Showing posts with label robustness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label robustness. Show all posts

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Cross-post: State climate schemes are still worthwhile under a carbon price

My first piece for The Conversation, written in response to recent events:

State climate schemes still worthwhile under a carbon price

In justifying their recent abandonment of state-based climate schemes, the governments of Queensland and Victoria have both claimed that the schemes will be redundant under the federal emissions trading scheme (ETS) that begins in July.¹ Yet this justification is only a smokescreen, as a carbon price can well exist with other environmental and climate schemes.

The goal of putting a price on carbon – more correctly, on greenhouse gases, but “carbon” is shorter – is to reduce the amount of carbon emissions. The flexible nature of an ETS lets the market decide whether this occurs. It reduces the activities that produce carbon or conducts those activities more efficiently.

The industries in which these reductions occur, and the people that are affected by them, can be only broadly selected by the Government. This is the point, since the idea is that the market will do the job more cheaply than if the Government prescribed everything. And the argument that state climate programs within a national ETS can make emissions reduction more expensive is correct.

However, getting the cheapest emissions abatement is not the only possible goal. Another goal might be to target particular geographic or social groups, such as rural areas or low-income households. South Australia’s Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme, for example, aims to reduce household electricity use, but requires a certain proportion of that reduction to occur in disadvantaged households. Energy costs are thus reduced where households are most struggling with them, rather than just where it’s cheapest to do so (which is usually higher-income households). Similar goals could well be pursued through state-based measures complementing a carbon price.

A goal of further policies might be to target areas that don’t respond well or rapidly to price changes, whether because of habit, socially shaped preferences, intrinsic motivation, or market problems. It’s certainly possible that carbon-price-related rises in electricity bills may cause us to go and demand more energy efficient appliances and houses, or at least appliances and houses that can be upgraded when better technology arrives. But these connections are often tenuous and it can make more sense simply to mandate minimum standards, as we already do for safety. (It is considered unacceptable to let the market decide how safe appliances and houses will be based on “price”, i.e. lawsuits.)

Yet the Victorian Government has removed support for precisely such a policy: coal power standards that would have required a certain level of emissions efficiency from new plants, and required them to be ready to install clean coal technology if it became viable.

Scrapping investments in climate-related infrastructure or research and development, as the Queensland Government is doing, only makes sense if you believe that markets always make the best choices. Research, however, is an area where markets commonly do too little, because the benefits of research tend to be shared amongst many (including competitors) rather than just the researching organisation itself.

Strategic government investment in technology can make it viable years before the market would deliver a similar result. A prime example is Germany’s highly advanced solar power industry, which it developed with subsidies despite being covered by the EU ETS. And while it’s unclear how well Germany’s bolstered solar industry will survive long-term against its rivals from China, it is inarguable that the solar industry made Germany’s power supply robust to the kind of shock that saw its nuclear reactors shut down after the disaster in Fukushima.

This robustness – the ability to maintain a minimum level of performance under a range of possible future conditions – was not delivered because of the EU ETS: it came from additional, smaller-scale policy. And while it may involve some amount of duplication, such robustness is valuable when unforeseen events occur; what if, against all expectation, the constitutional challenge to the Clean Energy Future legislation were to succeed? Achieving our environmental goals would be significantly easier if states still had their individual programs.

These are just a handful of reasons why complementary environmental and climate policies could be worth pursuing, even at a state level, under a national carbon price. There are more. And I do not claim that all policies will be worth it: complementary policies should be evaluated under frameworks such as the one recently published by Denniss, Grudnoff, & Macintosh.

If the Queensland and Victorian Governments had justified abandoning their climate programs based on such an evaluation, it would be easier to believe their faith in a “carbon tax”. And, to be fair, Victoria did conduct a review (PDF) that found no compelling case for a state-based emissions reduction target under a national carbon scheme. But the review also found other Victorian climate programs are worth keeping, and that the merits of state emissions target should be reviewed if the national scheme is altered or repealed.

The reason that state governments are backpedalling on climate policies isn’t because they believe that the “carbon tax” will solve all our environmental problems: this is a smokescreen. The reason is that they don’t share the goals that the federal legislation pursues, of reducing carbon pollution, encouraging renewable energy generation, and “future-proofing” the economy. For if they did, there are plenty of state climate schemes that would still be worthwhile.

¹ Readers may be more familiar with the incorrect, though widespread term, “carbon tax”. More on that here.

[UPDATE 30/03]
Green industry newsletter Climate Spectator republished the article today :-)

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Cross-post: Robust Response to Climate Change Risk and Uncertainty

When I started working my "climate change is about risk" paper, I was driven to try and bring some of the issues involved into the public arena, because I don't think they get enough of a run. (Understandably, perhaps – risk and uncertainty aren't sexy top[ics.) I wrote a short, tight opinion piece, with invaluable advice from an ex-colleague and communication professional, Nicole Trick Steinbach. Since it was my first attempt at an op-ed, I also ran it past a few colleagues, which resulted in some good tips but also took ages. Finally, I gave it to my department's media office, who attempted to "place" it with a newspaper or similar.

Sadly, they failed, but in the interim I'd started writing for New Matilda, and when they asked me to comment on the latest update on climate change science from the Australian Climate Change Commission earlier this week, I decided that would be a good chance to recycle the article. It was published yesterday, and I reproduce it, below:

Risk Rising, Uncertainty Falling

The suggestion by sceptics that we should not act on climate change because the science is uncertain is at odds with sensible management of risk and uncertainty, writes environmental economist Martin Jones

Australia needs a robust response to climate change that explicitly recognises risk and uncertainty to make us more resilient to the range of possible future situations. Coverage of the Australian Climate Commission’s science update, The Critical Decade, and an interim report into Public Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses to Climate Change in Australia and Great Britain have made it clear that this issue is still not fully understood.

Doing nothing in response to climate change exposes us to uncertainty: it is betting that what we currently have is able to cope with whatever the future throws at us. Like choosing clothes for a week-long trip based on today’s weather, it may work – but it would make more sense to prepare by a) finding out what the weather is forecast to be; and b) packing clothes that can adapt to all sorts of weather, in case the predictions are wrong. (Melburnians know all about this.)

Uncertainty should be distinguished from risk: risk is the combination of the likelihood of an (unwanted) event occurring and the severity of its consequences. Where the likelihood or severity are not precisely known, the predictions can be expressed in terms of probabilities; when the Climate Commission talks about “1-in-100 year events” (such as floods), they are describing risk, just as a meteorologist’s “chance of rain” describes risk.

Uncertainty is when we don’t know the risks; when we don’t know how probable an event is. (Some would argue that this describes meteorologists, but let’s be kind.) When opponents of action against climate change argue that there is “uncertainty around climate change”, they are technically correct – but it’s not that we don’t know that it’s going to get worse; we just don’t know how much worse it’s going to get.

An example is the Climate Commission’s projection of global average sea-level rises of 0.5 to 1.0 metre in 2100 compared to 1990, which would result in an increased frequency (higher risk) of high sea-level events (floods) in coastal areas. The Commission openly admits that uncertainty surrounds this figure, but that simply means we do not currently know which areas will have five, which will have ten, and which will have 100 times as many high-sea level events, not that this increase won’t occur.

If I belabour this point, it is because 56% of Australians recently surveyed by Griffith University and Cardiff University about their risk perceptions agree that the effects of climate change are uncertain, and 42% are unsure about or disagree with the notion of scientific consensus on climate change. (Source (PDF), Appendix Questions 12i, 12j, 28)  As The Critical Decade points out (PDF):
  • On a timescale of multiple decades to centuries, the Earth is warming, and at a very fast rate by geological standards. There is no doubt about this statement.
  • Human emissions of greenhouse gases are the primary factor triggering observed climate change since at least the mid 20th century. The IPCC attached 90% certainty to that statement in 2007; research over the past few years has strengthened our confidence in this statement even more.
  • Many uncertainties surround projections of the particular risks that climate change poses for human societies and natural and managed ecosystems, however, the number and magnitude of climate risks will rise as the climate warms further.
More positively, the Griffith/Cardiff University study (PDF) found that 71% of Australian respondents were personally convinced that climate change is really happening”; 90% believed that human activities were playing a causal role in climate change; 66% reported that they were “very concerned” or “fairly concerned” about climate change; and less than 6% of respondents could be characterised as being disbelievers or strong sceptics with respect to the reality of current climate change and/or the causal role of human activities and environmental impacts.

So what to do? When you know what the future will be (or can accurately predict it), taking a “big bet” of action or inaction will bring the biggest payoff – but only if the bet is correct. Under uncertainty, a robust strategy is better: one that has an acceptable outcome regardless of what happens by hedging against possible futures (even if that outcome isn’t as good as if we’d guessed correctly). Robust strategy is generally adaptable, and involves building the capability (technological, political, and institutional) to recognise the signs that we need to react and to do so quickly. 

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is an example of robust policy: though we have no certainty about the location, timing, or nature of future conflicts, the ADF maintains a range of units and institutions with different capabilities to be able to respond quickly with whatever strategy is most appropriate. The wait-and-see approach, on the other hand, is more akin to New South Wales’ action on infrastructure, where little is done until the system is at breaking point and fixing it will take years.

The suggested course of (in)action – business as usual – from those who claim there is doubt about climate change is thus at odds with sensible management of risk and uncertainty. When you're uncertain, you prepare by hedging your bets, not by taking a punt on the non-occurrence of catastrophe.

The more certain we are that dangerous climate change is occurring – and The Critical Decade is more certain than any report before it –, the more we should invest in anticipatory measures such as emissions reduction or adaptive measures to cope with the foreseen changes. The less certain we are, the more we should explore reactive measures that allow us to improve our level of knowledge (e.g. through environmental science) and act quickly once we have become certain (e.g. through environmental technologies, similar to those encouraged by the innovation programs scrapped a few months ago by the Gillard Government). But doing little or nothing about climate change is a course we should take only if we are completely certain that climate change is NOT occurring. And less than 6% of Australians believe that.

Regardless of your view on the correct level of a carbon price, having an appropriate emissions trading scheme gives us the crucial capability to control emissions, should we need to. Effective technological and innovation policy can give the capability to reduce or even reverse CO2e emissions, should we need to, and a sensible combination of an ETS, technology programs, and other policies will be more robust than any of these alone. Given the time lags inherent in the climate system, reducing our scientific, technological, political, and institutional response times is especially valuable; so, too, is the “learning-by-doing” effect. These strategies benefit us simply by protecting us against uncertainty, even if the worst-case scenarios don’t come to pass – and especially if they do.

Both proponents and sceptics view the risks and uncertainties involved in climate change with concern. Let’s deal with that uncertainty by implementing robust policies to secure Australia’s future under all foreseeable eventualities.



Several of the <6% have come out to comment on the piece. My favourite so far is the guy who calls carbon pricing an "unproven energy and market experiment" (as if the EU and New Zealand didn't exist), and claims that 10% of the "carbon tax money go round" will be "syphoned (sic) off to the UN". I actually laughed out loud at that.

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Climate change is about risk

So I'm working on a "robust policy mix" for climate change (more on that later... perhaps), but in the course of my research I've come across a nice little paragraph that, in my opinion, is a wonderful starting point for thinking about climate change:
[O]ur work suggests that climate change ought to be viewed more as a contingency problem than an optimization problem. Either society will have to make very large reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions over the course of the next century, or it will not. Since society does not yet know which future will happen, it needs to prepare for both. Thus, the most important near-term goals of climate-change policy may be to: (i) reach consensus on the observations that will indicate a need for drastic action to curtail greenhouse-gas emissions, (ii) take actions that will make large future reductions more feasible and less costly if, in fact, they are needed, and (iii) do this in such a way as to avoid over-allocating resources to a problem that turns out to be minor or preparing insufficiently for what we discover is an emerging catastrophe.
Source: Lempert & Schlesinger (2000) "Robust Strategies for Abating Climate Change" in Climatic Change Volume 45, Numbers 3-4, p. 395

The next time you hear something about climate change (more so in Australia than in Europe), take note of the mental model framing the argument – or, rather, the lack of it. This paper is 10 years old, yet a minority of pundits (and, sadly, politicians) have wrapped their head around how to approach the (possible) problem. We should be way beyond this (though at least we're ahead of the Yanks).

Oh, and here's another lovely little excerpt from the same page:
[P]olitical activity in this area [climate change] more closely resembles an evolving set of actions designed to shape the future political landscape and influence private-sector investments, rather than any firm consensus about the optimum level of emissions reductions. International negotiators often appear to regard the continuation of the process as more important than the particular results at each stage.
10 years on... how little has changed. However, the authors go on to differentiate between hedging – taking actions now to mitigate risk – and shaping – making it easier to take actions later –, and suggest that the latter approach may be as good as the former. I don't know to what extent I believe that, but it does give me a little more hope that the Conferences of the Parties are actually achieving anything.