Showing posts with label policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label policy. Show all posts

Friday, February 01, 2013

Australia’s carbon market at stake in September election

I'm quoted in the current issue of the Point Carbon ANZ newsletter, regarding the recently announced Australian federal election and Australia's climate policy. The story can be found via the above link; my full response to Stian Reklev is below.


Questions: 
1. In the international climate policy context, what would be the main difference between a Labor win vs a Coalition win?

2a. Is Tony Abbott likely to eliminate the ETS and institute his Direct Action plan instead, and can it easily be done?
2b. If Abbott does, how would this impact Australia’s domestic emissions profile?

3. If Abbott wins, would that mean Australia disappearing from the scene as one of the main advocates for an international carbon market?

Answers:
The Coalition’s lack of detailed policies make their actions difficult to predict, but it’s unlikely that a Coalition government would continue Australia’s recent run of strong international climate action advocacy, especially as far as international carbon markets are concerned.

While both Labor and the Coalition support international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as the Kyoto protocol, only Labor has recently supported joint global action to establish emissions trading schemes. Members of the Coalition have repeatedly been less than favourable toward foreign efforts to reduce or offset emissions. See e.g.
  • “in countries or organisations with less developed and less scrupulous administrative cultures [than Australia] the scope for corruption is obvious ... This is a market based on the non-delivery of an invisible product to no one, and is almost certain to be scammed” (Source)
  • “Australian businesses are going to have to spend more than $3 billion a year purchasing abatements from abroad - and we all know the potential for fraud, the potential for scamming.'' (Source)
  • “If such a sophisticated market as Norway is facing a $5 billion fraud, how will Australians know if that money is actually reducing emissions or is it going into the pockets of criminals? ... We will reduce emissions by 700 million tonnes by purchasing abatement in Australia that will clean up our own environment rather than sending money overseas.” (Source)
  • “[The Prime Minister] must also detail the measures and safeguards which will have to be put in place to ensure that the tens of billions of Australian taxpayer dollars committed to purchasing international carbon credits do not end up in the clutches of the carbon cowboys.” (Source)
  • “We aren’t reducing our emissions, we are just engaging in a massive transfer of wealth from this country to carbon traders overseas.” (Source)
  • “emissions reduction [based on foreign carbon credits] can easily turn out to be a real life version of the emperor’s new clothes” (Source)

While I again flag the lack of detail, the abatement policies suggested by the Coalition, such as direct action, likely wouldn’t offer as much abatement potential as a carbon price, cover as much of Australia’s emissions, and would likely cost more for what they would deliver. The DA and Emissions Reduction Fund at the moment seem to be essentially the same policies that the Coalition took into the last election, and they were heavily criticised at the time for focussing on a very narrow subset of options, not being scalable to achieve larger abatement, and exploiting only the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of emissions reduction while not prompting the deeper changes needed to decarbonise the Australian economy over the long term.

Change in the electricity sector will continue, as it is currently being driven more by the RET than by the carbon price, but the advancement of other low-carbon technologies risk stalling if efforts to provide a coherent regulatory and investment environment, such as through the CEFC, are wound down as promised. Trying instead to advance individual technologies is difficult: research and development of CCS, which the Coalition strongly supports, has been negligible despite the $400 million Global CCS Institute set up under Rudd.

If the Coalition win government in September, and follow their stated promise, they will introduce legislation to repeal the carbon price. This would pass the House of Representatives, but would presumably fail in the Senate where Labor and The Greens will still hold balance of power until at least 1 July 2014, when the senators elected in the 2013 election will take their places. Unless the Coalition win the election in landslide, Labor and The Greens will probably still control the Senate on 1 July 2014, and therefore be able to block the repeal of the carbon price.

To gain control of the Senate, a Coalition government would need to introduce their legislation (after 1 July 2014), have it blocked, wait three months, reintroduce it, and have it blocked a second time before being able to call a double dissolution election. Assuming they manage all this in 2014, Senators elected at that election would take their places on 1 July 2015.

Repealing the carbon price would be an incredibly tortuous process legislatively, for the public, and most of all for the businesses wondering whether they need to account for their liabilities under the existing carbon price, some replacement scheme, or nothing at all.

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Why drop the price floor? Taking a gamble on the EU ETS

I couldn't make much at first  of today's announcement by Greg Combet, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, that Australia was going to link its ETS with the EU ETS – and oh, by the way, we're dropping the price floor.

That Australia and the EU will link their schemes good news, but it's an expected development. Dropping the price floor, on the hand, had been speculated about (notably by the AFR; well done, Marcus Priest), but wasn't part of the original plan.

As I wrote back in May, a price floor has some good things going for it, despite being technically challenging; and as it's only regulation the government has the numbers to pass it even against Rob Oakeshott's opposition. So my initial reaction was that the floor price had been put in the "too hard" basket and the ETS linkage was just used to disguise that announcement somewhat.

I've since heard, however, that dropping the price floor was a condition of the EU agreeing to link the schemes, and Australia replaced it with the restriction of foreign units. This makes more sense.

The EU currently has an oversupply of permits (European Union Allowances; EUAs), and will have for a quite a few years yet, so it would welcome a new source of demand: Australia. (Even if our purchase volumes aren't that great in the scheme of things.) An Australian price floor would not only lessen demand for EUAs, it would also make integrating the schemes more complex.

The price floor, though, was there to stop the Australian market being flooded by cheap foreign permits; to give domestic sources of investment into potential abatement (or offsets) the certainty that they would be able to get at least $15 for their product. What fulfils that role?

Well, we've moved from a price restriction to a (sort-of) quantity restriction. Previously, entities could meet up to 50% of their AU ETS liabilities with foreign units, but the only foreign units decided upon were those from the Kyoto Protocol: CERs, ERUs, and RMUs. The CDM market is currently even more oversupplied than the EUA market, and prices are down, down, down;(1) well below the $15 price floor.

Now, the 50% limit on international units is still there, but only 12.5% (of total liabilities) can be met by Kyoto units. Once that limit is reached, the relevant price domestic permits (ACUs) and offsets (ACCUs) have to compete against is that of EUAs. (Remember that the large amount of free permits – I don't have exact figures, but it's around 30-40% of our cap, I think; leave a comment if you've better info – lowers the effective size of the domestic market, so the 50% international unit cap isn't as strict as it sounds.)

That 12.5% limit suits not only the EU, since the EUAs don't have to compete against the Kyoto units for the other 37.5%, but also suits  those like The Greens who want the carbon price to rise over time: they expect the EUA price to rise over time, pulling ACU/ACCU prices with it. It's not a bad gamble – certainly, I think the chance of EUA prices rising above $15 is higher than that of CDM prices doing so. (Exchange rates play a role in all this as well, but I'm buggered if I know which way they're going.)

Limiting Kyoto units also does a little bit to allay concerns about the additionality of some of those units, though it's a fairly blunt instrument; a quantity control is not a quality control.

That's the policy side of things. On the politics side, the EU ETS integration/no price floor does some interesting things. The lack of an auction price floor and international surrender charge (which together constitute the 'price floor' we've been discussing) could well reduce government revenue from the carbon price; it depends on what the EUA price does.

More interestingly, though, I think the EU integration and lack of a price floor will make the AU ETS appeal more to free market types, especially since at first glance it looks like providing opportunities for cheaper abatement. (You fine readers, of course, know better.) And unless the Liberals want to start slagging off Europeans, they might reign back calling foreign abaters cowboys, scammers, frauds, and criminals.

Yeah, okay, I don't buy that last one, either. But at least the government now have a better response to that.

Finally, integrating more fully with the EU ETS effectively places more responsibility for domestic prices in their hands: if EUA prices go up, so will Australia's prices – sorry, guys, it's out of our hands! (Though we keep the price ceiling, I understand it will be set with reference to the EUA price; so no great limit, there.)

A lot depends on how well the EU can reform its ETS to drive prices back up into its preferred (by almost everyone but Poland) range – but then, that's always been the case.



(1) Come at me, Coles.

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Laggard to Leader: a Review


Beyond Zero Emissions, the non-for-profit climate change group, yesterday released the latest in their series of plans to get Australia to a state of zero emissions (or below): Laggard to Leader; How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity.

The report springs from the observation, also reported by e.g. Crikey on Friday, that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is failing to achieve the actions required to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change. It then goes beyond this to suggest new means of addressing the problem, in which Australia leads the world to a zero carbon future.

Sound utopian? It’s actually reasonably well argued, by and large, even if it’s difficult to see our current crop of politicians implementing many of the report’s suggestions.

Laggard to Leader begins with a summary of the scientific need for action: if we want to constrain the rise in global temperatures to 2°C, then the world shouldn’t emit more than 550 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) greenhouse gases by 2050. Why 2°C? Because the really worrying thing about climate change is that the relationship between greenhouse gases and temperature could become non-linear, i.e. small emissions = big temperature rise;  this is estimated to occur somewhere between 2°C and 5°C.

On current projections, Laggard to Leader estimates the world will emit those 550 GtCO2-e by 2025 and warm by 6°C by the end of the century. With this metaphorical fire under our backsides, what is the world doing about it? Not nearly enough, writes the report, providing a very useful potted history – for those who don’t subscribe to international policy journals – of UN climate negotiations, the tactics involved, and the flaws in their outcomes; Australia in the 1990s, for example, made sure to maximise the scope of land-based emissions removals it could count as credits, while minimising those sources counted as debits; Russia and other ex-soviet states received billions of emissions credits made unnecessary by their unexpected deindustrialisation; and the USA and China seem to be engaged in a game of ‘abatement chicken’.

Having argued fairly convincing that the current top-down “treating, targets, and trading” paradigm is failing, Laggard to Leader suggests an alternative approach: countries engage in “Cooperative Decarbonisation”, in which “each country [phases] down to zero or very near zero the greenhouse gas emissions associated with every economic and social process over which it has control or influence.”

This “control or influence” argument – described as the “’sphere of influence’ approach” – is crucial for the rest of the report, as it establishes the rationale for claiming that Australia’s (and other countries’) responsibilities aren’t confined simply to the emissions produced domestically. The chapter worth reading in full, but a central point is that a focus on domestic emissions only makes sense in the context of a comprehensive, legally binding, and effectively enforced global regime of emissions reduction targets – which clearly isn’t the current situation.

Under the perhaps second-best but more realistic scenario of distributed or bottom-up action, the scope of emissions under Australia’s “control or influence” (and therefore those for which we bear at least partial responsibility) is staggering: 4% of the world’s emissions, primarily due to our fossil fuel exports.

Laggard to Leader, p. 20

Having established the scope for action – from a scientific and moral standpoint – the rest of Laggard to Leader describes in more detail the “Cooperative Decarbonisation” approach, exploring both domestic and international policy options.

It’s ambitious stuff: countries should form cooperative groups based on the goal of tackling particular causes of climate or the developing and deploying zero-carbon technology, with each group containing those countries with the greatest needs and capacities for help (and interest in participating). Where cooperation fails, countries should go it alone.

Countries should build a “race-to-the-top” culture, establishing norms and standards of conduct for the non-use of fossil fuels, as exist for e.g. nuclear testing and anti-personnel landmines, or, more formally, moratoria on mining in Antarctica and the use of nuclear weapons. Here Laggard to Leader provides past examples of Australian international leadership, arguing that we have an historical identify as a leader and are socially recognised as such by other states.

Between this ‘social’ position, our market-leading position in the fossil fuel trade – Australia is the world’s top coal exporter, and expected to be the top LNG exporter by the end of the decade –, and our high wealth, Laggard to Leader argues that we are in an almost unique position to decarbonise quickly, help developing countries do the same, and play a leadership role in facilitating international cooperation.

Under this plan, Australian fossil fuel exports (and domestic usage) should be phased out entirely, while providing assistance to developing countries to help them replace the fossil fuels with zero-carbon technology. Australia should price international flight and shipping emissions on transport to our shores, as well as implement border tax adjustments for goods whose greenhouse gas content is not adequately priced in source countries. And we should significantly ramp up investment in zero-carbon research, development, and deployment.

Much of Laggard to Leader is, if taken in isolation, not that controversial. If you accept the science, then the need for action is fairly self-evident, and the technology and policies described in the latter part of the report have been an on-going area of discussion between and within academia, industry, and government for a while. What sets Laggard to Leader apart and moves it into uncomfortable territory is – as with many of BZE’s publications – the marriage of technical possibility with ambition at a grand scale. Many won’t like the conclusions, and thus dismiss the whole report, but the argumentation is strong enough that Laggard to Leader’s conclusions bear consideration. Grand ambition may be our best hope.



I was not involved in writing Laggard to Leader, but provided feedback on an early draft.

Laggard to Leader is being launched tonight (24/07) in Sydney, and on Thursday (26/07) in Brisbane.



Saturday, June 30, 2012

Pricing carbon has passed the acid test

With "carbontaxageddon" just around the corner, various Australian media outlets are doing final coverage before July 1 – I hear The Age has the duty of covering the country town of Whyalla, which Tony Abbott memorably said would be "wiped off the map" by carbon pricing. Ben Cubby, the Sydney Morning Herald's environment editor, rang me on Thursday to get some quotes for a piece he was writing. Cubby's a lot more balanced and sensible than Imre Salusinsky and Annabel Hepworth of The Australian, so I had few qualms speaking with him.

The article, "Pricing carbon has passed the acid test", is published today in the News Review section of the SMH (and, I assume, The Age). I believe this is the first time I've been quoted in an Australian broadsheet, which is kind of cool; even cooler is the fact one my lines runs as the "highlight quote" (or whatever it's called) – thanks, sub-editors! I went down and showed my neighbours :-)

Newspaper article with highlighted quote by Martin Jones, "emissions trading schemes have proven records."

I think it's a good piece, quite generally, and I'm happy with how I'm quoted in it. Here's the full text of what I sent Cubby, for the record:

Q: Will the carbon pricing scheme work to achieve 5% emissions reduction by 2020?

A: Under the assumption that the (ostensibly bipartisan) 5% target is reflected in the caps to the ETS and the scheme isn't scrapped, very probably.

Why:
- If you assume the political will to implement the scheme is there (a huge if), then the question is whether the scheme is designed well enough to achieve its goals. I think it is.
- The mechanism is an effective one: emissions trading schemes have proven records of reducing emissions; not just for greenhouse gases (e.g. in the EU), but also for other permits (e.g. sulphur dioxide in the USA).
- We have independent regulatory oversight and review, which is important and positive. The parties governing and reviewing the scheme are competent, well-respected in their fields, and have good track records (as does Australian governance and regulation generally).
- The scheme covers a sufficiently large proportion of Australia's emissions to have a material effect. (I haven't actually heard if it's still 60% directly/two-thirds indirectly since we're only covering 294 installations, but I assume so).
 - Emissions from excluded sectors – agriculture, forestry, part of transport – could throw a spanner in the works, if their emissions increase (counteracting decreases within the ETS). Hopefully transport will be included – ideally all, but at least the heavy transport planned from 2014. Agriculture is partially addressed through the CFI, but including that and forestry in the ETS would improve it – they're tricky areas, though. A few natural disasters could throw our emissions budget right out of whack.
- The potential exists in Australia to achieve sufficient abatement at costs low enough that it would not impose too onerous costs upon businesses or consumers. (Based on several studies I've seen, but my favourite is the ClimateWorks' update of McKinsey's cost curves for Australia in their "low carbon growth plan")
- Emissions reductions achieved through international credits/offsets are, by and large, 'real' reductions. Certainly not all of them are, and we're a little at the mercy of the certification agencies, but at least we have certification agencies (and the higher-rated ones are quite confidently legit.) The choice between low-cost and confidence in additionality/legitimacy is a political one.
- Most (reasonable) criticisms of the scheme I've seen have been whether the emissions reduction will be lowest-cost (e.g. the 'buying power stations out' component), not will it occur.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Cross-post: Does it make sense for Australia to restrict its export of fossil fuels?

A friend of mine wrote for the ABC about Australia taking responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions generated by the fossil fuels we export, which inspired me to sit down and sort out my views on the topic. The notion of responsibility is often bound up with the idea of refusing to export fossil fuels – an idea also often ascribed to The Greens, though I wasn't able to find it in their official policies – which is an idea I think silly. After I figured out why I thought I was silly, I put my arguments into an article format, which New Matilda published today:

Who's Responsible For Exported CO2?


By Martin Jones

Once we dig up and sell the coal, are we still responsible for the emissions? 'Stop exporting fossil fuels' isn't a good enough solution when people in developing countries need to eat and build, writes environmental economist Martin Jones


During the Rio+20 sustainable development summit, Fergus Green and Reuben Finighan last week called for Australia to take responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) it enables through its exports of fossil fuels. Is this a good idea? How would we go about it?

Green and Finighan wrote that the Australian federal government should take a broader look at the sustainability of mining, focussing on the product, not just the process; i.e. it should consider the GHG generated by fossil fuels during their whole use cycle, not just the emissions generated during the mining process.

Mining nations such Australia, Green and Finighan argue, should take responsibility for the emissions caused when their exported fossil fuels are burned; assigning responsibility to the importers only makes sense in the context of an enforceable international climate change regime in which all major emitting countries were limiting their domestic emissions in line with science-based objectives.

Australia is certainly a large player in fossil fuels. We have around 9 per cent of the world’s proven coal reserves, and in 2011 were responsible for 5.8 per cent of the world’s production – down 2.2 percentage points on 2010 – making us the world’s third-largest coal producer after China and the USA. [1] 

Not needing nearly as many fossil fuels as China or the USA, we’re the world’s largest coal exporter, accounting for around 27 per cent of global trade [2]  Including liquid natural gas (LNG) exports and accounting for currently planned projects, critics of fossil fuel exports estimate that Australian fossil fuels could be responsible for 9 per cent of global GHG emissions by 2020 – and that’s excluding any domestic emissions. [3]

If Australia takes responsibility for its exported emissions, then presumably we would need to follow the same course as for our domestic emissions and reduce them. How? The most obvious answer is, “stop exporting fossil fuels.”

That’s also a poor answer, though, at least in the short- to mid-term. It’s probably by now common knowledge that mining products are Australia’s largest export earner, and large proportion of these are fossil fuels: as of April 2012, 27.5 per cent of our merchandise exports (by value) came from mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials (primarily fossil fuels). [4]  

And though the mining industry isn’t nearly as large an employer or tax-payer as they’d like us to think – employing 2.3 per cent of the Australian workforce as of this May [5] , and paying 15 per cent of company taxes in 2009-10 [6]  – removing this revenue stream from the Australian economy would be a long and painful process.
(I refer not only to the ‘pain’ of economic transition, but also the pain the mining industry would inflict upon anyone trying to reduce their profits, and the pain Australians would go through listening to it all.)

There are moral problems to consider, too. The Australian Coal Association (ACA) lists China and India as the second- and fourth-largest importers of Australian coal; Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the first-, third-, and fifth-largest, respectively. [7] 

The ACA is not alone in expecting demand for resources from China, India, and other developing countries to increase dramatically in the next decade [8], which means refusing to export fossil fuels would make India or China’s transition to a first-world country longer and/or more expensive. A refusal to export also smacks a little of paternalism; a “we know better” attitude where we don’t trust nations to put our resources to good use.

This may well be a path we’re willing to take. There is a precedent for refusing to export resources to countries that we consider might not use them responsibly: fuels for nuclear weapons, such as uranium. Applied to fossil fuels, one could imagine a stance where Australia refuses to export coal, etc. to countries that haven’t signed sufficient agreements on low-emissions usage.

Where the consequences of the actions we enable are severe enough – burning Australia's fossil fuel reserves would take the world 60 per cent of the way to 2 degrees warming, write Green and Finighan – a degree of unilateral action can be justified.

(Given Australia now looks like exporting uranium to India despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, though, this is a weak precedent. [9]  Nor would I envy the foreign minister who has to sell such a policy to two of the world’s largest economies.)

The bigger moral problem, though, in my opinion, is a policy that would see Australia reduce our export of fossil fuels before reducing our own usage of them. For starters, our exported fuels are generally higher-quality resources that are less polluting than what we use domestically; our coal exports, for example, are almost exclusively black coal, which releases significantly less GHGs than the brown coal used in Australia (especially Victoria) for power generation.

Not only that, our fossil fuels are arguably put to better use by developing countries than they would be in Australia: building infrastructure in China or India, while it may be more carbon-intensive than here, will probably do more to improve the lives of their citizens than using those resources here would improve ours.

By no means do I wish to suggest that Australia should wash its hands of responsibility for the emissions of the resources we export: I welcome Green and Finighan’s call for Australian leadership on this issue. That fairly broad concept, however, involves some tricky questions, some – by no means all – of which I have raised here. I expect Green and Finighan’s upcoming report for Beyond Zero Emissions will address many of them, and I look forward more discussion of this issue in the future.

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Wish one is ALWAYS for more wishes

Last week I went to drinks celebrating the 5th birthday of the Centre for Policy Development, a very cool, creative think tank that sprang out of the policy development the New Matilda magazine was doing; you may remember I've written for NM now and again.

The CPD is run by Miriam Lyons, a fascinating woman well worth listening to, and at the birthday drinks I ended up with conversation with her parents. Lyons' mother, a psychologist, asked me the following question:
"If you had three wishes to change the world to help the environment, but that change had to occur through political processes, what would those wishes be?"

I found the question fascinating, and pondered it for a minute or two. Think about your own answers for a while, if you like. (You know it's a happening party when people stare into the middle distance rubbing their chins thoughtfully for a while.)
My first wish, I decided, was:
  1. Give the environment legal rights.
Once you treat the environment as a legal entity, and give it rights, any dealings with it then have to recognise those rights. Damage to the environment no longer becomes 'free', but instead requires restitution to someone (presumably the government) for infringing these rights. Okay, 'the environment' probably has de facto rights (via the government) in some sense already, and I don't know exactly what my system of rights would look like, but this is magic genie wishing at a party, remember?

I was pretty happy with this answer, and for a while I couldn't think of anything to do with my other two wishes. After a bit of needling from Lyons Senior, I decided that a framework for protecting the environment and some absolute standards probably wasn't enough; I'm protecting the environment for the sake of people, so there should be a relationship to people in my plan. Therefore, my second wish was to:
  1.  Give every person the right to a minimum amount of environmental quality.
'Environmental quality' is obviously fairly fuzzy, but it would cover things like clean air, water, land, biodiversity, etc. There are thousands of indicators of environmental quality, so I'd let my genie loose on that. (Or some applied statistics majors, whatever.)

Having now established a framework of sorts and a mandated supply of environmental quality, my economist brain decided the final piece of the puzzle was obvious: create demand for environmental quality. How, though? Creating demand, especially ingrained demand, is tough – it's often as much cultural as anything else, and creating or changing culture is a barrier I've never been able to surmount. In genie-party-land, however, I was able to get away with:
  1. Create an ingrained (cultural) demand for environmental quality, e.g. through education.
When it comes to affecting (or effecting) culture, I usually throw my hands up and look for a sociologist/psychologist/theologian/whatever to pass the question to; they invariably profess to not know the answer either – and I don't know I'd believe them if they claimed they did! But educating people to value the environment, e.g. through bush walks or family outings, seems to be a fairly effective method. It was certainly a good topic of further conversation.

We asked the same question of another researcher at the CPD, and the differences in our answers was fascinating: her first wish would be to "assassinate some people – clear the decks!" (Lest you get the wrong idea about the CPD, remember this was birthday drinks, and I don't think she took the question quite as seriously as I did.)
I've forgotten her second wish, unfortunately, but her third was to take over a large stake in the media to promote her message: "buy Channel 9", basically.

It's intriguing how differently people approach the question; I think I'll squirrel it away as a conversation starter. You have been warned.

Friday, May 11, 2012

Cross-post: Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

After my previous misadventures with major media, I was pleasantly surprised when Stian Reklev, the chief correspondent for Reuters Point Carbon, asked me to write a comment piece on the Australian ETS price floor mechanism and its effect on the market for international permits. In retrospect, I perhaps lapsed a little too much into 'explainer' mode, but with only 650 words to play with there's only so much analysis you can do – I feel weird not backing statements up with solid argumentation and a few links. Here's the piece, published today in the Carbon Market Australia-New Zealand May newsletter:

Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

From July 2015, the Australian federal government will set the price of the permits in its emissions trading scheme free – within limits. The government intends to introduce a price floor and price ceiling until at least 2017/18, in order to provide certainty and reduce risks for market participants and investors.

This is good news for emission reduction activities whose viability depends on prices several years hence, such as larger, more complex projects. Further, the goal of abatement at least-cost should be balanced against the goal of abating as rapidly as possible; should reaching current targets be cheaper than expected, a floor price can ensure a minimum level of spending on abatement. Several EU countries already have or are considering similar measures, in recognition that adjusting the targets of an ETS in response to price movements often isn’t possible rapidly.

Last December, the government released a discussion paper and called for submission on the price floor, which combines a reserve price for Australian carbon units at auction with an ‘international unit surrender charge’ that ensures international carbon credits cost at least as much as domestic units.

Four options are being considered for the international unit surrender charge, with two main approaches: Options 1 and 2 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price of the international unit when it was purchased; Options 3 and 4 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price when the unit surrendered.

While calculating the surrender charge based on the difference between the buying price and the price floor is intuitively appealing, it has implementation issues ranging from administrative complexity, through estimating firms’ time value of money (to adjust the prices of credits purchased earlier rather than later), to the possibility of firms gaming the system by artificially inflating the price of purchased credits. The government paper also notes that Options 1 and 2 would create a preference for foreign units as “if the international price goes up, [firms] could sell the unit at a profit, purchase another unit at a similar (or the same) price, and pay a lower surrender charge.” (Source)

Option 3 appears the most likely: when firms surrender their international units, a charge is applied based on the difference between the prevailing spot price and the price floor. This is the “purest” option, with minimal government involvement and low administration costs. The risk that the price of units changes between purchasing and surrendering them is borne by the liable firms, though financial markets are expected (e.g. by Westpac (PDF)) to provide hedging products or forward contracts.

The costs of hedging, in addition to the surrender charge, could promote the purchase of domestic units over foreign credits. However, it’s worth noting that, since markets for foreign units will likely exist further forward than domestic units (which will only be auctioned three years in advance, based on current plans), there will be a strong bias toward international credits from firms looking to hedge long-term.

Option 4 is similar to Option 3, though with an option for firms to lock in a surrender charge ahead of time based on a regulator-calculated forward curve. This interesting idea would assist firms who, for reasons of cost, access, or complexity are unlikely to use financial markets’ hedging products. Though adding complexity, it would avoid any bias Option 3 has toward domestic units. However, is it the government’s role to insure traders from carbon price risk?

While an MP who supported the ETS, Rob Oakeshott, has recently spoken out against the price floor, the government has an advantage: the relevant legislation has already been passed, and the remaining details (e.g. the choice of option) can be passed by regulation. Regulation passes automatically unless blocked, so the opposition would need to find a 75-seat majority in the House of Representatives to do so. (Under convention established by Speaker Denison, the Speaker votes against motions in case of a tie.)

Even in the government’s current precarious position, this seems unlikely – the defection of Oakeshott alone would not suffice –, so that, if the government survives long enough to introduce a price floor, it will likely pass.

Martin C. Jones is a researcher at the Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets, UNSW.

Monday, April 09, 2012

Better no quote than a misquote

On Wednesday afternoon last week, a journalist called Imre Salusinszky from The Australian – a national broadsheet daily newspaper – asked me to ring him, as he had a question about carbon trading. I'd never heard of, let alone had anything to do with Salusinszky until then, so it's anyone's guess as to why he decided to contact me. (My suspicion is he read my piece on complementary measures on The Conversation.)

The Australian has an anti-climate change action editorial stance, and is openly anti-Greens, so I was a little apprehensive about what I was getting myself into, but Salusinszky seemed like reasonably enough chap on the phone. His questions were about the NSW GGAS, a state baseline-and-credit emissions reduction scheme that was shutting down when the national emissions trading scheme started on July 1. (In short: a company's levels of greenhouse gas emissions are projected into the future: this is the baseline. By reducing its emissions, a company receives a 'credit'. It can also buy credits from/sell to others. Each year, companies are required to submit credits to the Government.) From its conception, GGAS was intended to run only until a national scheme superseded it, but its closure had not officially been announced until Thursday. (The Oz had advance notice of the announcement.)

The issue was that the GGAS scheme had generated millions more credits – emissions reductions – than required, and while the holders of these credits would have used them to meet their submission requirement in later years, there obviously wouldn't be any later years now that the scheme was closing. The Oz had a quote from the NSW Energy Minister calling for the Federal Government to compensate the holders of NSW GGAS credits, and a quote from the Federal Government saying it was the state's problem.

Salusinszky asked me some questions about GGAS – e.g. What was the highest price the credits had ever reached? When was the scheme originally due to end? Could/should the two schemes coexist? Has GGAS worked? – and I answered them as best I could, sending a follow-up email with details on answers on which I was unclear. The line Salusinszky wanted to take seemed pretty clear – the national government was leaving companies in the lurch – and while I thought this a silly stance, I hoped to at least temper the piece with more realistic information.

When the draft piece arrived, my suspicions were confirmed: it clearly portrayed the NSW scheme as being victim of the national scheme; worse, it misquoted me as supporting a phased reduction of GGAS, when I had quite clearly said there was no point in the national and state schemes coexisting. Perhaps Salusinszky misheard me; perhaps he decided that, on the basis of my support for both national AND state schemes in The Conversation, it's what I should have said; perhaps the line came from his co-author, Annabel Hepworth, who's a bit of hack. In any case, I corrected the errors and sent the piece back.

The piece, "Carbon tax to scuttle state's pioneer ETS", left my quotes out entirely. I can only imagine why :-P

I criticised the article on Twitter, pointing out not only its flaws but that the authors well knew better, as I'd told them so the previous day. Following that, the Thomson Reuters Point Carbon reporter covering climate change policy in the Asia-Pacific, Stian Reklev, got in contact with me. (Reklev does follow me on Twitter.) I sent him my views, and he ended up quoting my in his piece (see below). That's probably less exposure than I would have gotten in The Australian, but far more reputable!

New South Wales bins carbon trading scheme (readable with free trial)

Australian state New South Wales will abandon its Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS) on July 1, when the federal government introduces a tax on CO2 emissions, state Energy Minister Chris Hartcher announced Thursday.
The baseline-and-credit scheme has operated since 2003, targeting emission cuts primarily in the state electricity sector, but also in industry and forestry.

The phase-out was expected, but leaves market participants with 16 million surplus credits that will be ineligible for use in the nationwide scheme.

This spurred Minister Hartcher to demand in local media Thursday that the federal government compensate the credit holders.

However, market observers dismissed Hartcher’s claims.

“It’s been clear from the outset of GGAS to all participants and government that GGAS would finish when a national carbon pricing scheme started,” said Martin Jones, a researcher at the University of New South Wales.

“The problem of excess supply and an upcoming end date have been on the radar for at least half a decade, and insufficient efforts to address it have little to do with the federal government,” he told Point Carbon News.

STEADY TARGET

The scheme aimed to bring per capita emissions of CO2 equivalent to 7.27 tonnes in 2007, down from 8.65 tonnes in 2003.

However, since 2007 the per capita target has remained steady at 7.27 tonnes.

Meanwhile, the scheme has led to emission cuts far beyond the target, noted Rob Fowler, Australia and New Zealand representative at the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA).

He said he was not convinced that holders of the surplus credits should be compensated, as the GGAS legislation only goes to 2012, and it was always clear it would be replaced by a national scheme.

“But the underlying abatement activities still have value under the new national regime,” he added.

FUTURE CFI CREDITS

The activities covered under the current GGAS will either be brought under Australia’s A$23 ($23.70) carbon tax from July 1, or qualify to generate offsets under the Carbon Farming Iniative (CFI).

GGAS projects seeking eligibility under the CFI must apply, and emission cuts achieved until now cannot be used in the new scheme.

But all in all, Thursday’s news was unlikely to impact emission reduction efforts in the state, according to Fowler.

“There is a low chance that abatement activities will cease,” he said.

Energy efficiency measures were part of GGAS when it launched in 2003, but was moved to a separate Energy Savings Scheme in 2009.

“The energy efficiency scheme will continue, and they will most likely expand it,” Fowler said, adding it could be linked to a similar scheme in neighbouring Victoria.

The federal government’s carbon tax will move to an emissions trading scheme on July 1, 2015.

 
Beijing

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Cross-post: State climate schemes are still worthwhile under a carbon price

My first piece for The Conversation, written in response to recent events:

State climate schemes still worthwhile under a carbon price

In justifying their recent abandonment of state-based climate schemes, the governments of Queensland and Victoria have both claimed that the schemes will be redundant under the federal emissions trading scheme (ETS) that begins in July.¹ Yet this justification is only a smokescreen, as a carbon price can well exist with other environmental and climate schemes.

The goal of putting a price on carbon – more correctly, on greenhouse gases, but “carbon” is shorter – is to reduce the amount of carbon emissions. The flexible nature of an ETS lets the market decide whether this occurs. It reduces the activities that produce carbon or conducts those activities more efficiently.

The industries in which these reductions occur, and the people that are affected by them, can be only broadly selected by the Government. This is the point, since the idea is that the market will do the job more cheaply than if the Government prescribed everything. And the argument that state climate programs within a national ETS can make emissions reduction more expensive is correct.

However, getting the cheapest emissions abatement is not the only possible goal. Another goal might be to target particular geographic or social groups, such as rural areas or low-income households. South Australia’s Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme, for example, aims to reduce household electricity use, but requires a certain proportion of that reduction to occur in disadvantaged households. Energy costs are thus reduced where households are most struggling with them, rather than just where it’s cheapest to do so (which is usually higher-income households). Similar goals could well be pursued through state-based measures complementing a carbon price.

A goal of further policies might be to target areas that don’t respond well or rapidly to price changes, whether because of habit, socially shaped preferences, intrinsic motivation, or market problems. It’s certainly possible that carbon-price-related rises in electricity bills may cause us to go and demand more energy efficient appliances and houses, or at least appliances and houses that can be upgraded when better technology arrives. But these connections are often tenuous and it can make more sense simply to mandate minimum standards, as we already do for safety. (It is considered unacceptable to let the market decide how safe appliances and houses will be based on “price”, i.e. lawsuits.)

Yet the Victorian Government has removed support for precisely such a policy: coal power standards that would have required a certain level of emissions efficiency from new plants, and required them to be ready to install clean coal technology if it became viable.

Scrapping investments in climate-related infrastructure or research and development, as the Queensland Government is doing, only makes sense if you believe that markets always make the best choices. Research, however, is an area where markets commonly do too little, because the benefits of research tend to be shared amongst many (including competitors) rather than just the researching organisation itself.

Strategic government investment in technology can make it viable years before the market would deliver a similar result. A prime example is Germany’s highly advanced solar power industry, which it developed with subsidies despite being covered by the EU ETS. And while it’s unclear how well Germany’s bolstered solar industry will survive long-term against its rivals from China, it is inarguable that the solar industry made Germany’s power supply robust to the kind of shock that saw its nuclear reactors shut down after the disaster in Fukushima.

This robustness – the ability to maintain a minimum level of performance under a range of possible future conditions – was not delivered because of the EU ETS: it came from additional, smaller-scale policy. And while it may involve some amount of duplication, such robustness is valuable when unforeseen events occur; what if, against all expectation, the constitutional challenge to the Clean Energy Future legislation were to succeed? Achieving our environmental goals would be significantly easier if states still had their individual programs.

These are just a handful of reasons why complementary environmental and climate policies could be worth pursuing, even at a state level, under a national carbon price. There are more. And I do not claim that all policies will be worth it: complementary policies should be evaluated under frameworks such as the one recently published by Denniss, Grudnoff, & Macintosh.

If the Queensland and Victorian Governments had justified abandoning their climate programs based on such an evaluation, it would be easier to believe their faith in a “carbon tax”. And, to be fair, Victoria did conduct a review (PDF) that found no compelling case for a state-based emissions reduction target under a national carbon scheme. But the review also found other Victorian climate programs are worth keeping, and that the merits of state emissions target should be reviewed if the national scheme is altered or repealed.

The reason that state governments are backpedalling on climate policies isn’t because they believe that the “carbon tax” will solve all our environmental problems: this is a smokescreen. The reason is that they don’t share the goals that the federal legislation pursues, of reducing carbon pollution, encouraging renewable energy generation, and “future-proofing” the economy. For if they did, there are plenty of state climate schemes that would still be worthwhile.

¹ Readers may be more familiar with the incorrect, though widespread term, “carbon tax”. More on that here.

[UPDATE 30/03]
Green industry newsletter Climate Spectator republished the article today :-)

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

Cosmetic, distortionary health care reform

I was musing that the further I looked into how the private health insurance rebate (and Medicare high-income levy) work, the weirder the incentive structures got. Some friends asked me to elaborate, so here goes:

Your basic tax-welfare compact is that you pay tax, and the government uses that to provide a range of services – including, in this case, health care. The amount of tax you pay varies depending on your level of income, while the services you're entitled to are – generally speaking – the same for everyone. So your level of tax shouldn't affect the level of services to which you're entitled. And underpinning Australia's universal health care system is the idea that everyone 'deserves' health care, even if they can't afford to pay for it themselves.

However, not all services are created equal. For example, everyone can drive on public roads for free. However, you may not be satisfied with the roads the government is offering you – perhaps too many other people use them, or they don't go where you want to go. You are free to go purchase extra, private services, such as toll roads. You still, however, keep your entitlement to use government services.

Now, replace "roads" with "health care". The government supplies everyone with a particular range of health care services, but the system can get overcrowded and may not cover what you want covered, so people who value health care – like people who value travelling on roads – are free to go off and purchase private services.

The big difference is that the government actively encourages some Australians not to use its services, but to instead use the private alternatives. It effectively pays them, by taxing them less. Who gets this encouragement? People who value health services? No: people with high incomes.

That's right: if you're on a high income (>$70k for singles) and you take out PHI, you effectively get money from the government by avoiding a levy. If you earn less than that, but you value health care highly enough that you take out PHI, you get no tax breaks.

That's a little weird.

So now we have this strange incentive system that assumes all high-income earners value health care and subsidises their use, instead of, say, assigning each person an amount of health care funding for a limited range of services regardless of where they go, and letting them purchase extra services if and when they choose. (Which would make it like our road system. Or like the way our education should work, but doesn't. But that's a different gripe.) The closest we come to giving everyone choice-independent health care funding is the PHI rebate, which pays for a portion of the health care costs for everyone who chooses the private rather than the public system

That's the current situation. Here's what's changing: the PHI rebate will be means-tested, which means fewer high-income people will get it. And, the Medicare surcharge for high-income earners is increasing – this is the levy high-income earners can avoid by taking out PHI. So we're reducing the choice-independent funding for high-income earners at the same time the incentive for high-income earners to take out PHI is increasing – why??

A point I'm indebted to Henry Ergas for (he also uses a road analogy, though I swear I thought of mine independently) is that the more you encourage people to take up PHI by offering them tax breaks, the less responsive they are to the actual costs of that health care: their incentives are being distorted. Less responsiveness to prices makes it more likely prices will rise, so that people who value health highly but are price-sensitive – lower-income people – will be less likely to take out PHI, and our health care system stratifies further. And, given that almost all high-income people take out PHI, means-testing the rebate is basically hidden progressive taxation. While I'm in favour of progressive taxation, hiding it isn't a great thing.

All of this makes me far more ambivalent about this reform than I was. I still don't think I'm fully across the topic, but it appears clear these health care reforms are at best okay, and at worst magnify pre-existing distortions. There are better reforms.

(My thoughts on this issue were prompted by this Stephen King piece – worth reading the comments. See also King's earlier piece.)

[Edited on 15/02/12 for clarity.]

Monday, January 02, 2012

The fundamental question on asylum seekers

Australia's dog of a policy on asylum seekers – at least, those arriving by boat – appears set to be a continued topic of political discussion this year, so I'd like to echo the sentiments of Guy Rundle as expressed just before Christmas:

The Australian asylum seeker discussion is wrongly framed. As signatories to the Refugee Convention, we have a categorical moral imperative to allow any potential refugees that reach our shores to claim asylum; this is their right.
However, the policy debate revolves around whether we can "wholly negate someone’s rights (that we have explicitly promised them), in a situation where their life and freedom will be wholly annihilated indefinitely, all as a strategy for dissuading unknown future persons from making a possibly perilous journey.

By that definition we are using the 'deterrent' — the people locked up for years on Manus, Nauru, in Malaysia, or god knows where — as a means to a utilitarian end. It is a clear use of human beings in their totality, as means to other ends, and cannot in any sense ground a moral policy."

We are "negating the irreducible moral base with a utilitarian argument based on unknowable contingencies and outcomes that cannot be guaranteed".

Our role should be "to stand up for what we believe to be irreducibly right — right not by emotion, but by well-argued reason from fundamental principles, capable of debate — and seek to repeatedly make those issues clear as they are ceaselessly covered over by, well by notions like 'offshore processing'. Making those issues clear would be done by making clear the fundamental political question that no politician will put — are we going to stay within the Convention, or are we not? Surely anyone who wants an honest debate and decision would want that question to rise to the surface.

Either we stay with the Convention, and honour its obligations – and further obligations that arise from those — or we repudiate it. Putting the question thus is first of all, simply honest — but I suspect it would also make clear to people eager to impose desert prisons etc, exactly what they are repudiating, about themselves as much as anything.

That seems to be the only moral approach of any honest commentator from any side regarding the issue."

Our current discussion is not about how to adhere to our committment: it's about the methods in which we intent to break it. A sad state of affairs.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Problems with Australian superannuation

Stephen Long (ABC economics correspondent) won a Walkley award for this 2010 piece on the low returns made by Australian superannuation funds; Fairfax economics journo Peter Martin picked up the theme this week with a scoring critique of fund managers' prowess (or lack of it).

They're both strong pieces, and are finding a lot of resonance. I disagree, however, with Peter Martin's suggestion in his piece – confirmed when I asked him – that compulsory superannuation is a bad idea, full stop. (Which is not to say that he'd like to see it ditched, now that it's here.) 
That many funds (and the system as a whole) have been delivering poor returns is indisputable, and it's also plain that fees are too high. I see that as issues within the system requiring reform, though, rather than crippling flaws.

Certainly, I'm troubled – and annoyed, at a personal level – that funds have not delivered good returns. But I wouldn't do away with the whole kit and caboodle just yet.

Thursday, November 03, 2011

IETA GHG Market Report 2011

A little over a month ago I alluded to an article I co-authored for the International Emissions Trading Association's (IETA) annual report on Greenhouse Gas Markets. That IETA GHG Market Report 2011 has now been published, and our article forms the very first chapter – hurrah!

It's too early to say whether this counts as a proper peer-reviewed publication or not – there was peer review, but other criteria come into play, as well –, but this is a nice little feather in my cap, regardless :-)

Thursday, September 29, 2011

Cross-post: Details of the Clean Energy Future package

About a month ago, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) asked one of my directors whether we'd like to prepare an overview of the last in Australian climate change politics for their annual report. Because I spend a lot of time following this sort of stuff and looking over the proposals from the Government, I got to take the lead on this (at least as far as the factual elements were concerned). Even though I'm only a lowly RA, my colleagues kindly decided my efforts were enough to warrant having my name listed first on our article, which I'm quietly pleased about.

After we'd sent our submission off, but before it was published (I think it comes out in October or November [UPDATE] in early November), New Matilda contacted me and asked if I'd like to summarise the details of the Clean Energy Future package – so, pretty much what we'd just done for IETA, but without the political analysis. I'm sometimes a little baffled by the things people ask me to write about, since I imagine they're of limited interest other than to wonks like myself (and wonks will probably have looked at the source material), but since I had the material fresh in my head I assented.

Here it is, then: a summary (at length) of the details of the Clean Energy Future package. I won't hold it against you if you don't read it – it's so long,  in fact, that NM split it into two parts! But if you want an explanation of the scheme, here you go.

Our Clean Energy Future Explained

The Government’s Clean Energy Future is underway, with 18 bills – the Clean Energy Legislative Package  – being introduced to Parliament on September 13th.

The legislation is lengthy and boring, but it’s important: these 18 bills (and a few more to come in the first half of next year) lay the framework for what will be the primary driver of Australia’s attempt to mitigate dangerous anthropogenic climate change – assuming they pass, of course. Ben Eltham has already taken an excellent look at the Clean Energy Future package (henceforth: CEF) for New Matilda. What follows in this article and its sequel is a summary of some of the CEF’s nitty-gritty details.

Much of my summary is based on the CEF package as it was released in July. As far as I’ve been able to tell, not much has changed in the current legislation, but if you spot any discrepancies, please comment.

The Emissions Trading Scheme
The best known, and arguable most important piece of the CEF package is an emissions trading scheme (ETS) which will begin on 1 July, 2012. Under an ETS, parties (generally companies) that emit those greenhouse gases covered by the scheme will be required to surrender permits to the Government equal to their emissions.

The ETS will cover four of the six greenhouse gases counted under the Kyoto Protocol – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and per fluorocarbon emissions from the aluminium sector. The remaining two (hydrofluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride) will face an equivalent carbon price through existing synthetic greenhouse gas legislation. To simplify things, the climate change potential of each greenhouse gas is measured in terms of how much carbon dioxide (CO2) it is equivalent to; hence the references to “CO2-e” (technical) or simply “carbon” (colloquial).

Emitters can purchase permits – officially called “carbon units” – for a tonne of CO2-e from the Government, or other participants in the ETS. During the first three years of the scheme, the price of permits will be fixed, and permits are immediately surrendered to the Government when purchased. This means that in the first phase the ETS will function very similarly to a tax, without actually being one: there is still the ability to trade, albeit at a fixed price. Non-governmental sellers of permits might be companies that have more permits than they need (see Compensation and Assistance, below), or farmers who have generated permits through the Carbon Farming Initiative (see Regulatory Bodies and Complementary Measures, below). For more on the fundamental differences between an emissions trading scheme and a tax, see Carbon Pricing 101.

Permits will cost $23 per tonne of CO2-e when the ETS begins in 2012, and will rise at 5 per cent per year (nominally); $24.15/t in 2013-14 and $25.40/t in 2014-15. From July 1, 2015, the price will be variable, and set by the market. The idea is that, by 2016, the international price of CO2-e will be around $29/t. 
No foreign permits or credits will be accepted during the fixed-price period, and a maximum of 50 per cent of a party’s obligation during the flexible-price period may be sourced internationally. Kyoto Protocol-compliant credits created under the Carbon Farming Initiative can be used for up to 5 per cent of compliance during the fixed price period. (This limit is far higher than then the number of credits the Carbon Farming Initiative is likely to produce.)

From 2015, some international permits will be allowed. These include Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), Emissions Reductions Units (ERUs), Removal Units (RMUs), and other units the Government may allow. The Government’s view is that linking to other credible trading schemes, including the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme, is in Australia’s national interest.

From 2015 to 2018 there will be a price ceiling of $20/t above the international price, and a price floor of $15/t. This is to reduce wild fluctuations and provide some measure of certainty for those who have to factor the price of carbon into their decision-making. These stabilisers will rise by 5 per cent and 4 per cent in real terms, that is, plus inflation, per year, and will be reviewed in 2017 by the Climate Change Authority (CCA). It is unclear which instrument will form the basis of this international price – will it be EU units (EUAs) or New Zealand Units (NZUs) – and to which foreign schemes the Australian ETS will be linked.

During the fixed-price period, permits allocated for free can be traded domestically or returned to the government, but not banked for use in later years. Parties that fail to surrender enough permits in a year will incur fines of 1.3 times the permit price for that year.

In the flexible-price period, an unlimited number of permits can be banked and up to 5 per cent of the current year’s liability can be met by “borrowing” from the next year’s permit vintage. Each year’s vintage of permits will be auctioned in advance by the government, and shortfalls will incur fines which are double the average permit price for that year.

ETS – Targets

Emissions caps – the maximum number of permits, and therefore emissions, permitted within the ETS each year – for the flexible-price period have not yet been decided. The lack of political agreement here is one of the reasons the ETS begins with a fixed price, but the targets will be announced in 2014 and then set five years in advance. Should no emissions cap be set by Parliament, the cap for 2015-16 will default to 38 MtCO2-e less than total emissions in 2012-13. From 2016 the default cap will be 12 MtCO2-e less than the previous year.

To put that into perspective: Treasury’s carbon price modelling estimated Australia’s emissions at 578 MtCO2-e in 2010, growing steadily, and our bipartisan target at around 527 MtCO2-e by 2020. (Non-Treasury estimates have different figures, but similar magnitudes.) The Government’s goal is to reduce Australia’s emissions by 5 per cent on 2000 levels by 2020 (up to 25 per cent depending on global action), and by 80 per cent by 2050 (previously 50 per cent) – but it’s not quite clear from the CEF package precisely how many tonnes of CO2-e that is.

Voluntary action will be taken into account when setting caps – the CCA will determine the methodology – and will be treated as additional, as will renewable electricity purchases through GreenPower. People will be able to make a tax-deductible contribution to a Pledge Fund to retire Australian carbon permits, Kyoto compliant and non-Kyoto compliant Australian Carbon Credit Units, and eligible international units.

ETS – Coverage

The ETS will fully cover emissions from stationary energy, industrial processes, fugitive emissions – which are those from coal mines or from extracting gas – and emissions from some waste. The transport sector will be partially covered: domestic aviation, shipping, rail transport, and non-transport fuels will face lower fuel tax credits or higher fuel excises (unless the companies voluntarily participate in the ETS), while household transport fuels, light vehicle business transport, and off-road fuel use by the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries will be excluded from the ETS. The Government wants to include heavy transport from 2014. (This last was rejected by the regional independent MPs. The Greens would like to include all transport.)

Roughly 60 per cent of Australia’s emissions are thus covered directly by the ETS, and two-thirds are covered indirectly (e.g. through fuel excise changes). Those companies (around 500) with facilities that have direct greenhouse gas emissions of 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e a year or more (excluding emissions from transport fuels and some synthetic greenhouse gases) must join the ETS, while others can join voluntarily. Companies may do this to profit through trading, hedge against risks, or because they would otherwise face costs such as higher fuel excises but see the opportunity to achieve their abatement more cheaply in the open market – which is the point of an ETS. Agricultural emissions, which form roughly 15 per cent of Australia’s total emissions, will be exempt, as will emissions from forestry and land-use change (e.g. conversion of bush into agricultural land).

Who Will Keep it Clean?

Regulatory Bodies and Complementary Measures

An independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) will be established to report publically on the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Beginning in February, 2014, and then every two years, it will examine all aspects of the scheme, including the price floor and ceiling, and recommend targets and emissions caps. The CCA will be made up of nine experts with a particular focus on climate science, economics, climate change mitigation, emissions trading, investment, and business, and will be chaired by Bernie Fraser (formerly head of the Reserve Bank of Australia).

The CCA’s recommendations are not binding on the government of the day, but the government must justify any difference between its legislation and the recommendations.

This is stronger independent regulation than was proposed under Kevin Rudd’s CPRS, and is complemented by a new Clean Energy Regulator and reviews by the Productivity Commission. The Productivity Commission will review industry compensation and assistance, in particular to emissions-intensive and trade-exposed industries, fuel taxation arrangements, and foreign action. The Clean Energy Regulator will combine administration of the ETS, the Carbon Farming Initiative – where farmers generate credits for storing carbon in soil or trees, or reducing/avoiding emissions –, the Renewable Energy Target, and the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System.

To encourage the construction of renewable energy generation, the CEF package will establish a Clean Energy Finance Corporation to invest – via loans or equity – $5 billion in renewable energy technologies, and $5 billion in low-pollution, and energy efficiency technologies which may include renewable energy projects. The Corporation will not invest in carbon capture and storage technology, though this is still supported by existing programs.

The Government will also establish an Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), which will provide grant-based funding for renewable energy projects. ARENA largely brings existing programs together into one organisation – and this should result in more coordinated and consistent operation of these programs. Both ARENA and the Clean Energy Finance Corporation will be independent agencies.

Australia’s Renewable Energy Target remains at 20 per cent by 2020. (Currently 8 per cent of Australia’s electricity is renewable; gas accounts for 16 per cent and coal 75 per cent.) The CEF package includes an Energy Security Fund, which will tender for bids to shut down 2000MW of highly emissions-intensive coal-fired power by 2020. The Fund will also offer transitional assistance of $5.5 billion, in the form of free permits and cash, to coal power generators facing significant asset loss. An Energy Security Council will advise the Government on emerging risks to energy security.

Compensation and Assistance

Simultaneous to the introduction of the ETS on July 1, 2012, personal tax-free thresholds will be trebled to $18,200, rising to $19,400 in 2015. This is designed to fully or over-compensate lower income households (yearly earnings of up to $30,000 for singles) for increased costs resulting from pricing CO2-e, and to partially compensate middle income households ($30-80,000 pa). Marginal tax rates for the new lower brackets will rise, so that those on higher incomes ($80,000 and above) do not pay less tax. The average increase in household costs from pricing CO2-e is expected to be $9.90 per week, with average compensation of $10.10 per week. There are also increases to the Pension, Senior Supplement for self-funded retirees, and Family Tax Benefit.

The ETS is expected to increase electricity prices by 10 per cent during its first year of operation. However, electricity prices have risen rapidly in recent years and are expected to do so in the future, largely in response to network infrastructure investment by operators; these increased prices are being conflated by many – sometimes deliberately – with the future effects of the carbon price.

Many industries covered by the ETS will receive some form of Government assistance. A Jobs and Competitiveness Program ($9.2 billion) will be available for the most emissions-intensive sectors (primarily manufacturing and heavy industry), with a Clean Technology Program ($1.2 billion) for less emissions-intensive sectors, and further programs for small businesses and supply chains. Most assistance will be in the form of free permits, the rest in grants.

Emission-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries will receive:
  • 94.5 per cent of their expected permit requirement for industries with average baseline of at least 2,000 tCO2-e/$m revenue or 6,000t CO2-e/$m value-added
  • 66 per cent of their expected permit requirement for industries with average baseline of at least 1,000 tCO2-e/$m revenue or 3,000t CO2-e/$m value added
  • 50 per cent of their expected permit requirement for the LNG industry
A trade-exposed industry is one whose value of imports and exports to domestic production exceeds 10 per cent, and that demonstrates a lack of capacity to pass through costs due to the potential for international competition.

Baseline for the free permits will be the historic industry average level of emissions per unit of production, and are based on those from the CPRS (including the extra free permits added as a “recession buffer” in 2009). Assistance will reduce 1.3 per cent each year, and be reviewed by the Productivity Commission from 2014-15 onwards with a view to winding assistance back to the levels suggested in the 2011 Garnaut Review.

The CEF package also includes an Energy Security Fund, which will tender for bids to shut down 2000MW of highly emissions-intensive coal-fired power by 2020. The Fund will also offer transitional assistance of AU$5.5 billion, in the form of free permits and cash, to coal power generators facing significant asset loss. An Energy Security Council will advise the Government on emerging risks to energy security.

In addition to the assistance described above, the Government plans to give the coal sector $1.3 billion over six years for “gassy” mines – those with high levels of fugitive emissions. The steel industry will also receive $300 million over five years. This assistance is separate to the CEF package, as not all members of the MPCCC agreed with it.

The CEF is highly likely to pass both Houses of Parliament before the end of the year, and then the next challenge beckons: implementation. I, for one, look forward to it.

These articles draw on material prepared for an upcoming annual report by the International Emissions Trading Association [http://www.ieta.org/].

Sunday, August 07, 2011

Cross-post: Implicit visions of Australia's future

I'm a few days putting this up here, but on Thursday I had another article published at New Matilda. They called it "Finally! Climate Policies Explained", but I wasn't actually trying to write an 'explainer' piece; instead, I was inspired by an article by Fergus Green to ponder the differences between what Australian political parties are saying about climate change and what they're doing. (Subsequent Twitter discussions between Fergus, Declan Kuch and myself also provided several ideas.)

The link to Fergus' article didn't make the NM editing cut, but I've restored it in my version, below (as well as one or two other bits I thought worth keeping, even if it does make the article slightly clunkier.)

What are the visions of Australia’s future reflected in our parties’ policies?

When the Government released its climate change package on July 10, it was under the moniker of a “Clean Energy Future”. This is, ostensibly, a fairly clear vision for where Labor sees Australia in 2050 and beyond. However, as Fergus Green rightly points out, the package is a mish-mash of measures that don’t deliver clear policy signals to achieve this clean energy future. While this is partially a result of the multi-party committee that spawned the package, the rhetoric the Government employs is ambiguous as to precisely what sort of society they see Australia moving toward.

But where are we really going with all this? If the world follows the suggestions of science and reduces CO2-e emissions to constrain dangerous climate change, what place is this future do our parties foresee?

There are five basic possibilities, relating to our emissions levels relative to our global entitlement and how we approach any excess/shortfall:
  1. Australia emits less than its global entitlement of CO2-e, and exports its remainder.(1)
  2. As above, but we don’t export the remainder.
  3. Australia emits at or about its share of CO2-e – a balanced carbon budget, if you like.
  4. Australia emits more than its global share of CO2-e, and offsets the difference by importing allowances/offsets from other countries.
  5. As above, but we don’t import (enough) to cover our excess emissions.
Note that these are possibilities for some stabilised-emissions future (2050 and beyond), without defining the transition path there-to.

Both the approach to calculating Australia’s right to CO2-e emissions and the position vis-à-vis offsetting domestic emissions internationally are predominantly moral decisions, even if they are underpinned by science, economics, law, and so on.

Following the argument that each person should have an equal right to the use of the global environment, which seems a sensible and equitable approach, Australia’s entitlement to emit CO2-e should be based our share of the global population. (Perhaps a little less, if you take our disproportionate historical use of the atmosphere into consideration.)

The 2011 Garnaut Review estimated that global per capita emissions would need to fall to less than two tonnes of CO2-e per year to stop CO2-e concentrations rising altogether, with even lower levels required to reduce concentrations. One to two tonnes of CO2-e per person per year seems a ballpark figure for our entitlement, then.

Offsetting domestic emissions internationally should, scientifically, be a non-issue: if the processes are of equal quality, arguing about whether Australian emissions should be offset by projects in Australia or Borneo is equivalent to arguing over offsetting in Queensland versus Tasmania; the climate responds equally well to both. And while the processes to offset emissions in Australia and Borneo are not of the same quality, we can restrict the import of foreign offsets to those that meet the relevant standards of additionality, verifiability, and so forth. This would be little different, in principle, to Australia’s importing of foodstuffs or consumer goods only from foreign companies certified to have a certain quality standard of production.

Where quality is equal, it would seem most efficient to choose the lowest cost abatement, which will probably not be in Australia. Investing in higher-cost domestic options, however, could establish new industries that prove more efficient in the long run, similar to the way Germany is fostering its solar and wind power industries. While Australia will end up importing some of our future offset and abatement technology – we simply aren’t large enough to develop everything ourselves –, a strong local market might have kept talents such as Dr. Zhongreng Shi or David Mills in Australia rather than watch them found their solar PV companies in China and the USA, respectively.

There are also the arguments that Australia should not achieve its entire net emissions reduction by shifting the work overseas. One argument involves equity: if foreign offsets are sold through intermediaries, is the money going to the end producers or the intermediaries? If it’s the intermediaries, would we prefer the money went to Australians, instead?  Another argument is that countries have an ethical responsibility to abate their own emissions (PDF). Such arguments for domestic abatement are broadly accepted (see Article 6(d) of the Kyoto Protocol, for example), though to varying degrees.

So: how do the climate policies of Australia’s political parties fit into the above framework?

Vision 1 – Low Emissions, Exporting Surplus

This is the vision of The Greens, and the clearest of the major parties. A goal of The Greens’ climate change policy is “to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as is feasible and by no later than 2050”. Emitting zero is obviously less than our entitlement, which leaves the question of trading our surplus allowances/abatement. Since The Greens are comfortable with the MPCCC proposal of importing up to 50% of permits required under the ETS – though only, they stress, permits of the highest quality that do not replace serious domestic action –, they would presumably also be comfortable exporting any surplus we might have. (Assuming, of course, that our own abatement is of the highest quality!)

Part of The Greens’ vision is a low-impact lifestyle: less energy use, less driving, less flying, more public transport use, less logging, etc. Such lifestyle change might not be absolutely necessary to reach a low-emissions scenario, but it would certainly be more difficult without it.

Vision 2 – Low Emissions, Not Exporting Surplus

While a part of the environmental movement (and The Greens) might be against Australia enabling the emissions of other countries – similar to current calls to stop fossil fuel exports –, this scenario is unrealistic. It would require explicitly rejecting a potentially quite large revenue stream, which Australian businesses are famously vociferous opposed to, and a significant change in public attitudes toward actions that might be primarily symbolic.

In particular, if Australia achieves low net emissions via plentiful offset generation rather than low gross emissions, it would be radical to ban the generating companies from selling their offsets overseas. To a certain extent, this vision seeks to impose a lifestyle choice upon other countries by limiting their options – such a vision is not always wrong (most people would be happy limiting certain countries’ access to nuclear weapons, for example), but it is controversial.

Vision 3 – Medium Emissions, Balanced Over Cycle

The use of the term “balanced” here is deliberate: this future sees Australia emitting at or about its share of global CO2-e emissions, trading allowances as and when economic or natural fluctuations require us to, but striving to maintain a roughly equal quantity of CO2-e imports and exports over time. Unlike other budgets, however, there is no pressing need that this one sum to zero over time; that would purely be a matter of preference.

Vision 4 – High Emissions, With Imported Offsets/Allowances

This is the ALP’s position – probably. It’s difficult to tell. Labor’s rhetoric has been about cutting pollution, supporting jobs, remaining competitive, increasing efficiency, and moving toward clean energy. These are all laudable goals, but jobs and competition have little to do with the climate and it’s unclear how clean the ALP’s energy future is, exactly. The Government’s long-term target of 80% reduction of CO2-e emissions versus 2000 levels by 2050 is one of the more concrete figures, but will still almost certainly lead to a future Australia that emits more than its global share.

Climate protection is not part of Labor’s core ideals. Though it’s not said so explicitly, implicit in the ALP’s rhetoric about maintaining our standard of living and its stance toward imported emissions (80% of required permits allowed under the CPRS; 50% under the current proposal) is a vision of an Australia that uses its wealth to pay other (poorer) nations to offset higher domestic consumption of CO2-e. Labor might be interested fuelling our current consumption model differently, but it’s not particularly interested in changing the style in which we live as The Greens are; the choice is for “cheaper, rather than deeper” action, to borrow a phrase.

Vision 5 – High Emissions, Without Imports

It seems harsh to ascribe this vision to the entirety of the Liberal and National parties, as it is certainly not shared by all their members. Under the current leadership, however, this is the Coalition’s vision. Its direct action plan is nonsense and won’t achieve 5% emissions reductions by 2020 under the proposed spending cap, while Liberal policy documents don’t even include a target for 2050 or beyond.

Though a theoretical commitment to 100% domestic action sounds very responsible, Tony Abbott’s tendency to frame his public opinion on climate change based largely on the views of his audience at the time (contravening common sense, his own history, and physics along the way) makes the idea that he has an underlying commitment to significant action roughly as likely as Alan Jones having an underlying commitment to fair and balanced reporting.

Between the, let’s call it ‘intellectual flexibility’ of Tony Abbott and his Shadow Minister for Climate Action, Greg Hunt, so long as no Australian is monetarily worse off – never mind the environmental costs, or the rest of the world – it seems the L/NP vision is to plant some fig trees for their metaphorical leaves and let someone else sort out the problem.


The examples here are not definitive of each category. Malcolm Turnbull’s vision, for example, sees lower emissions than Tony Abbot’s and could share a category with The Greens or the ALP, but differs from theirs in its greater emphasis on carbon capture and storage technologies, as well as a more explicit recognition of the need to manage risk and uncertainty. Similarly, Paul Frijters’ “Give up, or hope for a technological miracle” stance would fall into the same category as the Coaltion vision, though he expressly rejects their direct action policy. (And the ALP’s policy, too, to be fair.)

Which type of future you prefer is entirely your choice. But don’t kid yourself: the Coalition (under Abbott) aren’t really interested in a low-carbon economy; the ALP would like a low-carbon economy, but only where it’s not too difficult; and the Greens sincerely want a zero-carbon economy, but will want to change your lifestyle to achieve that. It’d be nice if they said it – but most voters only want so much honesty from their politicians.

(1) This needn’t be an allowance as under a global emissions trading scheme with binding national targets and permit allocations, but could simply be a level of domestic CO2-e offsetting in excess of the local demand that’s then traded abroad.