So I'm working on a "robust policy mix" for climate change (more on that later... perhaps), but in the course of my research I've come across a nice little paragraph that, in my opinion, is a wonderful starting point for thinking about climate change:
[O]ur work suggests that climate change ought to be viewed more as a contingency problem than an optimization problem. Either society will have to make very large reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions over the course of the next century, or it will not. Since society does not yet know which future will happen, it needs to prepare for both. Thus, the most important near-term goals of climate-change policy may be to: (i) reach consensus on the observations that will indicate a need for drastic action to curtail greenhouse-gas emissions, (ii) take actions that will make large future reductions more feasible and less costly if, in fact, they are needed, and (iii) do this in such a way as to avoid over-allocating resources to a problem that turns out to be minor or preparing insufficiently for what we discover is an emerging catastrophe.
Source: Lempert & Schlesinger (2000) "Robust Strategies for Abating Climate Change" in Climatic Change Volume 45, Numbers 3-4, p. 395
The next time you hear something about climate change (more so in Australia than in Europe), take note of the mental model framing the argument – or, rather, the lack of it. This paper is 10 years old, yet a minority of pundits (and, sadly, politicians) have wrapped their head around how to approach the (possible) problem. We should be way beyond this (though at least we're ahead of the Yanks).
Oh, and here's another lovely little excerpt from the same page:
[P]olitical activity in this area [climate change] more closely resembles an evolving set of actions designed to shape the future political landscape and influence private-sector investments, rather than any firm consensus about the optimum level of emissions reductions. International negotiators often appear to regard the continuation of the process as more important than the particular results at each stage.
10 years on... how little has changed. However, the authors go on to differentiate between hedging – taking actions now to mitigate risk – and shaping – making it easier to take actions later –, and suggest that the latter approach may be as good as the former. I don't know to what extent I believe that, but it does give me a little more hope that the Conferences of the Parties are actually achieving anything.

