Showing posts with label Point Carbon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Point Carbon. Show all posts

Friday, February 01, 2013

Australia’s carbon market at stake in September election

I'm quoted in the current issue of the Point Carbon ANZ newsletter, regarding the recently announced Australian federal election and Australia's climate policy. The story can be found via the above link; my full response to Stian Reklev is below.


Questions: 
1. In the international climate policy context, what would be the main difference between a Labor win vs a Coalition win?

2a. Is Tony Abbott likely to eliminate the ETS and institute his Direct Action plan instead, and can it easily be done?
2b. If Abbott does, how would this impact Australia’s domestic emissions profile?

3. If Abbott wins, would that mean Australia disappearing from the scene as one of the main advocates for an international carbon market?

Answers:
The Coalition’s lack of detailed policies make their actions difficult to predict, but it’s unlikely that a Coalition government would continue Australia’s recent run of strong international climate action advocacy, especially as far as international carbon markets are concerned.

While both Labor and the Coalition support international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as the Kyoto protocol, only Labor has recently supported joint global action to establish emissions trading schemes. Members of the Coalition have repeatedly been less than favourable toward foreign efforts to reduce or offset emissions. See e.g.
  • “in countries or organisations with less developed and less scrupulous administrative cultures [than Australia] the scope for corruption is obvious ... This is a market based on the non-delivery of an invisible product to no one, and is almost certain to be scammed” (Source)
  • “Australian businesses are going to have to spend more than $3 billion a year purchasing abatements from abroad - and we all know the potential for fraud, the potential for scamming.'' (Source)
  • “If such a sophisticated market as Norway is facing a $5 billion fraud, how will Australians know if that money is actually reducing emissions or is it going into the pockets of criminals? ... We will reduce emissions by 700 million tonnes by purchasing abatement in Australia that will clean up our own environment rather than sending money overseas.” (Source)
  • “[The Prime Minister] must also detail the measures and safeguards which will have to be put in place to ensure that the tens of billions of Australian taxpayer dollars committed to purchasing international carbon credits do not end up in the clutches of the carbon cowboys.” (Source)
  • “We aren’t reducing our emissions, we are just engaging in a massive transfer of wealth from this country to carbon traders overseas.” (Source)
  • “emissions reduction [based on foreign carbon credits] can easily turn out to be a real life version of the emperor’s new clothes” (Source)

While I again flag the lack of detail, the abatement policies suggested by the Coalition, such as direct action, likely wouldn’t offer as much abatement potential as a carbon price, cover as much of Australia’s emissions, and would likely cost more for what they would deliver. The DA and Emissions Reduction Fund at the moment seem to be essentially the same policies that the Coalition took into the last election, and they were heavily criticised at the time for focussing on a very narrow subset of options, not being scalable to achieve larger abatement, and exploiting only the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of emissions reduction while not prompting the deeper changes needed to decarbonise the Australian economy over the long term.

Change in the electricity sector will continue, as it is currently being driven more by the RET than by the carbon price, but the advancement of other low-carbon technologies risk stalling if efforts to provide a coherent regulatory and investment environment, such as through the CEFC, are wound down as promised. Trying instead to advance individual technologies is difficult: research and development of CCS, which the Coalition strongly supports, has been negligible despite the $400 million Global CCS Institute set up under Rudd.

If the Coalition win government in September, and follow their stated promise, they will introduce legislation to repeal the carbon price. This would pass the House of Representatives, but would presumably fail in the Senate where Labor and The Greens will still hold balance of power until at least 1 July 2014, when the senators elected in the 2013 election will take their places. Unless the Coalition win the election in landslide, Labor and The Greens will probably still control the Senate on 1 July 2014, and therefore be able to block the repeal of the carbon price.

To gain control of the Senate, a Coalition government would need to introduce their legislation (after 1 July 2014), have it blocked, wait three months, reintroduce it, and have it blocked a second time before being able to call a double dissolution election. Assuming they manage all this in 2014, Senators elected at that election would take their places on 1 July 2015.

Repealing the carbon price would be an incredibly tortuous process legislatively, for the public, and most of all for the businesses wondering whether they need to account for their liabilities under the existing carbon price, some replacement scheme, or nothing at all.

Friday, May 11, 2012

Cross-post: Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

After my previous misadventures with major media, I was pleasantly surprised when Stian Reklev, the chief correspondent for Reuters Point Carbon, asked me to write a comment piece on the Australian ETS price floor mechanism and its effect on the market for international permits. In retrospect, I perhaps lapsed a little too much into 'explainer' mode, but with only 650 words to play with there's only so much analysis you can do – I feel weird not backing statements up with solid argumentation and a few links. Here's the piece, published today in the Carbon Market Australia-New Zealand May newsletter:

Surrendering to the idea of a price floor

From July 2015, the Australian federal government will set the price of the permits in its emissions trading scheme free – within limits. The government intends to introduce a price floor and price ceiling until at least 2017/18, in order to provide certainty and reduce risks for market participants and investors.

This is good news for emission reduction activities whose viability depends on prices several years hence, such as larger, more complex projects. Further, the goal of abatement at least-cost should be balanced against the goal of abating as rapidly as possible; should reaching current targets be cheaper than expected, a floor price can ensure a minimum level of spending on abatement. Several EU countries already have or are considering similar measures, in recognition that adjusting the targets of an ETS in response to price movements often isn’t possible rapidly.

Last December, the government released a discussion paper and called for submission on the price floor, which combines a reserve price for Australian carbon units at auction with an ‘international unit surrender charge’ that ensures international carbon credits cost at least as much as domestic units.

Four options are being considered for the international unit surrender charge, with two main approaches: Options 1 and 2 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price of the international unit when it was purchased; Options 3 and 4 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price when the unit surrendered.

While calculating the surrender charge based on the difference between the buying price and the price floor is intuitively appealing, it has implementation issues ranging from administrative complexity, through estimating firms’ time value of money (to adjust the prices of credits purchased earlier rather than later), to the possibility of firms gaming the system by artificially inflating the price of purchased credits. The government paper also notes that Options 1 and 2 would create a preference for foreign units as “if the international price goes up, [firms] could sell the unit at a profit, purchase another unit at a similar (or the same) price, and pay a lower surrender charge.” (Source)

Option 3 appears the most likely: when firms surrender their international units, a charge is applied based on the difference between the prevailing spot price and the price floor. This is the “purest” option, with minimal government involvement and low administration costs. The risk that the price of units changes between purchasing and surrendering them is borne by the liable firms, though financial markets are expected (e.g. by Westpac (PDF)) to provide hedging products or forward contracts.

The costs of hedging, in addition to the surrender charge, could promote the purchase of domestic units over foreign credits. However, it’s worth noting that, since markets for foreign units will likely exist further forward than domestic units (which will only be auctioned three years in advance, based on current plans), there will be a strong bias toward international credits from firms looking to hedge long-term.

Option 4 is similar to Option 3, though with an option for firms to lock in a surrender charge ahead of time based on a regulator-calculated forward curve. This interesting idea would assist firms who, for reasons of cost, access, or complexity are unlikely to use financial markets’ hedging products. Though adding complexity, it would avoid any bias Option 3 has toward domestic units. However, is it the government’s role to insure traders from carbon price risk?

While an MP who supported the ETS, Rob Oakeshott, has recently spoken out against the price floor, the government has an advantage: the relevant legislation has already been passed, and the remaining details (e.g. the choice of option) can be passed by regulation. Regulation passes automatically unless blocked, so the opposition would need to find a 75-seat majority in the House of Representatives to do so. (Under convention established by Speaker Denison, the Speaker votes against motions in case of a tie.)

Even in the government’s current precarious position, this seems unlikely – the defection of Oakeshott alone would not suffice –, so that, if the government survives long enough to introduce a price floor, it will likely pass.

Martin C. Jones is a researcher at the Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets, UNSW.