhaps a little less, if you take our disproportionate historical use of the atmosphere into consideration.)

The 2011 Garnaut Review estimated that global per capita emissions would need to fall to less than two tonnes of CO2-e per year to stop CO2-e concentrations rising altogether, with even lower levels required to reduce concentrations. One to two tonnes of CO2-e per person per year seems a ballpark figure for our entitlement, then.

Offsetting domestic emissions internationally should, scientifically, be a non-issue: if the processes are of equal quality, arguing about whether Australian emissions should be offset by projects in Australia or Borneo is equivalent to arguing over offsetting in Queensland versus Tasmania; the climate responds equally well to both. And while the processes to offset emissions in Australia and Borneo are not of the same quality, we can restrict the import of foreign offsets to those that meet the relevant standards of additionality, verifiability, and so forth. This would be little different, in principle, to Australia’s importing of foodstuffs or consumer goods only from foreign companies certified to have a certain quality standard of production.

Where quality is equal, it would seem most efficient to choose the lowest cost abatement, which will probably not be in Australia. Investing in higher-cost domestic options, however, could establish new industries that prove more efficient in the long run, similar to the way Germany is fostering its solar and wind power industries. While Australia will end up importing some of our future offset and abatement technology – we simply aren’t large enough to develop everything ourselves –, a strong local market might have kept talents such as Dr. Zhongreng Shi or David Mills in Australia rather than watch them found their solar PV companies in China and the USA, respectively.

There are also the arguments that Australia should not achieve its entire net emissions reduction by shifting the work overseas. One argument involves equity: if foreign offsets are sold through intermediaries, is the money going to the end producers or the intermediaries? If it’s the intermediaries, would we prefer the money went to Australians, instead?  Another argument is that countries have an ethical responsibility to abate their own emissions (PDF). Such arguments for domestic abatement are broadly accepted (see Article 6(d) of the Kyoto Protocol, for example), though to varying degrees.

So: how do the climate policies of Australia’s political parties fit into the above framework?

Vision 1 – Low Emissions, Exporting Surplus

This is the vision of The Greens, and the clearest of the major parties. A goal of The Greens’ climate change policy is “to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as is feasible and by no later than 2050”. Emitting zero is obviously less than our entitlement, which leaves the question of trading our surplus allowances/abatement. Since The Greens are comfortable with the MPCCC proposal of importing up to 50% of permits required under the ETS – though only, they stress, permits of the highest quality that do not replace serious domestic action –, they would presumably also be comfortable exporting any surplus we might have. (Assuming, of course, that our own abatement is of the highest quality!)

Part of The Greens’ vision is a low-impact lifestyle: less energy use, less driving, less flying, more public transport use, less logging, etc. Such lifestyle change might not be absolutely necessary to reach a low-emissions scenario, but it would certainly be more difficult without it.

Vision 2 – Low Emissions, Not Exporting Surplus

While a part of the environmental movement (and The Greens) might be against Australia enabling the emissions of other countries – similar to current calls to stop fossil fuel exports –, this scenario is unrealistic. It would require explicitly rejecting a potentially quite large revenue stream, which Australian businesses are famously vociferous opposed to, and a significant change in public attitudes toward actions that might be primarily symbolic.

In particular, if Australia achieves low net emissions via plentiful offset generation rather than low gross emissions, it would be radical to ban the generating companies from selling their offsets overseas. To a certain extent, this vision seeks to impose a lifestyle choice upon other countries by limiting their options – such a vision is not always wrong (most people would be happy limiting certain countries’ access to nuclear weapons, for example), but it is controversial.

Vision 3 – Medium Emissions, Balanced Over Cycle

The use of the term “balanced” here is deliberate: this future sees Australia emitting at or about its share of global CO2-e emissions, trading allowances as and when economic or natural fluctuations require us to, but striving to maintain a roughly equal quantity of CO2-e imports and exports over time. Unlike other budgets, however, there is no pressing need that this one sum to zero over time; that would purely be a matter of preference.

Vision 4 – High Emissions, With Imported Offsets/Allowances

This is the ALP’s position – probably. It’s difficult to tell. Labor’s rhetoric has been about cutting pollution, supporting jobs, remaining competitive, increasing efficiency, and moving toward clean energy. These are all laudable goals, but jobs and competition have little to do with the climate and it’s unclear how clean the ALP’s energy future is, exactly. The Government’s long-term target of 80% reduction of CO2-e emissions versus 2000 levels by 2050 is one of the more concrete figures, but will still almost certainly lead to a future Australia that emits more than its global share.

Climate protection is not part of Labor’s core ideals. Though it’s not said so explicitly, implicit in the ALP’s rhetoric about maintaining our standard of living and its stance toward imported emissions (80% of required permits allowed under the CPRS; 50% under the current proposal) is a vision of an Australia that uses its wealth to pay other (poorer) nations to offset higher domestic consumption of CO2-e. Labor might be interested fuelling our current consumption model differently, but it’s not particularly interested in changing the style in which we live as The Greens are; the choice is for “cheaper, rather than deeper” action, to borrow a phrase.

Vision 5 – High Emissions, Without Imports

It seems harsh to ascribe this vision to the entirety of the Liberal and National parties, as it is certainly not shared by all their members. Under the current leadership, however, this is the Coalition’s vision. Its direct action plan is nonsense and won’t achieve 5% emissions reductions by 2020 under the proposed spending cap, while Liberal policy documents don’t even include a target for 2050 or beyond.

Though a theoretical commitment to 100% domestic action sounds very responsible, Tony Abbott’s tendency to frame his public opinion on climate change based largely on the views of his audience at the time (contravening common sense, his own history, and physics along the way) makes the idea that he has an underlying commitment to significant action roughly as likely as Alan Jones having an underlying commitment to fair and balanced reporting.

Between the, let’s call it ‘intellectual flexibility’ of Tony Abbott and his Shadow Minister for Climate Action, Greg Hunt, so long as no Australian is monetarily worse off – never mind the environmental costs, or the rest of the world – it seems the L/NP vision is to plant some fig trees for their metaphorical leaves and let someone else sort out the problem.


The examples here are not definitive of each category. Malcolm Turnbull’s vision, for example, sees lower emissions than Tony Abbot’s and could share a category with The Greens or the ALP, but differs from theirs in its greater emphasis on carbon capture and storage technologies, as well as a more explicit recognition of the need to manage risk and uncertainty. Similarly, Paul Frijters’ “Give up, or hope for a technological miracle” stance would fall into the same category as the Coaltion vision, though he expressly rejects their direct action policy. (And the ALP’s policy, too, to be fair.)

Which type of future you prefer is entirely your choice. But don’t kid yourself: the Coalition (under Abbott) aren’t really interested in a low-carbon economy; the ALP would like a low-carbon economy, but only where it’s not too difficult; and the Greens sincerely want a zero-carbon economy, but will want to change your lifestyle to achieve that. It’d be nice if they said it – but most voters only want so much honesty from their politicians.

(1) This needn’t be an allowance as under a global emissions trading scheme with binding national targets and permit allocations, but could simply be a level of domestic CO2-e offsetting in excess of the local demand that’s then traded abroad.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Cross-post: Robust Response to Climate Change Risk and Uncertainty

When I started working my "climate change is about risk" paper, I was driven to try and bring some of the issues involved into the public arena, because I don't think they get enough of a run. (Understandably, perhaps – risk and uncertainty aren't sexy top[ics.) I wrote a short, tight opinion piece, with invaluable advice from an ex-colleague and communication professional, Nicole Trick Steinbach. Since it was my first attempt at an op-ed, I also ran it past a few colleagues, which resulted in some good tips but also took ages. Finally, I gave it to my department's media office, who attempted to "place" it with a newspaper or similar.

Sadly, they failed, but in the interim I'd started writing for New Matilda, and when they asked me to comment on the latest update on climate change science from the Australian Climate Change Commission earlier this week, I decided that would be a good chance to recycle the article. It was published yesterday, and I reproduce it, below:

Risk Rising, Uncertainty Falling

The suggestion by sceptics that we should not act on climate change because the science is uncertain is at odds with sensible management of risk and uncertainty, writes environmental economist Martin Jones

Australia needs a robust response to climate change that explicitly recognises risk and uncertainty to make us more resilient to the range of possible future situations. Coverage of the Australian Climate Commission’s science update, The Critical Decade, and an interim report into Public Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses to Climate Change in Australia and Great Britain have made it clear that this issue is still not fully understood.

Doing nothing in response to climate change exposes us to uncertainty: it is betting that what we currently have is able to cope with whatever the future throws at us. Like choosing clothes for a week-long trip based on today’s weather, it may work – but it would make more sense to prepare by a) finding out what the weather is forecast to be; and b) packing clothes that can adapt to all sorts of weather, in case the predictions are wrong. (Melburnians know all about this.)

Uncertainty should be distinguished from risk: risk is the combination of the likelihood of an (unwanted) event occurring and the severity of its consequences. Where the likelihood or severity are not precisely known, the predictions can be expressed in terms of probabilities; when the Climate Commission talks about “1-in-100 year events” (such as floods), they are describing risk, just as a meteorologist’s “chance of rain” describes risk.

Uncertainty is when we don’t know the risks; when we don’t know how probable an event is. (Some would argue that this describes meteorologists, but let’s be kind.) When opponents of action against climate change argue that there is “uncertainty around climate change”, they are technically correct – but it’s not that we don’t know that it’s going to get worse; we just don’t know how much worse it’s going to get.

An example is the Climate Commission’s projection of global average sea-level rises of 0.5 to 1.0 metre in 2100 compared to 1990, which would result in an increased frequency (higher risk) of high sea-level events (floods) in coastal areas. The Commission openly admits that uncertainty surrounds this figure, but that simply means we do not currently know which areas will have five, which will have ten, and which will have 100 times as many high-sea level events, not that this increase won’t occur.

If I belabour this point, it is because 56% of Australians recently surveyed by Griffith University and Cardiff University about their risk perceptions agree that the effects of climate change are uncertain, and 42% are unsure about or disagree with the notion of scientific consensus on climate change. (Source (PDF), Appendix Questions 12i, 12j, 28)  As The Critical Decade points out (PDF):
  • On a timescale of multiple decades to centuries, the Earth is warming, and at a very fast rate by geological standards. There is no doubt about this statement.
  • Human emissions of greenhouse gases are the primary factor triggering observed climate change since at least the mid 20th century. The IPCC attached 90% certainty to that statement in 2007; research over the past few years has strengthened our confidence in this statement even more.
  • Many uncertainties surround projections of the particular risks that climate change poses for human societies and natural and managed ecosystems, however, the number and magnitude of climate risks will rise as the climate warms further.
More positively, the Griffith/Cardiff University study (PDF) found that 71% of Australian respondents were personally convinced that climate change is really happening”; 90% believed that human activities were playing a causal role in climate change; 66% reported that they were “very concerned” or “fairly concerned” about climate change; and less than 6% of respondents could be characterised as being disbelievers or strong sceptics with respect to the reality of current climate change and/or the causal role of human activities and environmental impacts.

So what to do? When you know what the future will be (or can accurately predict it), taking a “big bet” of action or inaction will bring the biggest payoff – but only if the bet is correct. Under uncertainty, a robust strategy is better: one that has an acceptable outcome regardless of what happens by hedging against possible futures (even if that outcome isn’t as good as if we’d guessed correctly). Robust strategy is generally adaptable, and involves building the capability (technological, political, and institutional) to recognise the signs that we need to react and to do so quickly. 

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is an example of robust policy: though we have no certainty about the location, timing, or nature of future conflicts, the ADF maintains a range of units and institutions with different capabilities to be able to respond quickly with whatever strategy is most appropriate. The wait-and-see approach, on the other hand, is more akin to New South Wales’ action on infrastructure, where little is done until the system is at breaking point and fixing it will take years.

The suggested course of (in)action – business as usual – from those who claim there is doubt about climate change is thus at odds with sensible management of risk and uncertainty. When you're uncertain, you prepare by hedging your bets, not by taking a punt on the non-occurrence of catastrophe.

The more certain we are that dangerous climate change is occurring – and The Critical Decade is more certain than any report before it –, the more we should invest in anticipatory measures such as emissions reduction or adaptive measures to cope with the foreseen changes. The less certain we are, the more we should explore reactive measures that allow us to improve our level of knowledge (e.g. through environmental science) and act quickly once we have become certain (e.g. through environmental technologies, similar to those encouraged by the innovation programs scrapped a few months ago by the Gillard Government). But doing little or nothing about climate change is a course we should take only if we are completely certain that climate change is NOT occurring. And less than 6% of Australians believe that.

Regardless of your view on the correct level of a carbon price, having an appropriate emissions trading scheme gives us the crucial capability to control emissions, should we need to. Effective technological and innovation policy can give the capability to reduce or even reverse CO2e emissions, should we need to, and a sensible combination of an ETS, technology programs, and other policies will be more robust than any of these alone. Given the time lags inherent in the climate system, reducing our scientific, technological, political, and institutional response times is especially valuable; so, too, is the “learning-by-doing” effect. These strategies benefit us simply by protecting us against uncertainty, even if the worst-case scenarios don’t come to pass – and especially if they do.

Both proponents and sceptics view the risks and uncertainties involved in climate change with concern. Let’s deal with that uncertainty by implementing robust policies to secure Australia’s future under all foreseeable eventualities.



Several of the <6% have come out to comment on the piece. My favourite so far is the guy who calls carbon pricing an "unproven energy and market experiment" (as if the EU and New Zealand didn't exist), and claims that 10% of the "carbon tax money go round" will be "syphoned (sic) off to the UN". I actually laughed out loud at that.

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Cross-post: Carbon Pricing 101

New Matilda were very pleased with my first article and the response thereto, and asked me to write a second, a sort of "carbon tax explainer". I think that these sort of explainer pieces are a dime a dozen, but perhaps I'm biased because I've studied and work in this area. In any case, the editor said some very flattering things, so I wrote this for her:

Carbon Tax 101


Confused about the difference between a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme? Martin Jones explains how the two mechanisms work - and how they differ.
The issue has been on the public agenda for several years but it still seems that the differences between a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme (ETS) are not fully understood. With too many commentators focussing on the details and neglecting the basics, this is perhaps understandable. So follow me, gentle reader, through some introductory environmental economics as I explain how carbon taxes and ETSs work — and how they differ. (Shane Wright has recently written an excellent overview of other aspects of the issue.)

The primary goals of taxes are usually one or more of the following: to raise revenue; to encourage or discourage certain forms of behaviour; to redistribute income or wealth; or to simplify the tax system. The goal of a carbon tax (or ETS) is primarily to discourage behaviour that generates emissions of carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gasses (GHGs)) into the atmosphere.

The emission of GHGs is, in economic parlance, an "externality": it’s a cost or benefit resulting from an action that directly affects someone external to (that is, not involved in) the action. When my neighbour, a bakery, bakes a pie, I enjoy its fresh smell from my balcony; when my other neighbour, a restaurant, fries something, I suffer through the fumes. In neither case do my neighbours take my welfare into account when baking or frying things; my costs or benefits are external to their decisions. 

Put another way, when there are external costs (or benefits), the private costs or benefits of those involved in an action are different to the costs or benefits for society as a whole. When private costs equal social costs, what is best for the individual is also best for society. With externalities, that’s not the case. 

GHGs affect society through their contribution to climate change. The costs to society are different — most probably greater — than the costs to the individual causing the emissions: there is therefore an externality. The individual makes decisions that are best for him or her (burning lots of petrol, using lots of coal-fired electricity), but not best for society. 

We can correct this problem by making the private costs equal the social costs again. There are several methods of doing so, one of which is to increase the private costs by taxing the offending behaviour. This is the thinking behind a carbon tax. 

However, it can be difficult to know precisely what the difference between private and social costs is — set the tax too low, and behaviour doesn’t change enough; too high, and it changes too much. Where the desired level of behaviour is better known than the cost difference, it can be easier to create permits — representing the right to engage in the behaviour — and, just like a sharemarket, let people trade permits between each other to determine the price. This is the thinking behind an emissions (permit) trading scheme. 

The fundamental difference between a carbon tax and an ETS is therefore whether you restrict behaviour using prices or quantities, respectively. The same outcome can be achieved using either mechanism, but, depending on the circumstances, one instrument can have advantages over the other. 

In 1974, the well-respected environmental economist Martin Weitzman compared price and quantity instruments (taxes and permit trading) when the costs and benefits are uncertain, and came to the conclusion that price controls for pollution are better when the costs of pollution reduction increase relatively faster than the benefits (and vice versa). 

Whether the costs or benefits of reducing GHG emissions rise faster is, literally, an academic debate, but if the climate has "tipping points" (such massively increasing costs when a certain level of GHGs is reached), then — economically as well intuitively — it would be better to restrict emissions to a level so that this tipping point is not reached, and let the market determine what the appropriate price for that quantity of permits is. (Weitzman wrote a further excellent, if technical piece on the economic uncertainties of climate change in 2007.) 

There are other relative strengths and weaknesses (pdf) of taxes and trading schemes. Taxes can be simpler as well as easier to implement and administer than trading schemes; all companies have established structures for dealing with tax requirements, but few are used to trading permits. Tax levels are generally stable and predictable, while permit prices can be volatile (though well-designed trading schemes avoid this: after initial turbulences, prices in the EU ETS (pdf) have been stable over the past two years). Domestic emissions trading schemes can be linked with foreign schemes to provide international price and quantity harmonisation, which is not possible with a tax. An ETS would also be counter-cyclical, with prices falling in a downturn (as production and demand for permits falls), and rising in an upturn (as production and demand for permits rises); taxes remain constant throughout. 

It’s important to note that choosing either an ETS or tax does not affect decisions about coverage or compensation. Industries can be excluded from either; they can receive free permits, lower tax rates, or tax-free thresholds (like the thresholds in income tax). In both cases the costs will initially fall on businesses, who will choose to absorb them or to pass them on to consumers. Again these choices are independent of the scheme selected. And revenues can be used to compensate those consumers under either scheme — provided permits are sold and not all given away. 

These are all details the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee (MPCCC) has yet to finalise for its carbon pricing framework. Increasing the cost of GHG emissions then compensating consumers for those costs can still change behaviour, since the prices of polluting goods and services will rise relative to the cleaner alternatives and influence consumers’ decisions about which to purchase in favour of the relatively cheaper, cleaner options. 

Both schemes have problems. In each case, they can be solved. It is extremely unlikely that, whichever instrument is chosen, the initial design will be perfect; in the first phase of the EU ETS, the permit price dropped to almost zero, and the Rudd-era Carbon Polluting Reduction Scheme (CPRS) contained far too much compensation for industries. There is quite a bit of learning by doing. 

In that sense, the MPCCC’s hybrid scheme isn’t such a bad idea; after a few years under a simple scheme, during which companies and the Government figure out how this whole carbon pricing thing works with a fixed price (and realise it isn’t the end of the world), we can move to a more complicated, but hopefully more effective ETS.



The article on New Matilda is worth checking out just for the wonderful picture of a contemplative Wayne Swan (our current Treasurer) they've chosen to accompany the piece.

Tuesday, March 08, 2011

Cross-post: Give us something to talk about

In the course of researching the paper I'm currently co-writing at work, I felt that some of the themes – the role of risk and uncertainty in climate change, as well as robust policy responses to them – had not received enough attention in the Australia policy debate and wrote an opinion piece to that effect. It hasn't yet been published – our media office is pitching it to newspapers, who are mulling it over –, but as a result a colleague of mine (@agentdeclan) put me in touch with the editors of New Matilda, who were looking for someone to write a piece on the current (lack of) debate around the newly-released carbon pricing framework and the role of economists in that debate.

Being a little quicker than newspapers they published it today, and I reproduce it, below.

There's plenty of talk about the proposed carbon tax but it's short on substance - and at any rate, details are thin on the ground. Martin Jones on the role of economists in this debate
[The title and teaser are the work of the editors]

If you were hoping for some policy debate in federal politics last week, you were wasting your time. Since the Multi-Party Committee on Climate Change (MPCCC) announced its Carbon Price Framework (CPF) (PDF), the debate in Parliament has gone around in circles, finding its nadir in the literal rotations performed by Senator Mary Jo Fischer.

Where once upon a time Oppositions deconstructed Government proposals in detail, building up sustained and intense critical pressure that occasionally culminated in a motion to censure the Prime Minister (the passing of which would traditionally cause a Government to resign), the current mob have virtually ignored the CPF to focus on whether Julia Gillard broke her pre-election promise to put a price on carbon in some form other than a tax. Indeed, they rolled out the censure motions with such regularity last week that the ABC started running a sweepstakes competition to guess when the suspension of standing orders would be called for.

One problem for the Opposition is that there isn’t very much in the CPF to criticise. The document is five pages long, and lays out a rough timeframe of when the fixed-price period, flexible-price period, and discussions about the latter could occur; what sectors could be covered; and that we couldn’t use international permits during the fixed-price period. That’s pretty much it -- aside from some pleasant language about “economic transformation”, “business certainty”, and “fairness”. As Ben Eltham pointed out last week, this is a much cannier strategy than what the ALP did with the CPRS (or even with the RSPT, which, even though it had the nominal benefit of being a well-constructed piece of policy, still crashed).

With little to criticise and not much to offer as an alternative, the Opposition resorted to hypothetical scenarios about possible food, petrol, and electricity price rises. They were forced to make assumptions about details that haven’t yet been decided, such as what the price of carbon permits will be, the extent to which the sectors will be covered, and what sort of compensation will be offered. Without these crucial details, however, you could assume pretty much anything about the carbon tax – which the Opposition (and Government in response) duly did, as did much of the media and a plethora of special interest groups (with BlueScope Steel delivering a particularly flagrant example). 

The thing is, we’ve been here before: we had the same special interest commentary and pseudo-analysis during the debate about the CPRS, but also plenty of more formal modelling and analysis. Some of these modelling and analysis has been updated since then – Ross Garnaut, for example, is currently half-way through releasing the updates to his Review – and newer studies have been added to the body of knowledge we have. The MPCCC carbon price framework has not changed the validity of any of these studies and so, if you paid attention the first time around, there is very little in the current iteration of the debate worth paying attention to from a policy perspective – as opposed to a political perspective.

More interesting are the frameworks established by these studies, and how the CPF fits into them. These frameworks are the contributions of experts in science, economics, sociology, law, philosophy; each discipline has its own structure, theories, body of knowledge, and a field over which it claims expertise. Sometimes these fields overlap, but more often they are complementary. When communicated well, they enrich public knowledge and enable us to better assess the arguments being put to us.

The strength of my field, economics, in the climate change debate is in evaluating the suitability of different policy instruments to achieve a stated set of (economic) objectives – for example, under which scenarios taxes are better than quantity controls; how firms and consumers will be affected by particular cost increases; weighing up the economic costs and benefits – through the use of models of human behaviour on a large scale, including the examination of secondary, possibly unintended, effects. Stating that economics is best for economic objectives may seem a little tautological, but, well, everyone is guilty of thinking their field can do it all at one point or another.

That we don’t have a consistent stated set of objectives or a climate policy philosophy from any party bar the Greens makes the task of the economist more difficult, of course. But, at the moment, anthropogenic climate change is widely accepted by all sides as a problem and the debate concerns the mechanism of the solution, with the CPF bearing more than a passing resemblance to proposals put forward by the Garnaut Review in 2008.

Any final carbon pricing framework could do much worse than base itself on the Review; it addresses prices, compensation, institutional arrangements, transitions, emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries, enforcement mechanisms, innovation policy, sectoral peculiarities, broad uncertainties, and eventual global agreements, all in the Australian context. A sensible economic analysis of any future climate policy could compare it to the Review’s recommendations (or those of the updated version of the Review, due to be released in May), spot the differences, and question whether they are decisions made within the economic framework or a political framework. Chances are, many of the compensation arrangements we’ll see will not be grounded in economic reasoning – if they are sold as such.

I have colleagues who believe that politicians’ decision-making processes are governed almost exclusively by the desire to win the next election – and sometimes it is difficult to believe otherwise. With the ALP struggling to clearly outline its core ideals and the Opposition functioning as a party of, well, opposition, their medium- and long-term goals for this country are opaque. But if we step away from the content-free zone of Question Time and offer our politicians frameworks and ideas – be they a more powerful social-justice imperative or the need for a mix of instruments in climate policy (PDF) –, perhaps they’ll take some of them up. Then we’d at least have something worth talking about.