Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Economics for five-year-olds

My neighbour's daughter asked what my job was. "I'm an economist," I replied.

"What's that?"

Normally I tell people that economists think about cost and benefits; the demand and supply of goods and services. I tell them we want to maximise 'utility', but since we can't measure it directly or ask people, we watch what people do instead (e.g. in markets) and use prices (money) as a proxy for utility.

From there, I explain that my field – environmental economics – is about valuing things that don't have markets, e.g. the environment. If they're really paying attention, I may even talk about externalities.

My neighbour's daughter, however, is five. She doesn't understand markets, or utility, or costs and benefits in an abstract sense. So I was stumped.

Months later, I've got a good answer:
An economist figures out how to share things so that everyone can be as happy as possible.


You're welcome.

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Why drop the price floor? Taking a gamble on the EU ETS

I couldn't make much at first  of today's announcement by Greg Combet, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, that Australia was going to link its ETS with the EU ETS – and oh, by the way, we're dropping the price floor.

That Australia and the EU will link their schemes good news, but it's an expected development. Dropping the price floor, on the hand, had been speculated about (notably by the AFR; well done, Marcus Priest), but wasn't part of the original plan.

As I wrote back in May, a price floor has some good things going for it, despite being technically challenging; and as it's only regulation the government has the numbers to pass it even against Rob Oakeshott's opposition. So my initial reaction was that the floor price had been put in the "too hard" basket and the ETS linkage was just used to disguise that announcement somewhat.

I've since heard, however, that dropping the price floor was a condition of the EU agreeing to link the schemes, and Australia replaced it with the restriction of foreign units. This makes more sense.

The EU currently has an oversupply of permits (European Union Allowances; EUAs), and will have for a quite a few years yet, so it would welcome a new source of demand: Australia. (Even if our purchase volumes aren't that great in the scheme of things.) An Australian price floor would not only lessen demand for EUAs, it would also make integrating the schemes more complex.

The price floor, though, was there to stop the Australian market being flooded by cheap foreign permits; to give domestic sources of investment into potential abatement (or offsets) the certainty that they would be able to get at least $15 for their product. What fulfils that role?

Well, we've moved from a price restriction to a (sort-of) quantity restriction. Previously, entities could meet up to 50% of their AU ETS liabilities with foreign units, but the only foreign units decided upon were those from the Kyoto Protocol: CERs, ERUs, and RMUs. The CDM market is currently even more oversupplied than the EUA market, and prices are down, down, down;(1) well below the $15 price floor.

Now, the 50% limit on international units is still there, but only 12.5% (of total liabilities) can be met by Kyoto units. Once that limit is reached, the relevant price domestic permits (ACUs) and offsets (ACCUs) have to compete against is that of EUAs. (Remember that the large amount of free permits – I don't have exact figures, but it's around 30-40% of our cap, I think; leave a comment if you've better info – lowers the effective size of the domestic market, so the 50% international unit cap isn't as strict as it sounds.)

That 12.5% limit suits not only the EU, since the EUAs don't have to compete against the Kyoto units for the other 37.5%, but also suits  those like The Greens who want the carbon price to rise over time: they expect the EUA price to rise over time, pulling ACU/ACCU prices with it. It's not a bad gamble – certainly, I think the chance of EUA prices rising above $15 is higher than that of CDM prices doing so. (Exchange rates play a role in all this as well, but I'm buggered if I know which way they're going.)

Limiting Kyoto units also does a little bit to allay concerns about the additionality of some of those units, though it's a fairly blunt instrument; a quantity control is not a quality control.

That's the policy side of things. On the politics side, the EU ETS integration/no price floor does some interesting things. The lack of an auction price floor and international surrender charge (which together constitute the 'price floor' we've been discussing) could well reduce government revenue from the carbon price; it depends on what the EUA price does.

More interestingly, though, I think the EU integration and lack of a price floor will make the AU ETS appeal more to free market types, especially since at first glance it looks like providing opportunities for cheaper abatement. (You fine readers, of course, know better.) And unless the Liberals want to start slagging off Europeans, they might reign back calling foreign abaters cowboys, scammers, frauds, and criminals.

Yeah, okay, I don't buy that last one, either. But at least the government now have a better response to that.

Finally, integrating more fully with the EU ETS effectively places more responsibility for domestic prices in their hands: if EUA prices go up, so will Australia's prices – sorry, guys, it's out of our hands! (Though we keep the price ceiling, I understand it will be set with reference to the EUA price; so no great limit, there.)

A lot depends on how well the EU can reform its ETS to drive prices back up into its preferred (by almost everyone but Poland) range – but then, that's always been the case.



(1) Come at me, Coles.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Cross-post: Does it make sense for Australia to restrict its export of fossil fuels?

A friend of mine wrote for the ABC about Australia taking responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions generated by the fossil fuels we export, which inspired me to sit down and sort out my views on the topic. The notion of responsibility is often bound up with the idea of refusing to export fossil fuels – an idea also often ascribed to The Greens, though I wasn't able to find it in their official policies – which is an idea I think silly. After I figured out why I thought I was silly, I put my arguments into an article format, which New Matilda published today:

Who's Responsible For Exported CO2?


By Martin Jones

Once we dig up and sell the coal, are we still responsible for the emissions? 'Stop exporting fossil fuels' isn't a good enough solution when people in developing countries need to eat and build, writes environmental economist Martin Jones


During the Rio+20 sustainable development summit, Fergus Green and Reuben Finighan last week called for Australia to take responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) it enables through its exports of fossil fuels. Is this a good idea? How would we go about it?

Green and Finighan wrote that the Australian federal government should take a broader look at the sustainability of mining, focussing on the product, not just the process; i.e. it should consider the GHG generated by fossil fuels during their whole use cycle, not just the emissions generated during the mining process.

Mining nations such Australia, Green and Finighan argue, should take responsibility for the emissions caused when their exported fossil fuels are burned; assigning responsibility to the importers only makes sense in the context of an enforceable international climate change regime in which all major emitting countries were limiting their domestic emissions in line with science-based objectives.

Australia is certainly a large player in fossil fuels. We have around 9 per cent of the world’s proven coal reserves, and in 2011 were responsible for 5.8 per cent of the world’s production – down 2.2 percentage points on 2010 – making us the world’s third-largest coal producer after China and the USA. [1] 

Not needing nearly as many fossil fuels as China or the USA, we’re the world’s largest coal exporter, accounting for around 27 per cent of global trade [2]  Including liquid natural gas (LNG) exports and accounting for currently planned projects, critics of fossil fuel exports estimate that Australian fossil fuels could be responsible for 9 per cent of global GHG emissions by 2020 – and that’s excluding any domestic emissions. [3]

If Australia takes responsibility for its exported emissions, then presumably we would need to follow the same course as for our domestic emissions and reduce them. How? The most obvious answer is, “stop exporting fossil fuels.”

That’s also a poor answer, though, at least in the short- to mid-term. It’s probably by now common knowledge that mining products are Australia’s largest export earner, and large proportion of these are fossil fuels: as of April 2012, 27.5 per cent of our merchandise exports (by value) came from mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials (primarily fossil fuels). [4]  

And though the mining industry isn’t nearly as large an employer or tax-payer as they’d like us to think – employing 2.3 per cent of the Australian workforce as of this May [5] , and paying 15 per cent of company taxes in 2009-10 [6]  – removing this revenue stream from the Australian economy would be a long and painful process.
(I refer not only to the ‘pain’ of economic transition, but also the pain the mining industry would inflict upon anyone trying to reduce their profits, and the pain Australians would go through listening to it all.)

There are moral problems to consider, too. The Australian Coal Association (ACA) lists China and India as the second- and fourth-largest importers of Australian coal; Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the first-, third-, and fifth-largest, respectively. [7] 

The ACA is not alone in expecting demand for resources from China, India, and other developing countries to increase dramatically in the next decade [8], which means refusing to export fossil fuels would make India or China’s transition to a first-world country longer and/or more expensive. A refusal to export also smacks a little of paternalism; a “we know better” attitude where we don’t trust nations to put our resources to good use.

This may well be a path we’re willing to take. There is a precedent for refusing to export resources to countries that we consider might not use them responsibly: fuels for nuclear weapons, such as uranium. Applied to fossil fuels, one could imagine a stance where Australia refuses to export coal, etc. to countries that haven’t signed sufficient agreements on low-emissions usage.

Where the consequences of the actions we enable are severe enough – burning Australia's fossil fuel reserves would take the world 60 per cent of the way to 2 degrees warming, write Green and Finighan – a degree of unilateral action can be justified.

(Given Australia now looks like exporting uranium to India despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, though, this is a weak precedent. [9]  Nor would I envy the foreign minister who has to sell such a policy to two of the world’s largest economies.)

The bigger moral problem, though, in my opinion, is a policy that would see Australia reduce our export of fossil fuels before reducing our own usage of them. For starters, our exported fuels are generally higher-quality resources that are less polluting than what we use domestically; our coal exports, for example, are almost exclusively black coal, which releases significantly less GHGs than the brown coal used in Australia (especially Victoria) for power generation.

Not only that, our fossil fuels are arguably put to better use by developing countries than they would be in Australia: building infrastructure in China or India, while it may be more carbon-intensive than here, will probably do more to improve the lives of their citizens than using those resources here would improve ours.

By no means do I wish to suggest that Australia should wash its hands of responsibility for the emissions of the resources we export: I welcome Green and Finighan’s call for Australian leadership on this issue. That fairly broad concept, however, involves some tricky questions, some – by no means all – of which I have raised here. I expect Green and Finighan’s upcoming report for Beyond Zero Emissions will address many of them, and I look forward more discussion of this issue in the future.

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Wish one is ALWAYS for more wishes

Last week I went to drinks celebrating the 5th birthday of the Centre for Policy Development, a very cool, creative think tank that sprang out of the policy development the New Matilda magazine was doing; you may remember I've written for NM now and again.

The CPD is run by Miriam Lyons, a fascinating woman well worth listening to, and at the birthday drinks I ended up with conversation with her parents. Lyons' mother, a psychologist, asked me the following question:
"If you had three wishes to change the world to help the environment, but that change had to occur through political processes, what would those wishes be?"

I found the question fascinating, and pondered it for a minute or two. Think about your own answers for a while, if you like. (You know it's a happening party when people stare into the middle distance rubbing their chins thoughtfully for a while.)
My first wish, I decided, was:
  1. Give the environment legal rights.
Once you treat the environment as a legal entity, and give it rights, any dealings with it then have to recognise those rights. Damage to the environment no longer becomes 'free', but instead requires restitution to someone (presumably the government) for infringing these rights. Okay, 'the environment' probably has de facto rights (via the government) in some sense already, and I don't know exactly what my system of rights would look like, but this is magic genie wishing at a party, remember?

I was pretty happy with this answer, and for a while I couldn't think of anything to do with my other two wishes. After a bit of needling from Lyons Senior, I decided that a framework for protecting the environment and some absolute standards probably wasn't enough; I'm protecting the environment for the sake of people, so there should be a relationship to people in my plan. Therefore, my second wish was to:
  1.  Give every person the right to a minimum amount of environmental quality.
'Environmental quality' is obviously fairly fuzzy, but it would cover things like clean air, water, land, biodiversity, etc. There are thousands of indicators of environmental quality, so I'd let my genie loose on that. (Or some applied statistics majors, whatever.)

Having now established a framework of sorts and a mandated supply of environmental quality, my economist brain decided the final piece of the puzzle was obvious: create demand for environmental quality. How, though? Creating demand, especially ingrained demand, is tough – it's often as much cultural as anything else, and creating or changing culture is a barrier I've never been able to surmount. In genie-party-land, however, I was able to get away with:
  1. Create an ingrained (cultural) demand for environmental quality, e.g. through education.
When it comes to affecting (or effecting) culture, I usually throw my hands up and look for a sociologist/psychologist/theologian/whatever to pass the question to; they invariably profess to not know the answer either – and I don't know I'd believe them if they claimed they did! But educating people to value the environment, e.g. through bush walks or family outings, seems to be a fairly effective method. It was certainly a good topic of further conversation.

We asked the same question of another researcher at the CPD, and the differences in our answers was fascinating: her first wish would be to "assassinate some people – clear the decks!" (Lest you get the wrong idea about the CPD, remember this was birthday drinks, and I don't think she took the question quite as seriously as I did.)
I've forgotten her second wish, unfortunately, but her third was to take over a large stake in the media to promote her message: "buy Channel 9", basically.

It's intriguing how differently people approach the question; I think I'll squirrel it away as a conversation starter. You have been warned.

Friday, May 11, 2012

Cross-post: Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

After my previous misadventures with major media, I was pleasantly surprised when Stian Reklev, the chief correspondent for Reuters Point Carbon, asked me to write a comment piece on the Australian ETS price floor mechanism and its effect on the market for international permits. In retrospect, I perhaps lapsed a little too much into 'explainer' mode, but with only 650 words to play with there's only so much analysis you can do – I feel weird not backing statements up with solid argumentation and a few links. Here's the piece, published today in the Carbon Market Australia-New Zealand May newsletter:

Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

From July 2015, the Australian federal government will set the price of the permits in its emissions trading scheme free – within limits. The government intends to introduce a price floor and price ceiling until at least 2017/18, in order to provide certainty and reduce risks for market participants and investors.

This is good news for emission reduction activities whose viability depends on prices several years hence, such as larger, more complex projects. Further, the goal of abatement at least-cost should be balanced against the goal of abating as rapidly as possible; should reaching current targets be cheaper than expected, a floor price can ensure a minimum level of spending on abatement. Several EU countries already have or are considering similar measures, in recognition that adjusting the targets of an ETS in response to price movements often isn’t possible rapidly.

Last December, the government released a discussion paper and called for submission on the price floor, which combines a reserve price for Australian carbon units at auction with an ‘international unit surrender charge’ that ensures international carbon credits cost at least as much as domestic units.

Four options are being considered for the international unit surrender charge, with two main approaches: Options 1 and 2 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price of the international unit when it was purchased; Options 3 and 4 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price when the unit surrendered.

While calculating the surrender charge based on the difference between the buying price and the price floor is intuitively appealing, it has implementation issues ranging from administrative complexity, through estimating firms’ time value of money (to adjust the prices of credits purchased earlier rather than later), to the possibility of firms gaming the system by artificially inflating the price of purchased credits. The government paper also notes that Options 1 and 2 would create a preference for foreign units as “if the international price goes up, [firms] could sell the unit at a profit, purchase another unit at a similar (or the same) price, and pay a lower surrender charge.” (Source)

Option 3 appears the most likely: when firms surrender their international units, a charge is applied based on the difference between the prevailing spot price and the price floor. This is the “purest” option, with minimal government involvement and low administration costs. The risk that the price of units changes between purchasing and surrendering them is borne by the liable firms, though financial markets are expected (e.g. by Westpac (PDF)) to provide hedging products or forward contracts.

The costs of hedging, in addition to the surrender charge, could promote the purchase of domestic units over foreign credits. However, it’s worth noting that, since markets for foreign units will likely exist further forward than domestic units (which will only be auctioned three years in advance, based on current plans), there will be a strong bias toward international credits from firms looking to hedge long-term.

Option 4 is similar to Option 3, though with an option for firms to lock in a surrender charge ahead of time based on a regulator-calculated forward curve. This interesting idea would assist firms who, for reasons of cost, access, or complexity are unlikely to use financial markets’ hedging products. Though adding complexity, it would avoid any bias Option 3 has toward domestic units. However, is it the government’s role to insure traders from carbon price risk?

While an MP who supported the ETS, Rob Oakeshott, has recently spoken out against the price floor, the government has an advantage: the relevant legislation has already been passed, and the remaining details (e.g. the choice of option) can be passed by regulation. Regulation passes automatically unless blocked, so the opposition would need to find a 75-seat majority in the House of Representatives to do so. (Under convention established by Speaker Denison, the Speaker votes against motions in case of a tie.)

Even in the government’s current precarious position, this seems unlikely – the defection of Oakeshott alone would not suffice –, so that, if the government survives long enough to introduce a price floor, it will likely pass.

Martin C. Jones is a researcher at the Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets, UNSW.

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Cross-post: State climate schemes are still worthwhile under a carbon price

My first piece for The Conversation, written in response to recent events:

State climate schemes still worthwhile under a carbon price

In justifying their recent abandonment of state-based climate schemes, the governments of Queensland and Victoria have both claimed that the schemes will be redundant under the federal emissions trading scheme (ETS) that begins in July.¹ Yet this justification is only a smokescreen, as a carbon price can well exist with other environmental and climate schemes.

The goal of putting a price on carbon – more correctly, on greenhouse gases, but “carbon” is shorter – is to reduce the amount of carbon emissions. The flexible nature of an ETS lets the market decide whether this occurs. It reduces the activities that produce carbon or conducts those activities more efficiently.

The industries in which these reductions occur, and the people that are affected by them, can be only broadly selected by the Government. This is the point, since the idea is that the market will do the job more cheaply than if the Government prescribed everything. And the argument that state climate programs within a national ETS can make emissions reduction more expensive is correct.

However, getting the cheapest emissions abatement is not the only possible goal. Another goal might be to target particular geographic or social groups, such as rural areas or low-income households. South Australia’s Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme, for example, aims to reduce household electricity use, but requires a certain proportion of that reduction to occur in disadvantaged households. Energy costs are thus reduced where households are most struggling with them, rather than just where it’s cheapest to do so (which is usually higher-income households). Similar goals could well be pursued through state-based measures complementing a carbon price.

A goal of further policies might be to target areas that don’t respond well or rapidly to price changes, whether because of habit, socially shaped preferences, intrinsic motivation, or market problems. It’s certainly possible that carbon-price-related rises in electricity bills may cause us to go and demand more energy efficient appliances and houses, or at least appliances and houses that can be upgraded when better technology arrives. But these connections are often tenuous and it can make more sense simply to mandate minimum standards, as we already do for safety. (It is considered unacceptable to let the market decide how safe appliances and houses will be based on “price”, i.e. lawsuits.)

Yet the Victorian Government has removed support for precisely such a policy: coal power standards that would have required a certain level of emissions efficiency from new plants, and required them to be ready to install clean coal technology if it became viable.

Scrapping investments in climate-related infrastructure or research and development, as the Queensland Government is doing, only makes sense if you believe that markets always make the best choices. Research, however, is an area where markets commonly do too little, because the benefits of research tend to be shared amongst many (including competitors) rather than just the researching organisation itself.

Strategic government investment in technology can make it viable years before the market would deliver a similar result. A prime example is Germany’s highly advanced solar power industry, which it developed with subsidies despite being covered by the EU ETS. And while it’s unclear how well Germany’s bolstered solar industry will survive long-term against its rivals from China, it is inarguable that the solar industry made Germany’s power supply robust to the kind of shock that saw its nuclear reactors shut down after the disaster in Fukushima.

This robustness – the ability to maintain a minimum level of performance under a range of possible future conditions – was not delivered because of the EU ETS: it came from additional, smaller-scale policy. And while it may involve some amount of duplication, such robustness is valuable when unforeseen events occur; what if, against all expectation, the constitutional challenge to the Clean Energy Future legislation were to succeed? Achieving our environmental goals would be significantly easier if states still had their individual programs.

These are just a handful of reasons why complementary environmental and climate policies could be worth pursuing, even at a state level, under a national carbon price. There are more. And I do not claim that all policies will be worth it: complementary policies should be evaluated under frameworks such as the one recently published by Denniss, Grudnoff, & Macintosh.

If the Queensland and Victorian Governments had justified abandoning their climate programs based on such an evaluation, it would be easier to believe their faith in a “carbon tax”. And, to be fair, Victoria did conduct a review (PDF) that found no compelling case for a state-based emissions reduction target under a national carbon scheme. But the review also found other Victorian climate programs are worth keeping, and that the merits of state emissions target should be reviewed if the national scheme is altered or repealed.

The reason that state governments are backpedalling on climate policies isn’t because they believe that the “carbon tax” will solve all our environmental problems: this is a smokescreen. The reason is that they don’t share the goals that the federal legislation pursues, of reducing carbon pollution, encouraging renewable energy generation, and “future-proofing” the economy. For if they did, there are plenty of state climate schemes that would still be worthwhile.

¹ Readers may be more familiar with the incorrect, though widespread term, “carbon tax”. More on that here.

[UPDATE 30/03]
Green industry newsletter Climate Spectator republished the article today :-)

Friday, March 23, 2012

Paying for organ donation

A friend asks: 
I did a piece last year on the economic benefits of paid organ donation schemes. I was just wondering if you had encountered this topic at all. I couldn't find an economic reason to oppose it.


I only just tossed off an answer, but I thought the topic interesting enough to preserve:

I haven't come across any studies of paid organ donation schemes, no.

The biggest economic problem I can think of is that it's paying people to do what 'right' anyway. If that sounds totally non-economisty, let me rephrase it: markets provide an extrinsic incentive, via payment. However, many – most – things also have an intrinsic value: "pride in your work"; "the satisfaction of a job well done"; the respect of others; the comfort of following your morals.* If you focus too strongly on extrinsic motivation – performance-related pay is a good example – you remove intrinsic motivation, and intrinsic motivation is a MUCH stronger force than extrinsic.

So a (possible) problem with paid organ donation schemes, depending on how they're set up, is that you may begin by supplementing your 'free' pool of donations with paid donations, but you end up having to pay everyone as payment becomes the prime motivator for donation.

Better, IMO, are non-monetary schemes to increase intrinsic motivation or overcome barriers to action: make organ donation opt-out, for example, rather than opt it. Marketing, awareness campaigns, stuff like that. Create a culture of giving, rather than a culture of 'pay me to do something good for other people'.

* Interesting side note: happiness studies have found people with strong (not strict; more, 'well-defined') moral codes are likelier to be happy than people with weak or no morals. The speculated reason is that acting in accordance with your morals lets you feel good about yourself (in addition to however good the activity makes you feel), while not having morals mean you get the benefit of the activity.

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

Cosmetic, distortionary health care reform

I was musing that the further I looked into how the private health insurance rebate (and Medicare high-income levy) work, the weirder the incentive structures got. Some friends asked me to elaborate, so here goes:

Your basic tax-welfare compact is that you pay tax, and the government uses that to provide a range of services – including, in this case, health care. The amount of tax you pay varies depending on your level of income, while the services you're entitled to are – generally speaking – the same for everyone. So your level of tax shouldn't affect the level of services to which you're entitled. And underpinning Australia's universal health care system is the idea that everyone 'deserves' health care, even if they can't afford to pay for it themselves.

However, not all services are created equal. For example, everyone can drive on public roads for free. However, you may not be satisfied with the roads the government is offering you – perhaps too many other people use them, or they don't go where you want to go. You are free to go purchase extra, private services, such as toll roads. You still, however, keep your entitlement to use government services.

Now, replace "roads" with "health care". The government supplies everyone with a particular range of health care services, but the system can get overcrowded and may not cover what you want covered, so people who value health care – like people who value travelling on roads – are free to go off and purchase private services.

The big difference is that the government actively encourages some Australians not to use its services, but to instead use the private alternatives. It effectively pays them, by taxing them less. Who gets this encouragement? People who value health services? No: people with high incomes.

That's right: if you're on a high income (>$70k for singles) and you take out PHI, you effectively get money from the government by avoiding a levy. If you earn less than that, but you value health care highly enough that you take out PHI, you get no tax breaks.

That's a little weird.

So now we have this strange incentive system that assumes all high-income earners value health care and subsidises their use, instead of, say, assigning each person an amount of health care funding for a limited range of services regardless of where they go, and letting them purchase extra services if and when they choose. (Which would make it like our road system. Or like the way our education should work, but doesn't. But that's a different gripe.) The closest we come to giving everyone choice-independent health care funding is the PHI rebate, which pays for a portion of the health care costs for everyone who chooses the private rather than the public system

That's the current situation. Here's what's changing: the PHI rebate will be means-tested, which means fewer high-income people will get it. And, the Medicare surcharge for high-income earners is increasing – this is the levy high-income earners can avoid by taking out PHI. So we're reducing the choice-independent funding for high-income earners at the same time the incentive for high-income earners to take out PHI is increasing – why??

A point I'm indebted to Henry Ergas for (he also uses a road analogy, though I swear I thought of mine independently) is that the more you encourage people to take up PHI by offering them tax breaks, the less responsive they are to the actual costs of that health care: their incentives are being distorted. Less responsiveness to prices makes it more likely prices will rise, so that people who value health highly but are price-sensitive – lower-income people – will be less likely to take out PHI, and our health care system stratifies further. And, given that almost all high-income people take out PHI, means-testing the rebate is basically hidden progressive taxation. While I'm in favour of progressive taxation, hiding it isn't a great thing.

All of this makes me far more ambivalent about this reform than I was. I still don't think I'm fully across the topic, but it appears clear these health care reforms are at best okay, and at worst magnify pre-existing distortions. There are better reforms.

(My thoughts on this issue were prompted by this Stephen King piece – worth reading the comments. See also King's earlier piece.)

[Edited on 15/02/12 for clarity.]

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Problems with Australian superannuation

Stephen Long (ABC economics correspondent) won a Walkley award for this 2010 piece on the low returns made by Australian superannuation funds; Fairfax economics journo Peter Martin picked up the theme this week with a scoring critique of fund managers' prowess (or lack of it).

They're both strong pieces, and are finding a lot of resonance. I disagree, however, with Peter Martin's suggestion in his piece – confirmed when I asked him – that compulsory superannuation is a bad idea, full stop. (Which is not to say that he'd like to see it ditched, now that it's here.) 
That many funds (and the system as a whole) have been delivering poor returns is indisputable, and it's also plain that fees are too high. I see that as issues within the system requiring reform, though, rather than crippling flaws.

Certainly, I'm troubled – and annoyed, at a personal level – that funds have not delivered good returns. But I wouldn't do away with the whole kit and caboodle just yet.

Thursday, November 03, 2011

IETA GHG Market Report 2011

A little over a month ago I alluded to an article I co-authored for the International Emissions Trading Association's (IETA) annual report on Greenhouse Gas Markets. That IETA GHG Market Report 2011 has now been published, and our article forms the very first chapter – hurrah!

It's too early to say whether this counts as a proper peer-reviewed publication or not – there was peer review, but other criteria come into play, as well –, but this is a nice little feather in my cap, regardless :-)

Thursday, September 29, 2011

Cross-post: Details of the Clean Energy Future package

About a month ago, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) asked one of my directors whether we'd like to prepare an overview of the last in Australian climate change politics for their annual report. Because I spend a lot of time following this sort of stuff and looking over the proposals from the Government, I got to take the lead on this (at least as far as the factual elements were concerned). Even though I'm only a lowly RA, my colleagues kindly decided my efforts were enough to warrant having my name listed first on our article, which I'm quietly pleased about.

After we'd sent our submission off, but before it was published (I think it comes out in October or November [UPDATE] in early November), New Matilda contacted me and asked if I'd like to summarise the details of the Clean Energy Future package – so, pretty much what we'd just done for IETA, but without the political analysis. I'm sometimes a little baffled by the things people ask me to write about, since I imagine they're of limited interest other than to wonks like myself (and wonks will probably have looked at the source material), but since I had the material fresh in my head I assented.

Here it is, then: a summary (at length) of the details of the Clean Energy Future package. I won't hold it against you if you don't read it – it's so long,  in fact, that NM split it into two parts! But if you want an explanation of the scheme, here you go.

Our Clean Energy Future Explained

The Government’s Clean Energy Future is underway, with 18 bills – the Clean Energy Legislative Package  – being introduced to Parliament on September 13th.

The legislation is lengthy and boring, but it’s important: these 18 bills (and a few more to come in the first half of next year) lay the framework for what will be the primary driver of Australia’s attempt to mitigate dangerous anthropogenic climate change – assuming they pass, of course. Ben Eltham has already taken an excellent look at the Clean Energy Future package (henceforth: CEF) for New Matilda. What follows in this article and its sequel is a summary of some of the CEF’s nitty-gritty details.

Much of my summary is based on the CEF package as it was released in July. As far as I’ve been able to tell, not much has changed in the current legislation, but if you spot any discrepancies, please comment.

The Emissions Trading Scheme
The best known, and arguable most important piece of the CEF package is an emissions trading scheme (ETS) which will begin on 1 July, 2012. Under an ETS, parties (generally companies) that emit those greenhouse gases covered by the scheme will be required to surrender permits to the Government equal to their emissions.

The ETS will cover four of the six greenhouse gases counted under the Kyoto Protocol – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and per fluorocarbon emissions from the aluminium sector. The remaining two (hydrofluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride) will face an equivalent carbon price through existing synthetic greenhouse gas legislation. To simplify things, the climate change potential of each greenhouse gas is measured in terms of how much carbon dioxide (CO2) it is equivalent to; hence the references to “CO2-e” (technical) or simply “carbon” (colloquial).

Emitters can purchase permits – officially called “carbon units” – for a tonne of CO2-e from the Government, or other participants in the ETS. During the first three years of the scheme, the price of permits will be fixed, and permits are immediately surrendered to the Government when purchased. This means that in the first phase the ETS will function very similarly to a tax, without actually being one: there is still the ability to trade, albeit at a fixed price. Non-governmental sellers of permits might be companies that have more permits than they need (see Compensation and Assistance, below), or farmers who have generated permits through the Carbon Farming Initiative (see Regulatory Bodies and Complementary Measures, below). For more on the fundamental differences between an emissions trading scheme and a tax, see Carbon Pricing 101.

Permits will cost $23 per tonne of CO2-e when the ETS begins in 2012, and will rise at 5 per cent per year (nominally); $24.15/t in 2013-14 and $25.40/t in 2014-15. From July 1, 2015, the price will be variable, and set by the market. The idea is that, by 2016, the international price of CO2-e will be around $29/t. 
No foreign permits or credits will be accepted during the fixed-price period, and a maximum of 50 per cent of a party’s obligation during the flexible-price period may be sourced internationally. Kyoto Protocol-compliant credits created under the Carbon Farming Initiative can be used for up to 5 per cent of compliance during the fixed price period. (This limit is far higher than then the number of credits the Carbon Farming Initiative is likely to produce.)

From 2015, some international permits will be allowed. These include Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), Emissions Reductions Units (ERUs), Removal Units (RMUs), and other units the Government may allow. The Government’s view is that linking to other credible trading schemes, including the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme, is in Australia’s national interest.

From 2015 to 2018 there will be a price ceiling of $20/t above the international price, and a price floor of $15/t. This is to reduce wild fluctuations and provide some measure of certainty for those who have to factor the price of carbon into their decision-making. These stabilisers will rise by 5 per cent and 4 per cent in real terms, that is, plus inflation, per year, and will be reviewed in 2017 by the Climate Change Authority (CCA). It is unclear which instrument will form the basis of this international price – will it be EU units (EUAs) or New Zealand Units (NZUs) – and to which foreign schemes the Australian ETS will be linked.

During the fixed-price period, permits allocated for free can be traded domestically or returned to the government, but not banked for use in later years. Parties that fail to surrender enough permits in a year will incur fines of 1.3 times the permit price for that year.

In the flexible-price period, an unlimited number of permits can be banked and up to 5 per cent of the current year’s liability can be met by “borrowing” from the next year’s permit vintage. Each year’s vintage of permits will be auctioned in advance by the government, and shortfalls will incur fines which are double the average permit price for that year.

ETS – Targets

Emissions caps – the maximum number of permits, and therefore emissions, permitted within the ETS each year – for the flexible-price period have not yet been decided. The lack of political agreement here is one of the reasons the ETS begins with a fixed price, but the targets will be announced in 2014 and then set five years in advance. Should no emissions cap be set by Parliament, the cap for 2015-16 will default to 38 MtCO2-e less than total emissions in 2012-13. From 2016 the default cap will be 12 MtCO2-e less than the previous year.

To put that into perspective: Treasury’s carbon price modelling estimated Australia’s emissions at 578 MtCO2-e in 2010, growing steadily, and our bipartisan target at around 527 MtCO2-e by 2020. (Non-Treasury estimates have different figures, but similar magnitudes.) The Government’s goal is to reduce Australia’s emissions by 5 per cent on 2000 levels by 2020 (up to 25 per cent depending on global action), and by 80 per cent by 2050 (previously 50 per cent) – but it’s not quite clear from the CEF package precisely how many tonnes of CO2-e that is.

Voluntary action will be taken into account when setting caps – the CCA will determine the methodology – and will be treated as additional, as will renewable electricity purchases through GreenPower. People will be able to make a tax-deductible contribution to a Pledge Fund to retire Australian carbon permits, Kyoto compliant and non-Kyoto compliant Australian Carbon Credit Units, and eligible international units.

ETS – Coverage

The ETS will fully cover emissions from stationary energy, industrial processes, fugitive emissions – which are those from coal mines or from extracting gas – and emissions from some waste. The transport sector will be partially covered: domestic aviation, shipping, rail transport, and non-transport fuels will face lower fuel tax credits or higher fuel excises (unless the companies voluntarily participate in the ETS), while household transport fuels, light vehicle business transport, and off-road fuel use by the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries will be excluded from the ETS. The Government wants to include heavy transport from 2014. (This last was rejected by the regional independent MPs. The Greens would like to include all transport.)

Roughly 60 per cent of Australia’s emissions are thus covered directly by the ETS, and two-thirds are covered indirectly (e.g. through fuel excise changes). Those companies (around 500) with facilities that have direct greenhouse gas emissions of 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e a year or more (excluding emissions from transport fuels and some synthetic greenhouse gases) must join the ETS, while others can join voluntarily. Companies may do this to profit through trading, hedge against risks, or because they would otherwise face costs such as higher fuel excises but see the opportunity to achieve their abatement more cheaply in the open market – which is the point of an ETS. Agricultural emissions, which form roughly 15 per cent of Australia’s total emissions, will be exempt, as will emissions from forestry and land-use change (e.g. conversion of bush into agricultural land).

Who Will Keep it Clean?

Regulatory Bodies and Complementary Measures

An independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) will be established to report publically on the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Beginning in February, 2014, and then every two years, it will examine all aspects of the scheme, including the price floor and ceiling, and recommend targets and emissions caps. The CCA will be made up of nine experts with a particular focus on climate science, economics, climate change mitigation, emissions trading, investment, and business, and will be chaired by Bernie Fraser (formerly head of the Reserve Bank of Australia).

The CCA’s recommendations are not binding on the government of the day, but the government must justify any difference between its legislation and the recommendations.

This is stronger independent regulation than was proposed under Kevin Rudd’s CPRS, and is complemented by a new Clean Energy Regulator and reviews by the Productivity Commission. The Productivity Commission will review industry compensation and assistance, in particular to emissions-intensive and trade-exposed industries, fuel taxation arrangements, and foreign action. The Clean Energy Regulator will combine administration of the ETS, the Carbon Farming Initiative – where farmers generate credits for storing carbon in soil or trees, or reducing/avoiding emissions –, the Renewable Energy Target, and the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System.

To encourage the construction of renewable energy generation, the CEF package will establish a Clean Energy Finance Corporation to invest – via loans or equity – $5 billion in renewable energy technologies, and $5 billion in low-pollution, and energy efficiency technologies which may include renewable energy projects. The Corporation will not invest in carbon capture and storage technology, though this is still supported by existing programs.

The Government will also establish an Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), which will provide grant-based funding for renewable energy projects. ARENA largely brings existing programs together into one organisation – and this should result in more coordinated and consistent operation of these programs. Both ARENA and the Clean Energy Finance Corporation will be independent agencies.

Australia’s Renewable Energy Target remains at 20 per cent by 2020. (Currently 8 per cent of Australia’s electricity is renewable; gas accounts for 16 per cent and coal 75 per cent.) The CEF package includes an Energy Security Fund, which will tender for bids to shut down 2000MW of highly emissions-intensive coal-fired power by 2020. The Fund will also offer transitional assistance of $5.5 billion, in the form of free permits and cash, to coal power generators facing significant asset loss. An Energy Security Council will advise the Government on emerging risks to energy security.

Compensation and Assistance

Simultaneous to the introduction of the ETS on July 1, 2012, personal tax-free thresholds will be trebled to $18,200, rising to $19,400 in 2015. This is designed to fully or over-compensate lower income households (yearly earnings of up to $30,000 for singles) for increased costs resulting from pricing CO2-e, and to partially compensate middle income households ($30-80,000 pa). Marginal tax rates for the new lower brackets will rise, so that those on higher incomes ($80,000 and above) do not pay less tax. The average increase in household costs from pricing CO2-e is expected to be $9.90 per week, with average compensation of $10.10 per week. There are also increases to the Pension, Senior Supplement for self-funded retirees, and Family Tax Benefit.

The ETS is expected to increase electricity prices by 10 per cent during its first year of operation. However, electricity prices have risen rapidly in recent years and are expected to do so in the future, largely in response to network infrastructure investment by operators; these increased prices are being conflated by many – sometimes deliberately – with the future effects of the carbon price.

Many industries covered by the ETS will receive some form of Government assistance. A Jobs and Competitiveness Program ($9.2 billion) will be available for the most emissions-intensive sectors (primarily manufacturing and heavy industry), with a Clean Technology Program ($1.2 billion) for less emissions-intensive sectors, and further programs for small businesses and supply chains. Most assistance will be in the form of free permits, the rest in grants.

Emission-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries will receive:
  • 94.5 per cent of their expected permit requirement for industries with average baseline of at least 2,000 tCO2-e/$m revenue or 6,000t CO2-e/$m value-added
  • 66 per cent of their expected permit requirement for industries with average baseline of at least 1,000 tCO2-e/$m revenue or 3,000t CO2-e/$m value added
  • 50 per cent of their expected permit requirement for the LNG industry
A trade-exposed industry is one whose value of imports and exports to domestic production exceeds 10 per cent, and that demonstrates a lack of capacity to pass through costs due to the potential for international competition.

Baseline for the free permits will be the historic industry average level of emissions per unit of production, and are based on those from the CPRS (including the extra free permits added as a “recession buffer” in 2009). Assistance will reduce 1.3 per cent each year, and be reviewed by the Productivity Commission from 2014-15 onwards with a view to winding assistance back to the levels suggested in the 2011 Garnaut Review.

The CEF package also includes an Energy Security Fund, which will tender for bids to shut down 2000MW of highly emissions-intensive coal-fired power by 2020. The Fund will also offer transitional assistance of AU$5.5 billion, in the form of free permits and cash, to coal power generators facing significant asset loss. An Energy Security Council will advise the Government on emerging risks to energy security.

In addition to the assistance described above, the Government plans to give the coal sector $1.3 billion over six years for “gassy” mines – those with high levels of fugitive emissions. The steel industry will also receive $300 million over five years. This assistance is separate to the CEF package, as not all members of the MPCCC agreed with it.

The CEF is highly likely to pass both Houses of Parliament before the end of the year, and then the next challenge beckons: implementation. I, for one, look forward to it.

These articles draw on material prepared for an upcoming annual report by the International Emissions Trading Association [http://www.ieta.org/].

Friday, September 23, 2011

Taxing My Patience

The think-thank Per Capita released a report during the week, in which they surveyed Australians' Public Attitudes towards Taxation and Government Expenditure. I posted a section of it to Twitter and Facebook:
OECD countries whose taxes are higher than Australia's (as percentage of GDP): everyone except Korea, USA, Turkey, Chile, Mexico – so 26 of 33.
Proportion of Australians who correctly identified us as a low-taxing, small-government nation: 4%
One of my friends reposted it, where it received the following comment.
And isn't it great that we are, given that the low taxing, small govt and more importantly no debt govt is what got us through the gfc then why are we reverting? Now we have huge debt which if swans magic 3bn surplus ever comes to fruition will take 50 years to repay. A govt which is not only increasing taxes, but burning through out savings (I.e. Selling down the future fund). The most annoying one is the mining tax that will simply be burned up in consolidated revenue rather than a sovereign wealth fund. Or the carbon tax that will effectively make 9 out of 10 house holds welfare recipients without taking a single gram of carbon out of the air (globally), but will cost jobs. So if we are a financially sound low taxing small govt country then it has fuck all to do with worlds greatest treasurer swan [MCJ: Wayne Swan recently received an award from Euromoney magazine as being Finance Minisiter of the Year] and the rest of his rabble, and more to do with their fiscally responsible predecessor.
This sort of stuff is crap I hear all the time, and I was feeling a little cranky this morning, so I couldn't help but respond.
The statement that a "no debt" Government got us through the GFC is complete rubbish. What got us through was prompt, sizeable, and well-targeted stimulus spending, reasonably strong institutions, and a bit of luck.

Australia's "huge debt" is also a falsehood. Australia Government Debt as a % of GDP in 2010 – the latest figures from the OECD database stats.oecd.org – is 11.0%. The only developed countries with lower proportions of debt are Estonia, and Chile. Here's what that looks like:

Which taxes are we increasing? The Government wants to lower the corporate tax rate. It's increasing the personal income tax-free threshold – less tax paid there. Even with the increased monetary costs of carbon price, consumers will come out ahead – particularly if you take into account the (non-monetary) environmental costs that we were bearing, are bearing, and will bear because the externalities embodied in CO2-e emissions have not been adequately priced.

Resource extraction will attract a new tax (the MRRT), which will affect Australian consumers roughly jot in terms of our extra costs, but deliver us billions in revenue. (The original, if terribly named, RSPT was even better, but that's politics for you.)

I don't know what you mean by "burning through our savings" in relation to the Future Fund, since (even when they ran a deficit) Labor still made contributions to the Fund, and I'm not aware of any attempts to sell the Fund or tap it for recurrent expenditure.

You decry 9 out of 10 household becoming "welfare recipients" due to compensation for the emissions trading scheme. What rank stupidity: the compensation is a higher tax-free threshold. If a tax-free threshold is "welfare", every single earner of income is a welfare recipient.

Your characterisation of the ineffectiveness of carbon pricing is similarly misguided. Emissions trading has been proven to have reduced emissions, and your statement is only true in the sense that emissions will continue to rise (in the near future). Well, yes, but they'll rise less than they would otherwise have. And if you don't think that's good enough, well, perhaps you'd better stop eating, because eating doesn't stop ageing, either: it just slows the rate at which you're dying. Alternatively, pick up a maths textbook and relearn second derivatives.

Sunday, August 07, 2011

Cross-post: Implicit visions of Australia's future

I'm a few days putting this up here, but on Thursday I had another article published at New Matilda. They called it "Finally! Climate Policies Explained", but I wasn't actually trying to write an 'explainer' piece; instead, I was inspired by an article by Fergus Green to ponder the differences between what Australian political parties are saying about climate change and what they're doing. (Subsequent Twitter discussions between Fergus, Declan Kuch and myself also provided several ideas.)

The link to Fergus' article didn't make the NM editing cut, but I've restored it in my version, below (as well as one or two other bits I thought worth keeping, even if it does make the article slightly clunkier.)

What are the visions of Australia’s future reflected in our parties’ policies?

When the Government released its climate change package on July 10, it was under the moniker of a “Clean Energy Future”. This is, ostensibly, a fairly clear vision for where Labor sees Australia in 2050 and beyond. However, as Fergus Green rightly points out, the package is a mish-mash of measures that don’t deliver clear policy signals to achieve this clean energy future. While this is partially a result of the multi-party committee that spawned the package, the rhetoric the Government employs is ambiguous as to precisely what sort of society they see Australia moving toward.

But where are we really going with all this? If the world follows the suggestions of science and reduces CO2-e emissions to constrain dangerous climate change, what place is this future do our parties foresee?

There are five basic possibilities, relating to our emissions levels relative to our global entitlement and how we approach any excess/shortfall:
  1. Australia emits less than its global entitlement of CO2-e, and exports its remainder.(1)
  2. As above, but we don’t export the remainder.
  3. Australia emits at or about its share of CO2-e – a balanced carbon budget, if you like.
  4. Australia emits more than its global share of CO2-e, and offsets the difference by importing allowances/offsets from other countries.
  5. As above, but we don’t import (enough) to cover our excess emissions.
Note that these are possibilities for some stabilised-emissions future (2050 and beyond), without defining the transition path there-to.

Both the approach to calculating Australia’s right to CO2-e emissions and the position vis-à-vis offsetting domestic emissions internationally are predominantly moral decisions, even if they are underpinned by science, economics, law, and so on.

Following the argument that each person should have an equal right to the use of the global environment, which seems a sensible and equitable approach, Australia’s entitlement to emit CO2-e should be based our share of the global population. (Perhaps a little less, if you take our disproportionate historical use of the atmosphere into consideration.)

The 2011 Garnaut Review estimated that global per capita emissions would need to fall to less than two tonnes of CO2-e per year to stop CO2-e concentrations rising altogether, with even lower levels required to reduce concentrations. One to two tonnes of CO2-e per person per year seems a ballpark figure for our entitlement, then.

Offsetting domestic emissions internationally should, scientifically, be a non-issue: if the processes are of equal quality, arguing about whether Australian emissions should be offset by projects in Australia or Borneo is equivalent to arguing over offsetting in Queensland versus Tasmania; the climate responds equally well to both. And while the processes to offset emissions in Australia and Borneo are not of the same quality, we can restrict the import of foreign offsets to those that meet the relevant standards of additionality, verifiability, and so forth. This would be little different, in principle, to Australia’s importing of foodstuffs or consumer goods only from foreign companies certified to have a certain quality standard of production.

Where quality is equal, it would seem most efficient to choose the lowest cost abatement, which will probably not be in Australia. Investing in higher-cost domestic options, however, could establish new industries that prove more efficient in the long run, similar to the way Germany is fostering its solar and wind power industries. While Australia will end up importing some of our future offset and abatement technology – we simply aren’t large enough to develop everything ourselves –, a strong local market might have kept talents such as Dr. Zhongreng Shi or David Mills in Australia rather than watch them found their solar PV companies in China and the USA, respectively.

There are also the arguments that Australia should not achieve its entire net emissions reduction by shifting the work overseas. One argument involves equity: if foreign offsets are sold through intermediaries, is the money going to the end producers or the intermediaries? If it’s the intermediaries, would we prefer the money went to Australians, instead?  Another argument is that countries have an ethical responsibility to abate their own emissions (PDF). Such arguments for domestic abatement are broadly accepted (see Article 6(d) of the Kyoto Protocol, for example), though to varying degrees.

So: how do the climate policies of Australia’s political parties fit into the above framework?

Vision 1 – Low Emissions, Exporting Surplus

This is the vision of The Greens, and the clearest of the major parties. A goal of The Greens’ climate change policy is “to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as is feasible and by no later than 2050”. Emitting zero is obviously less than our entitlement, which leaves the question of trading our surplus allowances/abatement. Since The Greens are comfortable with the MPCCC proposal of importing up to 50% of permits required under the ETS – though only, they stress, permits of the highest quality that do not replace serious domestic action –, they would presumably also be comfortable exporting any surplus we might have. (Assuming, of course, that our own abatement is of the highest quality!)

Part of The Greens’ vision is a low-impact lifestyle: less energy use, less driving, less flying, more public transport use, less logging, etc. Such lifestyle change might not be absolutely necessary to reach a low-emissions scenario, but it would certainly be more difficult without it.

Vision 2 – Low Emissions, Not Exporting Surplus

While a part of the environmental movement (and The Greens) might be against Australia enabling the emissions of other countries – similar to current calls to stop fossil fuel exports –, this scenario is unrealistic. It would require explicitly rejecting a potentially quite large revenue stream, which Australian businesses are famously vociferous opposed to, and a significant change in public attitudes toward actions that might be primarily symbolic.

In particular, if Australia achieves low net emissions via plentiful offset generation rather than low gross emissions, it would be radical to ban the generating companies from selling their offsets overseas. To a certain extent, this vision seeks to impose a lifestyle choice upon other countries by limiting their options – such a vision is not always wrong (most people would be happy limiting certain countries’ access to nuclear weapons, for example), but it is controversial.

Vision 3 – Medium Emissions, Balanced Over Cycle

The use of the term “balanced” here is deliberate: this future sees Australia emitting at or about its share of global CO2-e emissions, trading allowances as and when economic or natural fluctuations require us to, but striving to maintain a roughly equal quantity of CO2-e imports and exports over time. Unlike other budgets, however, there is no pressing need that this one sum to zero over time; that would purely be a matter of preference.

Vision 4 – High Emissions, With Imported Offsets/Allowances

This is the ALP’s position – probably. It’s difficult to tell. Labor’s rhetoric has been about cutting pollution, supporting jobs, remaining competitive, increasing efficiency, and moving toward clean energy. These are all laudable goals, but jobs and competition have little to do with the climate and it’s unclear how clean the ALP’s energy future is, exactly. The Government’s long-term target of 80% reduction of CO2-e emissions versus 2000 levels by 2050 is one of the more concrete figures, but will still almost certainly lead to a future Australia that emits more than its global share.

Climate protection is not part of Labor’s core ideals. Though it’s not said so explicitly, implicit in the ALP’s rhetoric about maintaining our standard of living and its stance toward imported emissions (80% of required permits allowed under the CPRS; 50% under the current proposal) is a vision of an Australia that uses its wealth to pay other (poorer) nations to offset higher domestic consumption of CO2-e. Labor might be interested fuelling our current consumption model differently, but it’s not particularly interested in changing the style in which we live as The Greens are; the choice is for “cheaper, rather than deeper” action, to borrow a phrase.

Vision 5 – High Emissions, Without Imports

It seems harsh to ascribe this vision to the entirety of the Liberal and National parties, as it is certainly not shared by all their members. Under the current leadership, however, this is the Coalition’s vision. Its direct action plan is nonsense and won’t achieve 5% emissions reductions by 2020 under the proposed spending cap, while Liberal policy documents don’t even include a target for 2050 or beyond.

Though a theoretical commitment to 100% domestic action sounds very responsible, Tony Abbott’s tendency to frame his public opinion on climate change based largely on the views of his audience at the time (contravening common sense, his own history, and physics along the way) makes the idea that he has an underlying commitment to significant action roughly as likely as Alan Jones having an underlying commitment to fair and balanced reporting.

Between the, let’s call it ‘intellectual flexibility’ of Tony Abbott and his Shadow Minister for Climate Action, Greg Hunt, so long as no Australian is monetarily worse off – never mind the environmental costs, or the rest of the world – it seems the L/NP vision is to plant some fig trees for their metaphorical leaves and let someone else sort out the problem.


The examples here are not definitive of each category. Malcolm Turnbull’s vision, for example, sees lower emissions than Tony Abbot’s and could share a category with The Greens or the ALP, but differs from theirs in its greater emphasis on carbon capture and storage technologies, as well as a more explicit recognition of the need to manage risk and uncertainty. Similarly, Paul Frijters’ “Give up, or hope for a technological miracle” stance would fall into the same category as the Coaltion vision, though he expressly rejects their direct action policy. (And the ALP’s policy, too, to be fair.)

Which type of future you prefer is entirely your choice. But don’t kid yourself: the Coalition (under Abbott) aren’t really interested in a low-carbon economy; the ALP would like a low-carbon economy, but only where it’s not too difficult; and the Greens sincerely want a zero-carbon economy, but will want to change your lifestyle to achieve that. It’d be nice if they said it – but most voters only want so much honesty from their politicians.

(1) This needn’t be an allowance as under a global emissions trading scheme with binding national targets and permit allocations, but could simply be a level of domestic CO2-e offsetting in excess of the local demand that’s then traded abroad.

Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Wolfers, Frank, and the Economics of Happiness

I've been interested in happiness economics for a while, having been fascinated by Robert Frank's "Choosing the right pond" as a undergrad at Monash Uni, and learning more about different measures of well-being and satisfaction at the University of Heidelberg (some of which formed part of my diploma thesis). I devoured Richard Layard's "Happiness", am currently working my way through Wilkinson & Pickett's "Spirit Level", and try and check out local talks on happiness by the likes of Paul Frijters when they happen. Luckily, these sort of talks are also on the interwebs!

An economist buddy of mine put me on to a recent discussion between the aforementioned Frank and Australian-American Justin Wolfers, who's a bit of an economics rock star (just check out his surfer hair). It's quite recent, and a wonderful overview of two of the main strands of happiness economics research: does being absolutely richer make you happier, or is it your relative income that matters? Well worth watching.

Saturday, July 09, 2011

Charitable giving: how much, and to whom?

It was getting close to the end of the Australian financial year (June 30th), and as I reviewed my financial situation I thought, "Oh! I have teh monies!! What to do with them?" So, I gave a few hundred dollars to charity.

The reasons for giving to charity are many and varied, but for me the prime drivers were: 1) the reasoning that I have more than I really 'need', so that giving to those with greater needs increases net wellbeing (which makes me feel good); and 2) I feel like it's the right thing to do.

I've donated to causes here and there for years, but since starting full-time work I've put off donations because I wanted to put a bit more thought into what I was doing, namely:
 - How much should I give? and
 - To whom should I give?

To find answers to the first one, I started out with reading some of Peter Singer's stuff, such as "The Life You Can Save" website. That gives you an easy figure of "1% of your income up to ~$100,000 of annual income, and increasing up to 5% beyond that", but it's a little light on the (philosophical) justification. I haven't read the book on which the website is based, though, so maybe I'll find more details there.

What I found more useful was the information on what charities/causes to give to. I've wondered for years about this: there are so many different causes out there (environmental, humanitarian, social; subsets of each (whales, forests; education, medicine; corruption, torture)) worthy of donating to, and I struggle to distinguish enough between the 'worth' of each to decide how to split any donation – plus, transaction costs (on the charities' side) mean giving $1 each to 500 causes is silly.

How to pick just a single (or few) causes, then? In the end, the choice seems fairly arbitrary, but Singer's website did recommend a list of organisations rated highly by GiveWell.org, which assess them on the basis of how transparent and effective they are. Those seem like two pretty good criteria to me, so I had a look at their list and slung some money towards Village Reach. It's not listed as a charity in Australia, so my contribution wasn't tax-deductible, but as I'm not paying that much tax this year that doesn't bother me. In future years, where I can use the tax-deductibility to increase my giving, I may reassess this.

How do you decide to whom and how much you give?

Friday, July 08, 2011

Carbon Pricing Placard: Missing the Point

Another lengthy analysis of my placard that misses the point, insults my character, and generally engages in strawman argumentation. I don't really think it's worth reading, but I'm posting a copy of my reply here for easy reference should I need it. At least the author was nice enough to email me and ask whether I'd like to respond.
Dear Mr O'Neill,

Thank you for bringing your article to my attention (I am the author of the sign in question).

Your analysis is cogent, coherent, and well written. Indeed, I have no truck with its main argument: that this graph cannot justify the mechanism of pricing a good with a negative externality. However, as I have commented on other analyses of my sign, that was never the point.

My sign was inspired by repeated exposure to people who didn't understand how taxing a good (service) and then returning the revenue in compensation could change behaviour; it is a graphical representation of the principle of changed relative prices – no more, no less. It was tongue in cheek, served as a basis of discussion with other rally attendees, and was a reminder of the role of economics in the carbon pricing debate.

In this context (as a partial equilibrium result), the sign is utterly unremarkable and – unless you wish to challenge basic microeconomics – difficult to dispute. Even libertarian/centre-right economists such as Sinclair Davidson recognise that: http://catallaxyfiles.com/2011/06/07/carbon-compensation-it-works-bitches-in-theory/

Let me repeat: your analysis is correct in its criticism of what you suggest is the purpose of the sign. However, that is not and was not its actual purpose.

Your post has indeed exposed a fallacy, but it has been the fallacy of arguing against a strawman. Your attacks against my intentions and character were uncalled for.

Sincerely,
Martin C. Jones

Tuesday, July 05, 2011

Cross-Post: Carbon Pricing: The Big Picture

I'm a regular reader of the left-leaning Crikey online newspaper, and something Bernard Keane wrote a few weeks ago got me thinking about what the end goal of climate change policy was. Back in February I'd had a look at how much each person's yearly carbon allowance was in the context of offsetting my own flight emissions, and wanted to combine that with a basic suggestion on how to assess the quality of Australia's upcoming carbon pricing framework. It started out as a blog post, but as I got into it I thought it might be interesting to a larger audience. So I sent it to Crikey, and today they published it!

Carbon Pricing: The Big Picture

With the details of the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee’s (MPCCC) carbon price proposal almost fully fleshed out, it is worth reminding ourselves of the broader context in which this policy should be assessed.

The starting point – and simultaneously the final metric of assessment – is the state of the Earth’s climate. We can have the most well-designed, democratic, efficient, no-loser everyone-gets-a-pony policies in place – if the climate goes to pot, we’ve lost.

The ultimate goal, according to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is to “stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” which was further specified in the Copenhagen Accord to recognise “the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius” from pre-industrial levels. The most commonly accepted atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gasses commensurate with a 2°C rise in temperatures is roughly 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon-dioxide equivalent gasses (CO2-e).

This goal is by no means unanimous within the United Nations: countries more vulnerable to climate change (typically small island states) have called for the target to be only 1.5°C of warming (roughly 350 ppm CO2-e). However, the present concentration of CO2-e is 394 ppm, and at the current rate of abatement the world appears more likely to hit 4°C of warming, if not higher.

Regardless, the ultimate goal is to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. In principle, this is very simple: for the level of CO2-e in the atmosphere to remain constant, the inflow should equal the outflow. (The climate system is more complicated than this, involving time lags and higher-order effects, but for our purposes the principle suffices.) The “outflow”, in this case, is the amount of CO2-e that nature absorbs or that breaks down over time (and, possibly, the CO2-e humans are able to remove), while the “inflow” is the sum of naturally-released CO2-e and human emissions. (Skeptical Science has a good overview, as does Wikipedia.)

The global carbon cycle is such that nature can safely absorb a certain amount of human-produced CO2-e, and it’s only human emissions in excess of this level that would cause atmospheric concentrations to rise. Stabilising concentrations thus means reducing worldwide human emissions to this “safe” level, and it would seem equitable that, eventually, each person has the right to emit an equal share of this level.

So what should the global annual per capita allowance of CO2-e be? Australia’s Climate Commission recently estimated that “humanity can emit not more than 1 trillion tonnes of CO2 between 2000 and 2050 to have a probability of about 75% of limiting temperature rise to 2 °C or less [by 2100].” At the current global population of 6.8 billion people, that’s slightly less than three tonnes of CO2-e per person, per year – remembering that this is only to slow the rise in CO2-e concentration to 450 ppm by 2050.

To stop CO2-e concentrations rising altogether, the 2011 Garnaut Review estimated that global per capita emissions would need to fall to less than two tonnes of CO2-e per year (even less if we want to reduce concentrations). Australia, as we well know, is the developed country furthest away from this limit: our 2010 emissions were roughly 25 tCO2-e per capita (excluding land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF)).

No-one is pretending that a domestic carbon price of $20-$30 per tonne will reduce Australian emissions from 25 tCO2-e pa to anywhere near two or three tonnes per year. Even the Greens’ target of reducing Australia’s emissions by 40% on 1990 levels, which Bob Brown recently described as being visible in the current MPCCC proposal only with “a pair of binoculars”, would still result in roughly 12 tCO2-e emissions pa at current population levels and can only be seen as an interim target.

Just as, if not more important than the starting price of any Australian scheme are therefore the structures and institutions the scheme establishes to enable future transformation of our economy: for example, whether future (interim) targets are set by an independent body or the Government of the day; or the manner in which the carbon pricing scheme interacts with other climate policies (a point also raised by Richard Denniss in Crikey).

A balance must be struck between the need to decarbonise the Australian economy and the transitional difficulties that this will bring. Government policy, with the MPCCC’s scheme as its centrepiece, will – and should – be scrutinised on how disruptive the transition will be. But this disruption must be assessed in the long-term context of decreasing our CO2-e production, or else it’s merely politics, not policy.




Some things I left out to get the article closer to the usual 700-800 words:
  • The numbers there aren't etched in stone; they're probabilistic ranges (as you can see from the source material); the bigger point is that our emissions have a long way to decrease.
  • An alternative to decreasing emissions is to increase the amount of CO2-e removed from the atmosphere or speed up its break-down (neither of which humanity is really capable of doing at the moment).
  • One could argue (in my view justifiably) that it would be fairer to assign CO2-e pollution to the countries that consume the goods & services in question, rather than those that produce them. This is of particular importance to Australia, as we export a significant amount of goods that are carbon-intensive in production and for whose emissions we therefore are currently responsible. However, given the torpidity of global climate change negotiations, these accounting rules seem unlikely to change.
  • If the world moves to an allowance of 2 tCO2-e pp pa, that doesn't mean everyone needs to consume that little: rich countries (consumers) will be able to purchase the emissions rights of poorer countries (consumers).
  • Getting to 2 tCO2-e pp pa means continually tightening caps, which means (ceteris paribus) higher prices. Making the transition easier is important, both in terms of switching behaviour and using cleaner production methods.