- Completing a report into electricity network tariff reform
- Organising the launch of an Energy Comparator Code of Conduct
- Writing articles for, editing, and publishing a newsletter
- Hosting two friends for the weekend of the Melbourne Swing Festival
- Performing at the Melbourne Swing Festival
- Writing job applications
- Helping my parents pay their bills, as they are travelling through Europe and hadn't set their internet banking up properly before they left
- Tracking my brother's solo travels through South America, and trying to decide if he's in actually trouble or if his GPS emergency beacon is just failing to check in (again)
- Moving house
Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts
Saturday, June 06, 2015
A little busy
Just for future reference, here are all the things I have going on this week:
Sunday, July 13, 2014
Dead tooth, part 1
I suffered my worst footballing injury yesterday, possibly the worst injury I've had at all: an opponent's stray elbow caught me in the mouth during an otherwise unremarkable challenge for the ball, knocking one of my front top teeth back at a ~15° angle. Prelimary medical advice is that the bent tooth is certainly dead, and each tooth either side has around a 50% likelihood of also being dead, as they will also have suffered impact from the blow.
The whole thing is a bit upsetting, from start to finish. The hit wasn't even called as a foul by the referee; I cleared the ball and subbed myself off after noticing a fair amount of blood; my top lip had been split and would require stitches. 20 minutes played.
No-one was really sure what to do – ice? Gauze? Hospital? Emergency dentist? I had cycled and caught the train to the ground in Eltham from Brunswick East ‐ how would I get to the hospital? A teammate offered the use of his car, but what about my bicycle?
While one of the team managers called a dental hospital walked up and down the sideline, rang my parents and asked them to pick me up. I was in shock, and midway through the call the tears kicked in. Being conscious that I was in shock didn't help much. The manager had me give my details to the hospital, then I sat down with a icepack to my face (wrapped in my football sock and a tissue, against the blood) and waited for my dad to arrive.
We went 0:1 down. It was a cup quarterfinal, and we were playing the league champions from one division higher than us; they were also last year's beaten cup finalists. We were light on numbers, I was having a good game, and I was upset not to be able to play.
Dad came at half time. He put my bike in the boot and drove me to the dental hospital in Carlton, stopping at home to dump my stuff and change into a fresh shirt. My housemate was having a dumpling day, and several friends were there. It was slightly surreal telling them I was just on my way to the hospital.
At the hospital, the dentist gave me the bad news: dead tooth. Possibly multiple. "Not the worst" he'd seen, though: a guy who'd been hit by a football came in with four fractured teeth, he said. What the fuck do I care about that? In 20 years of football the worst thing I've done to my teeth was to chip one – at training, failing to catch a medicine ball properly – now 1-3 are dead, and I'm supposed to compare myself to that guy?
'Best case: discolouration. Worst case: implants. But you can do a lot these days; you can always whiten the tooth when it darkens.' Geez, thanks. The news had me fairly down, and I mentioned to the nurse that I didn't find the dentist's bedside manner particularly reassuring. "Oh, do you think so? I think he's pretty good," she replied. Idiot. Lack of empathy all around, and $650 for the privilege. A ghastly wire now holds my front tooth in place until I go see a dentist to discuss root canal surgery (!)
I caught the tram home, where dumpling day was in full swing. It was good to have people there to keep my spirits up, even though it was frustrating not to be able to eat any of the food; I'm not allowed to bite into anything for two weeks, and attempting to eat even boiled dumplings showed how difficult it is to chew without the front top teeth meeting the bottom.
Once everyone had left my girlfriend came over and nursed me. She was fantastic: she shooed me out of the kitchen and made me lentil soup with mashed apple for desert, then kept me company all night and made me more soft breakfast in the morning. I'm very grateful of her. I was due to meet her family tonight at dinner, but inability to eat very well has scuppered those plans.
I'm not really sure where it goes from here. I'll see a dentist ASAP, and presumably have horrendously expensive surgery soon afterward. Klaus tells me I killed one of his teeth when we were kids, requiring a root canal surgery, but it didn't discolour. I don't remember that, but feel awful about it, though I am very glad it didn't discolour. It gives me a bit of hope.
Oh, and we won the football match, 3:2. Another small mercy.
Friday, May 31, 2013
Myki wants to fine me for hypothetical trips
A colleague of mine received a fine this morning for not 'touching on' her Myki, though she thought she had. (For those unfamiliar with Melbourne, Myki is the city's public transport ticketing system; it requires you to hold a smartcard near a reader at the beginning and end of every trip, from which it calculates your fare.) Having only recently moved back to Melbourne, I wondered what the rules were if you had purchased a Myki pass valid for, say, six months, but had failed to 'touch on' for a particular journey. No-one in the office was able to tell me, so I called Myki. And very rapidly felt like I was trolling them.
A lot depends on the discretion of the ticket inspector. However, the rules – as stated to me by the call centre operator – appear to be, "If you don't touch on for a given trip, you can be fined."
I questioned the rationale behind that for my given example of a six-month pass.
"We need to know that you have a valid ticket, and that you're not travelling outside your valid zones. If you don't touch on or off, we can't track that."
That's fair enough, but let's say I have a Zone 1+2 Myki; I'm covered for essentially the entirely of Melbourne, extending to the end of all metropolitan train lines.
"You might have started your journey or intend to finish your journey in Zone 3 or 4."
I'm not even sure where those zones are – rural Victoria, I assume – so I specified my example: I have been 'caught' on a tram, with my six-month ticket. Trams cannot go further than Zone 1. Why should I be fined?
"We need to make sure you're paying for your journey."
Right, yes, okay, but I have a six-month pass, I persisted; I have paid for my ticket. This is where it got interesting.
"You would be fined because you may have on a previous journey been travelling on an invalid ticket."
Excuse me? I want you to be very sure of what you're saying to me, I told the operator: you're suggesting that, if I get 'caught' on a tram with six-monthly Zone 1+2 ticket, but don't touch on, you might fine me because on a previous day I might have travelled in Zone 3?
"Yes."
You would fine me for the possibility of previous invalid journeys?
"Yes."
Astonishing. Ludicrous. And so wholly without justifiable rationale it's both laughable and insulting. (Not that I said this to the poor woman; I think my questions were enough.)
I was afraid of asking whether it was also Myki policy to fine me for hypothetical future infractions, in case it gave them ideas, so I instead asked what my responsibilities were in finding a working card reader on a tram or bus: if the one within reach were broken, would I be expected to push through a crowded service to reach a working one?
"You must do everything in your power to find a working reader to 'touch on'."
That's quite broad, I complained, and I'm not sure what it means. Could you help me out with some examples? Do I need to push through a crowd to get to the other end of a tram at peak hour?
"You must do everything in your power to 'touch on'."
What if the tram is really full, and I can't push through? Should I get off?
"If you really wanted to do the right thing, you should get off and catch the next tram, yes."
Wow. I'm getting a sense of why so many Melburnians dislike Myki.
I don't blame the Myki call centre operator. The system of rule enforcement is clearly overly rigid, but that's not her fault, and having to rationalise things is rarely something call centre staff do well; an attitude of, "I just work here, man" is a failure of the organisation, not the staff. (Though, having the courage to answer questions with, "I don't know", is something more people could do with.)
The Myki rule setters, however, have things arse-backward. The primary purpose of a ticketing (enforcement) system is to make sure passengers pay for the trips. Everything else is secondary. Fining people for taking a trip they have paid for is outrageous – it's not fare evasion, it's "tracking-system-evasion" at worst. I had a yearly travel pass as a kid; I'd just wave that at a driver or gate attendant and off I went; sure, passenger numbers were harder to track, but how on earth did we get to the point where not letting a company track you while using their service is worthy of a fine?
Public Transport Victoria – if you run services that are usable, but make it unreasonably difficult for people to satisfy all your conditions (e.g. touching on), give us some bloody leeway. Don't be dickheads. The problem I'm seeing isn't one of technology, or infrastructure – it's a "them's the rules" culture lacking flexibility and compassion toward your consumers. No wonder people don't like you.
Friday, February 01, 2013
Australia’s carbon market at stake in September election
I'm quoted in the current issue of the Point Carbon ANZ newsletter, regarding the recently announced Australian federal election and Australia's climate policy. The story can be found via the above link; my full response to Stian Reklev is below.
Questions:
1. In the international climate policy context, what would be the main difference between a Labor win vs a Coalition win?
2a. Is Tony Abbott likely to eliminate the ETS and institute his Direct Action plan instead, and can it easily be done?
2a. Is Tony Abbott likely to eliminate the ETS and institute his Direct Action plan instead, and can it easily be done?
2b. If Abbott does, how would this impact Australia’s domestic emissions profile?
3. If Abbott wins, would that mean Australia disappearing from the scene as one of the main advocates for an international carbon market?
Answers:
The Coalition’s lack of detailed policies make their actions difficult to predict, but it’s unlikely that a Coalition government would continue Australia’s recent run of strong international climate action advocacy, especially as far as international carbon markets are concerned.
While both Labor and the Coalition support international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as the Kyoto protocol, only Labor has recently supported joint global action to establish emissions trading schemes. Members of the Coalition have repeatedly been less than favourable toward foreign efforts to reduce or offset emissions. See e.g.
The Coalition’s lack of detailed policies make their actions difficult to predict, but it’s unlikely that a Coalition government would continue Australia’s recent run of strong international climate action advocacy, especially as far as international carbon markets are concerned.
While both Labor and the Coalition support international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as the Kyoto protocol, only Labor has recently supported joint global action to establish emissions trading schemes. Members of the Coalition have repeatedly been less than favourable toward foreign efforts to reduce or offset emissions. See e.g.
- “in countries or organisations with less developed and less scrupulous administrative cultures [than Australia] the scope for corruption is obvious ... This is a market based on the non-delivery of an invisible product to no one, and is almost certain to be scammed” (Source)
- “Australian businesses are going to have to spend more than $3 billion a year purchasing abatements from abroad - and we all know the potential for fraud, the potential for scamming.'' (Source)
- “If such a sophisticated market as Norway is facing a $5 billion fraud, how will Australians know if that money is actually reducing emissions or is it going into the pockets of criminals? ... We will reduce emissions by 700 million tonnes by purchasing abatement in Australia that will clean up our own environment rather than sending money overseas.” (Source)
- “[The Prime Minister] must also detail the measures and safeguards which will have to be put in place to ensure that the tens of billions of Australian taxpayer dollars committed to purchasing international carbon credits do not end up in the clutches of the carbon cowboys.” (Source)
- “We aren’t reducing our emissions, we are just engaging in a massive transfer of wealth from this country to carbon traders overseas.” (Source)
- “emissions reduction [based on foreign carbon credits] can easily turn out to be a real life version of the emperor’s new clothes” (Source)
While I again flag the lack of detail, the abatement policies suggested by the Coalition, such as direct action, likely wouldn’t offer as much abatement potential as a carbon price, cover as much of Australia’s emissions, and would likely cost more for what they would deliver. The DA and Emissions Reduction Fund at the moment seem to be essentially the same policies that the Coalition took into the last election, and they were heavily criticised at the time for focussing on a very narrow subset of options, not being scalable to achieve larger abatement, and exploiting only the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of emissions reduction while not prompting the deeper changes needed to decarbonise the Australian economy over the long term.
Change in the electricity sector will continue, as it is currently being driven more by the RET than by the carbon price, but the advancement of other low-carbon technologies risk stalling if efforts to provide a coherent regulatory and investment environment, such as through the CEFC, are wound down as promised. Trying instead to advance individual technologies is difficult: research and development of CCS, which the Coalition strongly supports, has been negligible despite the $400 million Global CCS Institute set up under Rudd.
If the Coalition win government in September, and follow their stated promise, they will introduce legislation to repeal the carbon price. This would pass the House of Representatives, but would presumably fail in the Senate where Labor and The Greens will still hold balance of power until at least 1 July 2014, when the senators elected in the 2013 election will take their places. Unless the Coalition win the election in landslide, Labor and The Greens will probably still control the Senate on 1 July 2014, and therefore be able to block the repeal of the carbon price.
To gain control of the Senate, a Coalition government would need to introduce their legislation (after 1 July 2014), have it blocked, wait three months, reintroduce it, and have it blocked a second time before being able to call a double dissolution election. Assuming they manage all this in 2014, Senators elected at that election would take their places on 1 July 2015.
Repealing the carbon price would be an incredibly tortuous process legislatively, for the public, and most of all for the businesses wondering whether they need to account for their liabilities under the existing carbon price, some replacement scheme, or nothing at all.
Labels:
Australia,
carbon pricing,
climate change,
Point Carbon,
policy,
politics,
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Sunday, December 09, 2012
Maybe don't lead with that
My party conversation needs a little work:
Her: "So, what do you do?"
Me: "I'm an environmental economist. I do research into climate change and energy policy."
Her: "Oh, that sounds cool!"
Me: "Yeah, I love it!"
Her: "So, what the latest on climate change? Are we all going to suffer in 5° higher temperatures? Haha."
Me: "Yeah, actually, we're pretty well fucked. It's not as though we don't know what to do – we're just not doing it. It's a bit depressing, actually."
Her: *pause* "So.. umm, hobbies?"
Her: "So, what do you do?"
Me: "I'm an environmental economist. I do research into climate change and energy policy."
Her: "Oh, that sounds cool!"
Me: "Yeah, I love it!"
Her: "So, what the latest on climate change? Are we all going to suffer in 5° higher temperatures? Haha."
Me: "Yeah, actually, we're pretty well fucked. It's not as though we don't know what to do – we're just not doing it. It's a bit depressing, actually."
Her: *pause* "So.. umm, hobbies?"
Friday, December 07, 2012
Backing the wrong horse
This conversation really occurred tonight, during a dance:
Her: "Do you have anything to do with horses, or horse-racing?"
Me: "Errm... no. Why?"
Her: "You smell like you do."
Me: "........... I smell like I do?"
Her: "Yeah. I'm a little psychic about stuff like that sometimes. What about betting on horses – are you a bookie?"
Me: "I'm not a bookie. I have nothing to do with horses at all. I'm an economist and work in a university."
Her: *shrug* "Well, you smell like you work with horse-racing."
I still don't know what to make of this. Except that bookies apparently smell like Hugo Boss and two hours dancing's worth of sweat.
Her: "Do you have anything to do with horses, or horse-racing?"
Me: "Errm... no. Why?"
Her: "You smell like you do."
Me: "........... I smell like I do?"
Her: "Yeah. I'm a little psychic about stuff like that sometimes. What about betting on horses – are you a bookie?"
Me: "I'm not a bookie. I have nothing to do with horses at all. I'm an economist and work in a university."
Her: *shrug* "Well, you smell like you work with horse-racing."
I still don't know what to make of this. Except that bookies apparently smell like Hugo Boss and two hours dancing's worth of sweat.
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
Why drop the price floor? Taking a gamble on the EU ETS
I couldn't make much at first of today's announcement by Greg Combet, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, that Australia was going to link its ETS with the EU ETS – and oh, by the way, we're dropping the price floor.
That Australia and the EU will link their schemes good news, but it's an expected development. Dropping the price floor, on the hand, had been speculated about (notably by the AFR; well done, Marcus Priest), but wasn't part of the original plan.
As I wrote back in May, a price floor has some good things going for it, despite being technically challenging; and as it's only regulation the government has the numbers to pass it even against Rob Oakeshott's opposition. So my initial reaction was that the floor price had been put in the "too hard" basket and the ETS linkage was just used to disguise that announcement somewhat.
I've since heard, however, that dropping the price floor was a condition of the EU agreeing to link the schemes, and Australia replaced it with the restriction of foreign units. This makes more sense.
The EU currently has an oversupply of permits (European Union Allowances; EUAs), and will have for a quite a few years yet, so it would welcome a new source of demand: Australia. (Even if our purchase volumes aren't that great in the scheme of things.) An Australian price floor would not only lessen demand for EUAs, it would also make integrating the schemes more complex.
The price floor, though, was there to stop the Australian market being flooded by cheap foreign permits; to give domestic sources of investment into potential abatement (or offsets) the certainty that they would be able to get at least $15 for their product. What fulfils that role?
Well, we've moved from a price restriction to a (sort-of) quantity restriction. Previously, entities could meet up to 50% of their AU ETS liabilities with foreign units, but the only foreign units decided upon were those from the Kyoto Protocol: CERs, ERUs, and RMUs. The CDM market is currently even more oversupplied than the EUA market, and prices are down, down, down;(1) well below the $15 price floor.
Now, the 50% limit on international units is still there, but only 12.5% (of total liabilities) can be met by Kyoto units. Once that limit is reached, the relevant price domestic permits (ACUs) and offsets (ACCUs) have to compete against is that of EUAs. (Remember that the large amount of free permits – I don't have exact figures, but it's around 30-40% of our cap, I think; leave a comment if you've better info – lowers the effective size of the domestic market, so the 50% international unit cap isn't as strict as it sounds.)
That 12.5% limit suits not only the EU, since the EUAs don't have to compete against the Kyoto units for the other 37.5%, but also suits those like The Greens who want the carbon price to rise over time: they expect the EUA price to rise over time, pulling ACU/ACCU prices with it. It's not a bad gamble – certainly, I think the chance of EUA prices rising above $15 is higher than that of CDM prices doing so. (Exchange rates play a role in all this as well, but I'm buggered if I know which way they're going.)
Limiting Kyoto units also does a little bit to allay concerns about the additionality of some of those units, though it's a fairly blunt instrument; a quantity control is not a quality control.
That's the policy side of things. On the politics side, the EU ETS integration/no price floor does some interesting things. The lack of an auction price floor and international surrender charge (which together constitute the 'price floor' we've been discussing) could well reduce government revenue from the carbon price; it depends on what the EUA price does.
More interestingly, though, I think the EU integration and lack of a price floor will make the AU ETS appeal more to free market types, especially since at first glance it looks like providing opportunities for cheaper abatement. (You fine readers, of course, know better.) And unless the Liberals want to start slagging off Europeans, they might reign back calling foreign abaters cowboys, scammers, frauds, and criminals.
Yeah, okay, I don't buy that last one, either. But at least the government now have a better response to that.
Finally, integrating more fully with the EU ETS effectively places more responsibility for domestic prices in their hands: if EUA prices go up, so will Australia's prices – sorry, guys, it's out of our hands! (Though we keep the price ceiling, I understand it will be set with reference to the EUA price; so no great limit, there.)
A lot depends on how well the EU can reform its ETS to drive prices back up into its preferred (by almost everyone but Poland) range – but then, that's always been the case.
(1) Come at me, Coles.
That Australia and the EU will link their schemes good news, but it's an expected development. Dropping the price floor, on the hand, had been speculated about (notably by the AFR; well done, Marcus Priest), but wasn't part of the original plan.
As I wrote back in May, a price floor has some good things going for it, despite being technically challenging; and as it's only regulation the government has the numbers to pass it even against Rob Oakeshott's opposition. So my initial reaction was that the floor price had been put in the "too hard" basket and the ETS linkage was just used to disguise that announcement somewhat.
I've since heard, however, that dropping the price floor was a condition of the EU agreeing to link the schemes, and Australia replaced it with the restriction of foreign units. This makes more sense.
The EU currently has an oversupply of permits (European Union Allowances; EUAs), and will have for a quite a few years yet, so it would welcome a new source of demand: Australia. (Even if our purchase volumes aren't that great in the scheme of things.) An Australian price floor would not only lessen demand for EUAs, it would also make integrating the schemes more complex.
The price floor, though, was there to stop the Australian market being flooded by cheap foreign permits; to give domestic sources of investment into potential abatement (or offsets) the certainty that they would be able to get at least $15 for their product. What fulfils that role?
Well, we've moved from a price restriction to a (sort-of) quantity restriction. Previously, entities could meet up to 50% of their AU ETS liabilities with foreign units, but the only foreign units decided upon were those from the Kyoto Protocol: CERs, ERUs, and RMUs. The CDM market is currently even more oversupplied than the EUA market, and prices are down, down, down;(1) well below the $15 price floor.
Now, the 50% limit on international units is still there, but only 12.5% (of total liabilities) can be met by Kyoto units. Once that limit is reached, the relevant price domestic permits (ACUs) and offsets (ACCUs) have to compete against is that of EUAs. (Remember that the large amount of free permits – I don't have exact figures, but it's around 30-40% of our cap, I think; leave a comment if you've better info – lowers the effective size of the domestic market, so the 50% international unit cap isn't as strict as it sounds.)
That 12.5% limit suits not only the EU, since the EUAs don't have to compete against the Kyoto units for the other 37.5%, but also suits those like The Greens who want the carbon price to rise over time: they expect the EUA price to rise over time, pulling ACU/ACCU prices with it. It's not a bad gamble – certainly, I think the chance of EUA prices rising above $15 is higher than that of CDM prices doing so. (Exchange rates play a role in all this as well, but I'm buggered if I know which way they're going.)
Limiting Kyoto units also does a little bit to allay concerns about the additionality of some of those units, though it's a fairly blunt instrument; a quantity control is not a quality control.
That's the policy side of things. On the politics side, the EU ETS integration/no price floor does some interesting things. The lack of an auction price floor and international surrender charge (which together constitute the 'price floor' we've been discussing) could well reduce government revenue from the carbon price; it depends on what the EUA price does.
More interestingly, though, I think the EU integration and lack of a price floor will make the AU ETS appeal more to free market types, especially since at first glance it looks like providing opportunities for cheaper abatement. (You fine readers, of course, know better.) And unless the Liberals want to start slagging off Europeans, they might reign back calling foreign abaters cowboys, scammers, frauds, and criminals.
Yeah, okay, I don't buy that last one, either. But at least the government now have a better response to that.
Finally, integrating more fully with the EU ETS effectively places more responsibility for domestic prices in their hands: if EUA prices go up, so will Australia's prices – sorry, guys, it's out of our hands! (Though we keep the price ceiling, I understand it will be set with reference to the EUA price; so no great limit, there.)
A lot depends on how well the EU can reform its ETS to drive prices back up into its preferred (by almost everyone but Poland) range – but then, that's always been the case.
(1) Come at me, Coles.
Labels:
Australia,
carbon pricing,
climate change,
economics,
Europe,
policy,
politics
Thursday, August 09, 2012
A Comment on the Political Discussion of Electricity Regulations
With her speech to the the Energy Policy Institute of Australia on Tuesday, the Prime Minister Julia Gillard has moved (or at least expanded) the discussion of electricity regulations from the roundtable meetings and conferences of industry, academia, and government to the political arena. Hurrah..?
A few points:
Are there problems with dividend policy, reliability standards, and peak demand? Yes.
Have the incentives in the existing regulations led some states to act in a manner that has unnecessarily raised prices for consumers (and thus led to increased profits for the states)? Very probably.
Has this been going on for several years, including under Labor governments? Yes – but so what?
Reforming energy industry regulations isn't a particularly new issue for the industry itself, energy academics, or government bodies; the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (DRET) has been developing an Energy White Paper for a while now, with associated submissions and consultations. But even if you were to argue that the problems should have been addressed earlier, why shouldn't we address them now?
To suggest, as Oppisition Leader Tony Abbott did this morning, that there can't be a problem with electricity regulations, because otherwise the Federal Government would been telling us this for years, is facile. Opposition energy spokesman Ian Macfarlane might have been closer when he described the PM as a latecomer, but again – so what?
Let's accept, for the sake of argument, that Julia Gillard's strategy is to a signicant extent motivated by political desires, chiefly to separate the effects of the carbon price from unrelated electricity price rises. If it leads to good energy market reform, I don't care.
I might be disappointed that worthy reforms aren't being undertaken because politicians don't see any votes in it, but if a political party uses a policy debate to make its opponents look bad while focussing on implementing good policy, then I'm riding that gift horse until it gets distracted and wanders off to chew a Newspoll. (When it gets to the point of using a policy discussion chiefly to attack your opponents rather than actually try and solve any problems – see e.g. asylum seekers – that's a different matter.)
Has the carbon price made electricity prices rise this year? Yes. Yawn. Not that big of a deal. It certainly isn't the primary cause of electricity prices rises over the last few years. Spot the carbon price effect in this graph:
So when Abbott says,
Regardless of why they've been raised, whose fault they are, and what other problems may be out there as well, can't we just accept that these problems are real and talk about how to fix them? There's no time like the present (especially in politics).
A few points:
Are there problems with dividend policy, reliability standards, and peak demand? Yes.
Have the incentives in the existing regulations led some states to act in a manner that has unnecessarily raised prices for consumers (and thus led to increased profits for the states)? Very probably.
Has this been going on for several years, including under Labor governments? Yes – but so what?
Reforming energy industry regulations isn't a particularly new issue for the industry itself, energy academics, or government bodies; the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (DRET) has been developing an Energy White Paper for a while now, with associated submissions and consultations. But even if you were to argue that the problems should have been addressed earlier, why shouldn't we address them now?
To suggest, as Oppisition Leader Tony Abbott did this morning, that there can't be a problem with electricity regulations, because otherwise the Federal Government would been telling us this for years, is facile. Opposition energy spokesman Ian Macfarlane might have been closer when he described the PM as a latecomer, but again – so what?
Let's accept, for the sake of argument, that Julia Gillard's strategy is to a signicant extent motivated by political desires, chiefly to separate the effects of the carbon price from unrelated electricity price rises. If it leads to good energy market reform, I don't care.
I might be disappointed that worthy reforms aren't being undertaken because politicians don't see any votes in it, but if a political party uses a policy debate to make its opponents look bad while focussing on implementing good policy, then I'm riding that gift horse until it gets distracted and wanders off to chew a Newspoll. (When it gets to the point of using a policy discussion chiefly to attack your opponents rather than actually try and solve any problems – see e.g. asylum seekers – that's a different matter.)
Has the carbon price made electricity prices rise this year? Yes. Yawn. Not that big of a deal. It certainly isn't the primary cause of electricity prices rises over the last few years. Spot the carbon price effect in this graph:
So when Abbott says,
"the problem is not the regulation of power prices. The problem is the carbon tax putting up power prices"well, the Australian Energy Regulator disagrees on the first bit, and state reports disagree on the last bit.
Regardless of why they've been raised, whose fault they are, and what other problems may be out there as well, can't we just accept that these problems are real and talk about how to fix them? There's no time like the present (especially in politics).
Tuesday, August 07, 2012
The Effect of the Carbon Price on Electricity Prices
In an otherwise good article, Peter Martin today wrote that
[the TD Securities Melbourne Institute price index] reports a jump in electricity prices of 14.9 per cent and a jump in household gas prices of 10.3 per cent, almost all of which would have been due to the carbon tax. [emphasis mine]
This is incorrect, and, unfortunately, he is not the first journalist to make this mistaken claim. Evidence to the contrary be found in, for example, the reports from the relevant authorities in states that regulate their electricity prices:
New South Wales
Over all NSW retailers, the carbon price is responsible for slightly less than half of the latest regulated price rise.
Queensland
The regulated allowance for carbon costs was around 2c/kWh, of a 6-8c/kWh rise; 25-36%.
Western Australia
IMO – "2012 Energy Price Limits Review" (specifically the SKM MMA Final Report).
The maximum short term energy market price (STEM) rose by $9/MWh from $314/MWh to $323/MWh. In this case, the increase was entirely due to the carbon price:
However, in the last five years, the maximum STEM price has risen from $159.84/MWh to its current level of $314/MWh, and the WA Department of Finance notes:
Although WA’s electricity prices have increased, the prices are still lower than the cost of supplying electricity. At the moment, the WA Government covers this difference – paying a subsidy of $367 million in the 2011–12 financial year.
As far as the trend of electricity prices rises go, the carbon price is a drop in the bucket.

I haven't put in the effort to research the effects of the carbon price on electricity prices in states with deregulated industries (e.g. Victoria), but I'm sure they're similar.
That final image of historical prices in NSW and QLD, by the way, is from a very good fact sheet by the Energy Supply Association of Australia showing where our electricity prices sit in an international comparison. Fingers crossed for an update.
In the meantime, go forth and blame not the carbon price for the sins of the network.
Labels:
Australia,
carbon pricing,
energy
Tuesday, July 24, 2012
Laggard to Leader: a Review
Beyond Zero Emissions, the non-for-profit climate change group, yesterday released the latest in their series of plans to get Australia to a state of zero emissions (or below): Laggard to Leader; How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity.
The report springs from the observation, also reported by e.g. Crikey on Friday, that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is failing to achieve the actions required to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change. It then goes beyond this to suggest new means of addressing the problem, in which Australia leads the world to a zero carbon future.
Sound utopian? It’s actually reasonably well argued, by and large, even if it’s difficult to see our current crop of politicians implementing many of the report’s suggestions.
Laggard to Leader begins with a summary of the scientific need for action: if we want to constrain the rise in global temperatures to 2°C, then the world shouldn’t emit more than 550 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) greenhouse gases by 2050. Why 2°C? Because the really worrying thing about climate change is that the relationship between greenhouse gases and temperature could become non-linear, i.e. small emissions = big temperature rise; this is estimated to occur somewhere between 2°C and 5°C.
On current projections, Laggard to Leader estimates the world will emit those 550 GtCO2-e by 2025 and warm by 6°C by the end of the century. With this metaphorical fire under our backsides, what is the world doing about it? Not nearly enough, writes the report, providing a very useful potted history – for those who don’t subscribe to international policy journals – of UN climate negotiations, the tactics involved, and the flaws in their outcomes; Australia in the 1990s, for example, made sure to maximise the scope of land-based emissions removals it could count as credits, while minimising those sources counted as debits; Russia and other ex-soviet states received billions of emissions credits made unnecessary by their unexpected deindustrialisation; and the USA and China seem to be engaged in a game of ‘abatement chicken’.
Having argued fairly convincing that the current top-down “treating, targets, and trading” paradigm is failing, Laggard to Leader suggests an alternative approach: countries engage in “Cooperative Decarbonisation”, in which “each country [phases] down to zero or very near zero the greenhouse gas emissions associated with every economic and social process over which it has control or influence.”
This “control or influence” argument – described as the “’sphere of influence’ approach” – is crucial for the rest of the report, as it establishes the rationale for claiming that Australia’s (and other countries’) responsibilities aren’t confined simply to the emissions produced domestically. The chapter worth reading in full, but a central point is that a focus on domestic emissions only makes sense in the context of a comprehensive, legally binding, and effectively enforced global regime of emissions reduction targets – which clearly isn’t the current situation.
Under the perhaps second-best but more realistic scenario of distributed or bottom-up action, the scope of emissions under Australia’s “control or influence” (and therefore those for which we bear at least partial responsibility) is staggering: 4% of the world’s emissions, primarily due to our fossil fuel exports.
![]() |
| Laggard to Leader, p. 20 |
Having established the scope for action – from a scientific and moral standpoint – the rest of Laggard to Leader describes in more detail the “Cooperative Decarbonisation” approach, exploring both domestic and international policy options.
It’s ambitious stuff: countries should form cooperative groups based on the goal of tackling particular causes of climate or the developing and deploying zero-carbon technology, with each group containing those countries with the greatest needs and capacities for help (and interest in participating). Where cooperation fails, countries should go it alone.
Countries should build a “race-to-the-top” culture, establishing norms and standards of conduct for the non-use of fossil fuels, as exist for e.g. nuclear testing and anti-personnel landmines, or, more formally, moratoria on mining in Antarctica and the use of nuclear weapons. Here Laggard to Leader provides past examples of Australian international leadership, arguing that we have an historical identify as a leader and are socially recognised as such by other states.
Between this ‘social’ position, our market-leading position in the fossil fuel trade – Australia is the world’s top coal exporter, and expected to be the top LNG exporter by the end of the decade –, and our high wealth, Laggard to Leader argues that we are in an almost unique position to decarbonise quickly, help developing countries do the same, and play a leadership role in facilitating international cooperation.
Under this plan, Australian fossil fuel exports (and domestic usage) should be phased out entirely, while providing assistance to developing countries to help them replace the fossil fuels with zero-carbon technology. Australia should price international flight and shipping emissions on transport to our shores, as well as implement border tax adjustments for goods whose greenhouse gas content is not adequately priced in source countries. And we should significantly ramp up investment in zero-carbon research, development, and deployment.
Much of Laggard to Leader is, if taken in isolation, not that controversial. If you accept the science, then the need for action is fairly self-evident, and the technology and policies described in the latter part of the report have been an on-going area of discussion between and within academia, industry, and government for a while. What sets Laggard to Leader apart and moves it into uncomfortable territory is – as with many of BZE’s publications – the marriage of technical possibility with ambition at a grand scale. Many won’t like the conclusions, and thus dismiss the whole report, but the argumentation is strong enough that Laggard to Leader’s conclusions bear consideration. Grand ambition may be our best hope.
I was not involved in writing Laggard to Leader, but provided feedback on an early draft.
Laggard to Leader is being launched tonight (24/07) in Sydney, and on Thursday (26/07) in Brisbane.
Labels:
Australia,
BZE,
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Saturday, June 30, 2012
Pricing carbon has passed the acid test
With "carbontaxageddon" just around the corner, various Australian media outlets are doing final coverage before July 1 – I hear The Age has the duty of covering the country town of Whyalla, which Tony Abbott memorably said would be "wiped off the map" by carbon pricing. Ben Cubby, the Sydney Morning Herald's environment editor, rang me on Thursday to get some quotes for a piece he was writing. Cubby's a lot more balanced and sensible than Imre Salusinsky and Annabel Hepworth of The Australian, so I had few qualms speaking with him.
The article, "Pricing carbon has passed the acid test", is published today in the News Review section of the SMH (and, I assume, The Age). I believe this is the first time I've been quoted in an Australian broadsheet, which is kind of cool; even cooler is the fact one my lines runs as the "highlight quote" (or whatever it's called) – thanks, sub-editors! I went down and showed my neighbours :-)
I think it's a good piece, quite generally, and I'm happy with how I'm quoted in it. Here's the full text of what I sent Cubby, for the record:
Q: Will the carbon pricing scheme work to achieve 5% emissions reduction by 2020?A: Under the assumption that the (ostensibly bipartisan) 5% target is reflected in the caps to the ETS and the scheme isn't scrapped, very probably.Why:- If you assume the political will to implement the scheme is there (a huge if), then the question is whether the scheme is designed well enough to achieve its goals. I think it is.- The mechanism is an effective one: emissions trading schemes have proven records of reducing emissions; not just for greenhouse gases (e.g. in the EU), but also for other permits (e.g. sulphur dioxide in the USA).- We have independent regulatory oversight and review, which is important and positive. The parties governing and reviewing the scheme are competent, well-respected in their fields, and have good track records (as does Australian governance and regulation generally).- The scheme covers a sufficiently large proportion of Australia's emissions to have a material effect. (I haven't actually heard if it's still 60% directly/two-thirds indirectly since we're only covering 294 installations, but I assume so).- Emissions from excluded sectors – agriculture, forestry, part of transport – could throw a spanner in the works, if their emissions increase (counteracting decreases within the ETS). Hopefully transport will be included – ideally all, but at least the heavy transport planned from 2014. Agriculture is partially addressed through the CFI, but including that and forestry in the ETS would improve it – they're tricky areas, though. A few natural disasters could throw our emissions budget right out of whack.- The potential exists in Australia to achieve sufficient abatement at costs low enough that it would not impose too onerous costs upon businesses or consumers. (Based on several studies I've seen, but my favourite is the ClimateWorks' update of McKinsey's cost curves for Australia in their "low carbon growth plan")- Emissions reductions achieved through international credits/offsets are, by and large, 'real' reductions. Certainly not all of them are, and we're a little at the mercy of the certification agencies, but at least we have certification agencies (and the higher-rated ones are quite confidently legit.) The choice between low-cost and confidence in additionality/legitimacy is a political one.- Most (reasonable) criticisms of the scheme I've seen have been whether the emissions reduction will be lowest-cost (e.g. the 'buying power stations out' component), not will it occur.
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No hard feelings
After my neighbours locked me out on their balcony I wrote them a note of apology, saying, in essence, "I'm sorry I made you feel uncomfortable; I didn't know you were so weird." I found this response out on the balcony today, though judging by its condition it'd been there a few weeks and I just hadn't seen it:
Hi Martin,
It was the end of a long night – lots of drinks had, no hard feelings.
Cheers A.
I particularly like the bit where they accept my apology, but fail to offer one of their own. That's my favourite.
Wednesday, June 27, 2012
Cross-post: Does it make sense for Australia to restrict its export of fossil fuels?
A friend of mine wrote for the ABC about Australia taking responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions generated by the fossil fuels we export, which inspired me to sit down and sort out my views on the topic. The notion of responsibility is often bound up with the idea of refusing to export fossil fuels – an idea also often ascribed to The Greens, though I wasn't able to find it in their official policies – which is an idea I think silly. After I figured out why I thought I was silly, I put my arguments into an article format, which New Matilda published today:
By Martin Jones
Once we dig up and sell the coal, are we still responsible for the emissions? 'Stop exporting fossil fuels' isn't a good enough solution when people in developing countries need to eat and build, writes environmental economist Martin Jones
During the Rio+20 sustainable development summit, Fergus Green and Reuben Finighan last week called for Australia to take responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) it enables through its exports of fossil fuels. Is this a good idea? How would we go about it?
Green and Finighan wrote that the Australian federal government should take a broader look at the sustainability of mining, focussing on the product, not just the process; i.e. it should consider the GHG generated by fossil fuels during their whole use cycle, not just the emissions generated during the mining process.
Mining nations such Australia, Green and Finighan argue, should take responsibility for the emissions caused when their exported fossil fuels are burned; assigning responsibility to the importers only makes sense in the context of an enforceable international climate change regime in which all major emitting countries were limiting their domestic emissions in line with science-based objectives.
Australia is certainly a large player in fossil fuels. We have around 9 per cent of the world’s proven coal reserves, and in 2011 were responsible for 5.8 per cent of the world’s production – down 2.2 percentage points on 2010 – making us the world’s third-largest coal producer after China and the USA. [1]
Not needing nearly as many fossil fuels as China or the USA, we’re the world’s largest coal exporter, accounting for around 27 per cent of global trade [2] Including liquid natural gas (LNG) exports and accounting for currently planned projects, critics of fossil fuel exports estimate that Australian fossil fuels could be responsible for 9 per cent of global GHG emissions by 2020 – and that’s excluding any domestic emissions. [3]
If Australia takes responsibility for its exported emissions, then presumably we would need to follow the same course as for our domestic emissions and reduce them. How? The most obvious answer is, “stop exporting fossil fuels.”
That’s also a poor answer, though, at least in the short- to mid-term. It’s probably by now common knowledge that mining products are Australia’s largest export earner, and large proportion of these are fossil fuels: as of April 2012, 27.5 per cent of our merchandise exports (by value) came from mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials (primarily fossil fuels). [4]
And though the mining industry isn’t nearly as large an employer or tax-payer as they’d like us to think – employing 2.3 per cent of the Australian workforce as of this May [5] , and paying 15 per cent of company taxes in 2009-10 [6] – removing this revenue stream from the Australian economy would be a long and painful process.
(I refer not only to the ‘pain’ of economic transition, but also the pain the mining industry would inflict upon anyone trying to reduce their profits, and the pain Australians would go through listening to it all.)
There are moral problems to consider, too. The Australian Coal Association (ACA) lists China and India as the second- and fourth-largest importers of Australian coal; Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the first-, third-, and fifth-largest, respectively. [7]
The ACA is not alone in expecting demand for resources from China, India, and other developing countries to increase dramatically in the next decade [8], which means refusing to export fossil fuels would make India or China’s transition to a first-world country longer and/or more expensive. A refusal to export also smacks a little of paternalism; a “we know better” attitude where we don’t trust nations to put our resources to good use.
This may well be a path we’re willing to take. There is a precedent for refusing to export resources to countries that we consider might not use them responsibly: fuels for nuclear weapons, such as uranium. Applied to fossil fuels, one could imagine a stance where Australia refuses to export coal, etc. to countries that haven’t signed sufficient agreements on low-emissions usage.
Where the consequences of the actions we enable are severe enough – burning Australia's fossil fuel reserves would take the world 60 per cent of the way to 2 degrees warming, write Green and Finighan – a degree of unilateral action can be justified.
(Given Australia now looks like exporting uranium to India despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, though, this is a weak precedent. [9] Nor would I envy the foreign minister who has to sell such a policy to two of the world’s largest economies.)
The bigger moral problem, though, in my opinion, is a policy that would see Australia reduce our export of fossil fuels before reducing our own usage of them. For starters, our exported fuels are generally higher-quality resources that are less polluting than what we use domestically; our coal exports, for example, are almost exclusively black coal, which releases significantly less GHGs than the brown coal used in Australia (especially Victoria) for power generation.
Not only that, our fossil fuels are arguably put to better use by developing countries than they would be in Australia: building infrastructure in China or India, while it may be more carbon-intensive than here, will probably do more to improve the lives of their citizens than using those resources here would improve ours.
By no means do I wish to suggest that Australia should wash its hands of responsibility for the emissions of the resources we export: I welcome Green and Finighan’s call for Australian leadership on this issue. That fairly broad concept, however, involves some tricky questions, some – by no means all – of which I have raised here. I expect Green and Finighan’s upcoming report for Beyond Zero Emissions will address many of them, and I look forward more discussion of this issue in the future.
Who's Responsible For Exported CO2?
By Martin Jones
Once we dig up and sell the coal, are we still responsible for the emissions? 'Stop exporting fossil fuels' isn't a good enough solution when people in developing countries need to eat and build, writes environmental economist Martin Jones
During the Rio+20 sustainable development summit, Fergus Green and Reuben Finighan last week called for Australia to take responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) it enables through its exports of fossil fuels. Is this a good idea? How would we go about it?
Green and Finighan wrote that the Australian federal government should take a broader look at the sustainability of mining, focussing on the product, not just the process; i.e. it should consider the GHG generated by fossil fuels during their whole use cycle, not just the emissions generated during the mining process.
Mining nations such Australia, Green and Finighan argue, should take responsibility for the emissions caused when their exported fossil fuels are burned; assigning responsibility to the importers only makes sense in the context of an enforceable international climate change regime in which all major emitting countries were limiting their domestic emissions in line with science-based objectives.
Australia is certainly a large player in fossil fuels. We have around 9 per cent of the world’s proven coal reserves, and in 2011 were responsible for 5.8 per cent of the world’s production – down 2.2 percentage points on 2010 – making us the world’s third-largest coal producer after China and the USA. [1]
Not needing nearly as many fossil fuels as China or the USA, we’re the world’s largest coal exporter, accounting for around 27 per cent of global trade [2] Including liquid natural gas (LNG) exports and accounting for currently planned projects, critics of fossil fuel exports estimate that Australian fossil fuels could be responsible for 9 per cent of global GHG emissions by 2020 – and that’s excluding any domestic emissions. [3]
If Australia takes responsibility for its exported emissions, then presumably we would need to follow the same course as for our domestic emissions and reduce them. How? The most obvious answer is, “stop exporting fossil fuels.”
That’s also a poor answer, though, at least in the short- to mid-term. It’s probably by now common knowledge that mining products are Australia’s largest export earner, and large proportion of these are fossil fuels: as of April 2012, 27.5 per cent of our merchandise exports (by value) came from mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials (primarily fossil fuels). [4]
And though the mining industry isn’t nearly as large an employer or tax-payer as they’d like us to think – employing 2.3 per cent of the Australian workforce as of this May [5] , and paying 15 per cent of company taxes in 2009-10 [6] – removing this revenue stream from the Australian economy would be a long and painful process.
(I refer not only to the ‘pain’ of economic transition, but also the pain the mining industry would inflict upon anyone trying to reduce their profits, and the pain Australians would go through listening to it all.)
There are moral problems to consider, too. The Australian Coal Association (ACA) lists China and India as the second- and fourth-largest importers of Australian coal; Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the first-, third-, and fifth-largest, respectively. [7]
The ACA is not alone in expecting demand for resources from China, India, and other developing countries to increase dramatically in the next decade [8], which means refusing to export fossil fuels would make India or China’s transition to a first-world country longer and/or more expensive. A refusal to export also smacks a little of paternalism; a “we know better” attitude where we don’t trust nations to put our resources to good use.
This may well be a path we’re willing to take. There is a precedent for refusing to export resources to countries that we consider might not use them responsibly: fuels for nuclear weapons, such as uranium. Applied to fossil fuels, one could imagine a stance where Australia refuses to export coal, etc. to countries that haven’t signed sufficient agreements on low-emissions usage.
Where the consequences of the actions we enable are severe enough – burning Australia's fossil fuel reserves would take the world 60 per cent of the way to 2 degrees warming, write Green and Finighan – a degree of unilateral action can be justified.
(Given Australia now looks like exporting uranium to India despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, though, this is a weak precedent. [9] Nor would I envy the foreign minister who has to sell such a policy to two of the world’s largest economies.)
The bigger moral problem, though, in my opinion, is a policy that would see Australia reduce our export of fossil fuels before reducing our own usage of them. For starters, our exported fuels are generally higher-quality resources that are less polluting than what we use domestically; our coal exports, for example, are almost exclusively black coal, which releases significantly less GHGs than the brown coal used in Australia (especially Victoria) for power generation.
Not only that, our fossil fuels are arguably put to better use by developing countries than they would be in Australia: building infrastructure in China or India, while it may be more carbon-intensive than here, will probably do more to improve the lives of their citizens than using those resources here would improve ours.
By no means do I wish to suggest that Australia should wash its hands of responsibility for the emissions of the resources we export: I welcome Green and Finighan’s call for Australian leadership on this issue. That fairly broad concept, however, involves some tricky questions, some – by no means all – of which I have raised here. I expect Green and Finighan’s upcoming report for Beyond Zero Emissions will address many of them, and I look forward more discussion of this issue in the future.
Labels:
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climate change,
economics,
New Matilda,
policy,
publication
Friday, May 11, 2012
Cross-post: Surrendering to the idea of a price floor
After my previous misadventures with major media, I was pleasantly surprised when Stian Reklev, the chief correspondent for Reuters Point Carbon, asked me to write a comment piece on the Australian ETS price floor mechanism and its effect on the market for international permits. In retrospect, I perhaps lapsed a little too much into 'explainer' mode, but with only 650 words to play with there's only so much analysis you can do – I feel weird not backing statements up with solid argumentation and a few links. Here's the piece, published today in the Carbon Market Australia-New Zealand May newsletter:
Surrendering to the idea of a price floor
From July 2015, the Australian federal government will set the price of the permits in its emissions trading scheme free – within limits. The government intends to introduce a price floor and price ceiling until at least 2017/18, in order to provide certainty and reduce risks for market participants and investors.
This is good news for emission reduction activities whose viability depends on prices several years hence, such as larger, more complex projects. Further, the goal of abatement at least-cost should be balanced against the goal of abating as rapidly as possible; should reaching current targets be cheaper than expected, a floor price can ensure a minimum level of spending on abatement. Several EU countries already have or are considering similar measures, in recognition that adjusting the targets of an ETS in response to price movements often isn’t possible rapidly.
Last December, the government released a discussion paper and called for submission on the price floor, which combines a reserve price for Australian carbon units at auction with an ‘international unit surrender charge’ that ensures international carbon credits cost at least as much as domestic units.
Four options are being considered for the international unit surrender charge, with two main approaches: Options 1 and 2 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price of the international unit when it was purchased; Options 3 and 4 calculate the charge based on the difference between the price floor and the price when the unit surrendered.
While calculating the surrender charge based on the difference between the buying price and the price floor is intuitively appealing, it has implementation issues ranging from administrative complexity, through estimating firms’ time value of money (to adjust the prices of credits purchased earlier rather than later), to the possibility of firms gaming the system by artificially inflating the price of purchased credits. The government paper also notes that Options 1 and 2 would create a preference for foreign units as “if the international price goes up, [firms] could sell the unit at a profit, purchase another unit at a similar (or the same) price, and pay a lower surrender charge.” (Source)
Option 3 appears the most likely: when firms surrender their international units, a charge is applied based on the difference between the prevailing spot price and the price floor. This is the “purest” option, with minimal government involvement and low administration costs. The risk that the price of units changes between purchasing and surrendering them is borne by the liable firms, though financial markets are expected (e.g. by Westpac (PDF)) to provide hedging products or forward contracts.
The costs of hedging, in addition to the surrender charge, could promote the purchase of domestic units over foreign credits. However, it’s worth noting that, since markets for foreign units will likely exist further forward than domestic units (which will only be auctioned three years in advance, based on current plans), there will be a strong bias toward international credits from firms looking to hedge long-term.
Option 4 is similar to Option 3, though with an option for firms to lock in a surrender charge ahead of time based on a regulator-calculated forward curve. This interesting idea would assist firms who, for reasons of cost, access, or complexity are unlikely to use financial markets’ hedging products. Though adding complexity, it would avoid any bias Option 3 has toward domestic units. However, is it the government’s role to insure traders from carbon price risk?
While an MP who supported the ETS, Rob Oakeshott, has recently spoken out against the price floor, the government has an advantage: the relevant legislation has already been passed, and the remaining details (e.g. the choice of option) can be passed by regulation. Regulation passes automatically unless blocked, so the opposition would need to find a 75-seat majority in the House of Representatives to do so. (Under convention established by Speaker Denison, the Speaker votes against motions in case of a tie.)
Even in the government’s current precarious position, this seems unlikely – the defection of Oakeshott alone would not suffice –, so that, if the government survives long enough to introduce a price floor, it will likely pass.
Martin C. Jones is a researcher at the Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets, UNSW.
Sunday, May 06, 2012
The chill of neighbourly distrust
I have neighbours on one side, A. and D., whose apartment has the same layout as mine. Our balconies are adjacent, and so we've had a bit of friendly interaction since I moved in a year and a half ago. It's irregular and infrequent, but we'll hang out on our respective balconies with a drink or something to eat and shoot the breeze. Sometimes they'll have parties and I'll perch on our shared balcony wall and chat with the guests. They're perfectly nice people, I thought.
Tonight I got home from a hip-hop gig in the city, and found A. & D. having another party. I went onto my balcony to say hello, and they – or their guests, or all together; I don't remember, exactly – offered me a beer. Then they realised they'd run out of beer, so they told me it was BYO beer. "No problem!", I said: went inside, grabbed a ginger beer, and climbed over onto their balcony.
I'll admit: I had not received the explicit invitation to set foot on A. & D.'s balcony – but the "come join us" vibe was definitely there. After a year and a half of living next to and interacting with someone, I think it would have been weirder to offer them a drink but then expect them to stay on their own property.
At any rate, I took an empty chair on their balcony and chatted with their guests. It was A.'s birthday, so I congratulated her. We talked about the gig I was at. The conversation turned to dancing, and one of the guests, J., challenged me to dance.
"Really?", I said, "Because I will. What style?" Perhaps influenced by the DJ inside pumping out cool house music, J. replied, "Melbourne Shuffle."
"I'm from Melbourne," I said, "I can do that."
And I did. And they were impressed.
I sat down again, and chatted some more. As this apartment has the same floor layout as mine (but, from A. & D.'s accounts, a much more responsible owner), I was curious to see what it was like. "Can I have a look around your apartment?", I asked. A. paused slightly.
"Um. Alright. J., go with him, would you?"
Being chaperoned mystified me slightly, but I strode inside a few steps to where D. was standing with some of the other guests. We danced on the spot a little. A few moments later, one of the women on the balcony called me back out to them. I went. Then it got weird.
They asked me to sit; I did. With great hesitation and obtuseness, A. and friends eventually explained that they'd called me out because I had
I'm going to interrupt here for a second, because this is the sort of experience it was. You've done something: you don't know what it is, but it seems bad. Was it asking to see the apartment? Have I come across as a thief? I asked. No, no, it wasn't that. What I'd done, was...
Had I called out A.'s name, they asked. Huh? When? (Oh, god – had I gotten her name wrong all this time? Had I called it out in my sleep, for some bizarre reason? Has I played a movie – or porn – where somebody calls out "A." really loudly? (No, no, and no.))
Had I ever stood on my balcony and called out A.'s name when she wasn't on her balcony, they clarified.
"I... guess. Probably. I don't remember."
"Why?"
"... because the lights were on, the balcony doors were open, and I wanted to say hello?"
"... because the lights were on, the balcony doors were open, and I wanted to say hello?"
"Did you ever want to use her internet?"
"Oh. Yes. Yeah, when I first moved in, before I got mine hooked up."
"But why call her name? Why not go and knock on her door?"
"Why would I go down two flights of stairs, out into the street, ring a doorbell, and make A. come down two flights of stairs to answer it, when I'm right next door."
What followed was a bizarre discussion about the appropriateness of calling people by their names, or not, which all made much more sense when they revealed that they were incredibly high. Okay! Much less weird. Or, at least, weird, but explainable. A. told me it didn't matter, and – we were standing by that point – gave me a friendly waist-hug.
All sorted! Hurrah! D. and the other party guests came out, as did the DJ, and we all stood on the balcony talking rubbish for a while. Lutherans vs. Catholics, bloodlines, why to invest in silver, that sort of thing. (I don't know what "that sort of thing" is, but then, I wasn't on nearly as many drugs.)
It was pretty cold by this stage, so everyone except D., the DJ and I went inside. A. called us in, and I would've been happy to comply, but D. gently pulled on my arm to indicate that I should stay. I guessed he didn't want to be stuck alone in conversation with the silver-investing, Lutheran DJ, so I stayed. I was wearing a thin jacket, though, so I tried to stand on the apartment-side of our trio for warmth. D. casually position himself between me and the doors. We talked until the DJ decided it was getting cold, and suggested we go inside. Gratefully, I moved to follow, but D. grabbed me again and suggested we stay and talk outside. I began to sense a theme.
We shut the double balcony doors, so the guests inside weren't cold, then D. and I took a chair. (Each.) I asked whether we were out here because he wanted to be outside, or because he didn't want me to be inside.
"A little bit of both."
Aha. I joked about "feeling the love." We got into a discussion about trust, and D. – who was not high, he said, but possibly drunk – told me I've been "overly familiar" in coming onto their balcony and going inside. I responded that I was invited.
"I didn't invite you."
"Well, I don't remember who invited me. I felt invited."
"Well, we didn't."
Awkward.
"Shall I go? I don't feel particularly welcome any more."
"No, no, it's alright."
"No, no, it's alright."
What the fuck?
A. came to the balcony doors. She tried to open them, but D. pushed them shut in her face. She scolded him, and he relented.
"D., I need you for something. Right now. It's important."
"Later."
"No, it needs to be now. It's important."
"I'll do it later!"
"It's alright, D.," I said, "go inside. I'll sit out here by myself. In plain sight."
A. and D. stepped inside the balcony doors to keep arguing about whether D. should do this thing or not. As soon as they were inside, D. locked the doors.
He locked me outside on his balcony.
D. didn't go and do whatever it was A. wanted him to, if this thing wasn't just a pretext of some sort anyway. After a minute or two he came back outside, where I was playing with my phone.
A. locked the door after him.
"Samsung Galaxy?"
"Yep. S II."
"Yeah, I've known you've had one of those for a few months now."
I looked at him blankly. Had I shown it to him? Bragged about it?
"I've had it for about a year."
"You tried to connect to our network with it. I saw it come up: 'Martin's Galaxy'"
"You tried to connect to our network with it. I saw it come up: 'Martin's Galaxy'"
"Umm... okay. Perhaps. Must've been by accident, I–"
"Don't get defensive."
"... I'm not getting defensive, I'm just saying that I have my own, high-speed internet connection, and I have no need to connect to your network. I don't even know what your network is called. Which one is it?"
"That doesn't matter. You tried to connect to it. It's fine; you don't need to defend yourself."
This is so. fucking. weird.
A. came to the balcony door again and called D. in for something else. He refused, again, and she told him off for being so aggressive. Whether to me (our conversation was probably audible inside) or to her, I don't know. I'd had enough, and told D. he should go inside; I was just leaving.
"Yeah, you were just leaving", affirmed A., pulled D. inside, and bolted the doors again.
Weirdos. Fucking weirdos.
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
Just the way the bilby crumbles
A summary of my Easter:
- Played many board games with friends. Won convincingly at Boggle (a word game), and did well in other games. Felt very smart.
- Realised that, when loading my bike into a friend's car to get to the games night, I'd left my front wheel, expensive lock, and all my keys on the ground in Redfern (a low socio-economic area). Unsurprisingly, they were no longer there when I returned five hours later. Felt not very smart.
- Went camping! Four days at Turon Gates, out past the Blue Mountains.
- Canoed, rode a horse, built lots of camp-fires, smelled of smoke, read novels in a hammock. Did not mountain bike :-(
- Spent ~$330 on a new front wheel, lock, and keys. Am telling everyone they were "stolen". But you know better, dear readers. (All three of you.)
- Ate chocolate! Not eggs, or bunnies, or anything... just chocolate. Because I like chocolate. (I'm not sure what chocolate really has to do with Easter anyway, now that I think about it.)
Monday, April 09, 2012
Better no quote than a misquote
On Wednesday afternoon last week, a journalist called Imre Salusinszky from The Australian – a national broadsheet daily newspaper – asked me to ring him, as he had a question about carbon trading. I'd never heard of, let alone had anything to do with Salusinszky until then, so it's anyone's guess as to why he decided to contact me. (My suspicion is he read my piece on complementary measures on The Conversation.)
The Australian has an anti-climate change action editorial stance, and is openly anti-Greens, so I was a little apprehensive about what I was getting myself into, but Salusinszky seemed like reasonably enough chap on the phone. His questions were about the NSW GGAS, a state baseline-and-credit emissions reduction scheme that was shutting down when the national emissions trading scheme started on July 1. (In short: a company's levels of greenhouse gas emissions are projected into the future: this is the baseline. By reducing its emissions, a company receives a 'credit'. It can also buy credits from/sell to others. Each year, companies are required to submit credits to the Government.) From its conception, GGAS was intended to run only until a national scheme superseded it, but its closure had not officially been announced until Thursday. (The Oz had advance notice of the announcement.)
The issue was that the GGAS scheme had generated millions more credits – emissions reductions – than required, and while the holders of these credits would have used them to meet their submission requirement in later years, there obviously wouldn't be any later years now that the scheme was closing. The Oz had a quote from the NSW Energy Minister calling for the Federal Government to compensate the holders of NSW GGAS credits, and a quote from the Federal Government saying it was the state's problem.
Salusinszky asked me some questions about GGAS – e.g. What was the highest price the credits had ever reached? When was the scheme originally due to end? Could/should the two schemes coexist? Has GGAS worked? – and I answered them as best I could, sending a follow-up email with details on answers on which I was unclear. The line Salusinszky wanted to take seemed pretty clear – the national government was leaving companies in the lurch – and while I thought this a silly stance, I hoped to at least temper the piece with more realistic information.
When the draft piece arrived, my suspicions were confirmed: it clearly portrayed the NSW scheme as being victim of the national scheme; worse, it misquoted me as supporting a phased reduction of GGAS, when I had quite clearly said there was no point in the national and state schemes coexisting. Perhaps Salusinszky misheard me; perhaps he decided that, on the basis of my support for both national AND state schemes in The Conversation, it's what I should have said; perhaps the line came from his co-author, Annabel Hepworth, who's a bit of hack. In any case, I corrected the errors and sent the piece back.
The piece, "Carbon tax to scuttle state's pioneer ETS", left my quotes out entirely. I can only imagine why :-P
I criticised the article on Twitter, pointing out not only its flaws but that the authors well knew better, as I'd told them so the previous day. Following that, the Thomson Reuters Point Carbon reporter covering climate change policy in the Asia-Pacific, Stian Reklev, got in contact with me. (Reklev does follow me on Twitter.) I sent him my views, and he ended up quoting my in his piece (see below). That's probably less exposure than I would have gotten in The Australian, but far more reputable!
New South Wales bins carbon trading scheme (readable with free trial)
Australian state New South Wales will abandon its Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS) on July 1, when the federal government introduces a tax on CO2 emissions, state Energy Minister Chris Hartcher announced Thursday.The baseline-and-credit scheme has operated since 2003, targeting emission cuts primarily in the state electricity sector, but also in industry and forestry.The phase-out was expected, but leaves market participants with 16 million surplus credits that will be ineligible for use in the nationwide scheme.This spurred Minister Hartcher to demand in local media Thursday that the federal government compensate the credit holders.However, market observers dismissed Hartcher’s claims.“It’s been clear from the outset of GGAS to all participants and government that GGAS would finish when a national carbon pricing scheme started,” said Martin Jones, a researcher at the University of New South Wales.“The problem of excess supply and an upcoming end date have been on the radar for at least half a decade, and insufficient efforts to address it have little to do with the federal government,” he told Point Carbon News.STEADY TARGETThe scheme aimed to bring per capita emissions of CO2 equivalent to 7.27 tonnes in 2007, down from 8.65 tonnes in 2003.However, since 2007 the per capita target has remained steady at 7.27 tonnes.Meanwhile, the scheme has led to emission cuts far beyond the target, noted Rob Fowler, Australia and New Zealand representative at the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA).He said he was not convinced that holders of the surplus credits should be compensated, as the GGAS legislation only goes to 2012, and it was always clear it would be replaced by a national scheme.“But the underlying abatement activities still have value under the new national regime,” he added.FUTURE CFI CREDITSThe activities covered under the current GGAS will either be brought under Australia’s A$23 ($23.70) carbon tax from July 1, or qualify to generate offsets under the Carbon Farming Iniative (CFI).GGAS projects seeking eligibility under the CFI must apply, and emission cuts achieved until now cannot be used in the new scheme.But all in all, Thursday’s news was unlikely to impact emission reduction efforts in the state, according to Fowler.“There is a low chance that abatement activities will cease,” he said.Energy efficiency measures were part of GGAS when it launched in 2003, but was moved to a separate Energy Savings Scheme in 2009.“The energy efficiency scheme will continue, and they will most likely expand it,” Fowler said, adding it could be linked to a similar scheme in neighbouring Victoria.The federal government’s carbon tax will move to an emissions trading scheme on July 1, 2015.
Labels:
Australia,
carbon pricing,
climate change,
policy,
publication,
quoted
Thursday, March 29, 2012
Cross-post: State climate schemes are still worthwhile under a carbon price
My first piece for The Conversation, written in response to recent events:
State climate schemes still worthwhile under a carbon price
In justifying their recent abandonment of state-based climate schemes, the governments of Queensland and Victoria
have both claimed that the schemes will be redundant under the federal
emissions trading scheme (ETS) that begins in July.¹ Yet this
justification is only a smokescreen, as a carbon price can well exist
with other environmental and climate schemes.
The goal of putting a price on carbon – more correctly, on greenhouse
gases, but “carbon” is shorter – is to reduce the amount of carbon
emissions. The flexible nature of an ETS lets the market decide whether
this occurs. It reduces the activities that produce carbon or conducts
those activities more efficiently.
The industries in which these reductions occur, and the people that
are affected by them, can be only broadly selected by the Government.
This is the point, since the idea is that the market will do the job
more cheaply than if the Government prescribed everything. And the
argument that state climate programs within a national ETS can make
emissions reduction more expensive is correct.
However, getting the cheapest emissions abatement is not the only
possible goal. Another goal might be to target particular geographic or
social groups, such as rural areas or low-income households. South
Australia’s Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme,
for example, aims to reduce household electricity use, but requires a
certain proportion of that reduction to occur in disadvantaged
households. Energy costs are thus reduced where households are most
struggling with them, rather than just where it’s cheapest to do so
(which is usually higher-income households). Similar goals could well be
pursued through state-based measures complementing a carbon price.
A goal of further policies might be to target areas that don’t
respond well or rapidly to price changes, whether because of habit,
socially shaped preferences, intrinsic motivation, or market problems.
It’s certainly possible that carbon-price-related rises in electricity
bills may cause us to go and demand more energy efficient appliances and
houses, or at least appliances and houses that can be upgraded when
better technology arrives. But these connections are often tenuous and
it can make more sense simply to mandate minimum standards, as we
already do for safety. (It is considered unacceptable to let the market
decide how safe appliances and houses will be based on “price”, i.e.
lawsuits.)
Yet the Victorian Government has removed support for precisely such a policy:
coal power standards that would have required a certain level of
emissions efficiency from new plants, and required them to be ready to
install clean coal technology if it became viable.
Scrapping investments in climate-related infrastructure or research and development, as the Queensland Government is doing,
only makes sense if you believe that markets always make the best
choices. Research, however, is an area where markets commonly do too
little, because the benefits of research tend to be shared amongst many
(including competitors) rather than just the researching organisation
itself.
Strategic government investment in technology can make it viable
years before the market would deliver a similar result. A prime example
is Germany’s highly advanced solar power industry, which it developed
with subsidies despite being covered by the EU ETS. And while it’s
unclear how well Germany’s bolstered solar industry will survive
long-term against its rivals from China, it is inarguable that the solar
industry made Germany’s power supply robust to the kind of shock that
saw its nuclear reactors shut down after the disaster in Fukushima.
This robustness – the ability to maintain a minimum level of
performance under a range of possible future conditions – was not
delivered because of the EU ETS: it came from additional, smaller-scale
policy. And while it may involve some amount of duplication, such
robustness is valuable when unforeseen events occur; what if, against
all expectation, the constitutional challenge
to the Clean Energy Future legislation were to succeed? Achieving our
environmental goals would be significantly easier if states still had
their individual programs.
These are just a handful of reasons why complementary environmental
and climate policies could be worth pursuing, even at a state level,
under a national carbon price. There are more. And I do not claim that all policies will be worth it: complementary policies should be evaluated under frameworks such as the one recently published by Denniss, Grudnoff, & Macintosh.
If the Queensland and Victorian Governments had justified abandoning
their climate programs based on such an evaluation, it would be easier
to believe their faith in a “carbon tax”. And, to be fair, Victoria did
conduct a review (PDF)
that found no compelling case for a state-based emissions reduction
target under a national carbon scheme. But the review also found other
Victorian climate programs are worth keeping, and that the merits of
state emissions target should be reviewed if the national scheme is
altered or repealed.
The reason that state governments are backpedalling on climate
policies isn’t because they believe that the “carbon tax” will solve all
our environmental problems: this is a smokescreen. The reason is that
they don’t share the goals that the federal legislation pursues, of
reducing carbon pollution, encouraging renewable energy generation, and
“future-proofing” the economy. For if they did, there are plenty of
state climate schemes that would still be worthwhile.
¹ Readers may be more familiar with the incorrect, though widespread term, “carbon tax”. More on that here.
[UPDATE 30/03]
Green industry newsletter Climate Spectator republished the article today :-)
[UPDATE 30/03]
Green industry newsletter Climate Spectator republished the article today :-)
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