Showing posts with label resource tax. Show all posts
Showing posts with label resource tax. Show all posts

Friday, August 06, 2010

Countering some poor arguments for a mining tax

I was recently asked by Xavier Shay (blog, twitter) to comment on an article in The Age by Michael Gilding, entitled "More tax dollars and less mining? That's a win-win situation". Here is my response: 

Short version: Gilding identifies several problems for which a reduction in mining – though it might help – is the wrong solution.
Longer, point by point version:

Gilding's first argument, that "mining sucks oxygen (capital investment) from the rest of the economy", is one I can't support. The reason is that a basic tenet of economics is that people (the market) make their own best decisions – in this case, investing in mining rather than, say, toll roads. The first rule of taxation is therefore that it distorts private decision-making as little as possible, which makes justifying a mining tax on the grounds that it distorts decisions problematic. (The RSPT, I note, was lauded precisely for NOT distorting investment decisions.)

There is a notable exception to this non-distorting policy: when the social costs/benefits are not adequately reflected by the monetary costs/benefits. That's why we have extra taxes on cigarettes – the "costs" they impose are less than the untaxed price a market sets on them. Similarly, education provides (societal) benefits far in excess of what it costs to deliver, and is therefore subsidised.

Now, Gilding argues that capital that goes to mining could instead go to "innovative technologies or creative industries", like solar power. Well, yes, but it could also go to building apartment buildings, shopping centres, car manufacturing plants, coal power stations, wharves, or toll roads. I am open to the idea of stimulating innovative and creative industries (and solar power), but reducing capital investment in mining is a silly way of doing it.


Gilding's second argument is about the effects that mining exports have on the Australian dollar. It is true that a higher Australian dollar reduces our (quantity of) exports. Gilding expresses the commonly held view that exports are better than imports, and we should increase our net exports. In the first point, I am agnostic: exports are like saving, imports are like borrowing. As long as I'm in balance over time, there is no intrinsic "better" or "worse". I have more sympathy for the second point – that we should increase our net exports at this point in time –, as we have reasonably high levels of private foreign debt that really should be addressed. However, the proposed mechanism is, again, rubbish: if we wanted to increase our exports by devaluing the Australian dollar (by reducing mining production), why not just do as the Chinese do and go back to a pegged currency? Oh, that's right – decades of economic and political doctrine advocating the contrary.
In short: making one industry less competitive (mining) does not make other industries (cars) more competitive.


Gilding's third argument is about the difficulty in managing a two-speed economy. That difficulty absolutely exists, and skimming profits off high-performing industries to help (through reform, not subsidies!) low-performing industries is good economic management. But why is mining unique is this regard? There are other industries in Australia whose return on investment is just as high (in percentile terms), and taking "super profits" from one high-performing industry while ignoring others is inequitable, unfair, and distortionary policy. (An economy wide super-profits tax – essentially progressive company taxes, as we have on income – is certainly an interesting idea, but not one that's within a coo-ee of public debate. I don't even know how theoretically valid it is.)
No, the rationale for the extra tax on mining was: 1) natural resources are non-renewable; and 2) natural resources are pubic assets. That the revenue then be used to reform the rest of the economy – yes, absolutely! Using that RSPT/MRRT/$ACRONYM revenue for anything other than infrastructure and/or business investment would be awful, short-sighted policy.


There is a fourth argument in Gilding's piece, though he barely touches on it: "[M]inerals are not going to go anywhere. In fact, it might be prudent to leave some of those minerals in the ground for future generations of Australians." This is a rather tricky issue of inter-temporal profit maximisation – is it better to sell something now or later? Just imagine you have a bar of gold sitting at home – when you do you sell it? All now, all later, bits and pieces over time (let's assume you can separate it into discrete portions easily)? The answer depends on when you think you'll need money over your lifetime, your expectations of the development of the value of gold, and your expectations of the development of the value of alternative investments. Maybe, in 50 years, gold can be cheaply synthesised and will become very cheap. Maybe it will be discovered to be a key ingredient in life-prolonging elixirs and will sky-rocket in value. Maybe you have a high preference for getting a return on your gold in the next 10 years and don't care about anything else. (How long does a CEO typically stay at a company?) But, certainly, it's a very complex topic.

Actually, I lie – Gilding does touch on the topic again, in his summary: "Mining is robbing future generations of natural resources." Where is our future generations' "right" to natural resources? Would they be just as happy with the proceeds of alternative investments funded by selling those resources? Huge, thorny topic; barely scratched in the article.

Saturday, July 03, 2010

RSPT –> MRRT

So, the Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT) has been replaced with the Mineral Resource Rent Tax (MRRT). What's all that about?

The RSPT, as I've written about previously, was a very solidly thought out tax based upon the concept that, since the stuff the Australian people are giving the resource sector can only be sold once, we should get more from it than if the sector were using something that doesn't run out (e.g. farming). Further (and unrelated to the fact it's a non-renewable resource; this is just good general taxation policy) the amount we got should be somehow linked to the amount the stuff is worth.

The second of these reforms has been kept in the MRRT. The first – the bigger rationale behind the tax – has been beaten, bludgeoned, and finally sloughed off to die in a muddy ditch. Not to belabour the point, but I'm really not impressed with what the Australian Government has done here.

If you are of short attention span, here's the summary: dumping the RSPT for the MRRT is a very good (short-term) political move, and rubbish economic policy.

Rather than going through the whole thing again, let's look at some of the bigger changes (from the media release):
  • "The Government will focus the resource tax reforms on our biggest and most profitable commodities: iron ore, coal, oil and gas." – Why only these? This is a political rationale (let's tackle a few big things that look good, while shutting all those small miners up) rather than an economic rationale (which would apply equally to all resources). That being said, this isn't all that bad: though it reduces the number of companies affected from 2,500-odd to 320, it still covers three-quarters of the market (by value). Of course, if something other than iron ore, coal, oil, or gas become valuable in future, we'll have to adjust the tax. And we can all imagine how easy that will be...
  • "Iron ore and coal will be subject to a new profits-based Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) at a rate of 30 per cent." – this is a backdown, pure and simple. Choosing the rate is not really a question for economists, any more than deciding how high pensions should be is; everyone gets a say on that. So this is me talking as a regular voter, not as an economist: I think that this is soft; a cave-in to get the issue off the table quickly and make Gillard look good. It's something Rudd wouldn't have been able to do, and for that I miss him. Our new Prime Minister has brought with her a new capacity to "compromise" before being seen as back-flipping. My real revulsion, however, arises through the combination of the reduced rate with...
  • "Projects will be entitled to a 25 per cent extraction allowance that reduces taxable profits subject to the MRRT. This allowance recognises the contribution of the miner's expertise to profits at the mine gate." – "contribution of miner's expertise"? Are you fucking kidding me? Not only will we be taxing the miners at a lower rate, we're going to exempt 25% of their profits from the tax because of – no, look, I'll tell you why: it's because they're good at lobbying. That's all this is. Sickening.
  • "MRRT assessable profits are calculated on the value of the commodity, determined at its first saleable form (at mine gate), less all costs to that point." – I don't know enough to comment properly, but it sounds fishy.
  • "Small miners with resource profits below $50 million per annum will not have an MRRT liability." – This won't change the revenues that much, but it's not like the "you don't earn much so we're going to make life easy for you" personal tax treatments (see, e.g., the proposals for bank interest or deductions) – these are companies with up to $50 million dollar profits. They can afford accountants. My opinion: buying the small miners off.
There are more changes that are less important – no more exploration rebate, a smaller company tax rate decrease – and others that, while important, I'm frankly too tired to address right after having driven from Sydney to Melbourne (a post on that should appear in the next few days).
Dumping the 40% "equity" thing and changing the way depreciation and uplifting are handled require more concentration that my post-drive (and post-football) brain is able to muster right now, but I hope to get to it soon.

Watch this space.

Friday, May 28, 2010

A man of letters

I sent a letter to The Age yesterday about the Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT), which was published today with minor alterations. Here is my original text:

RSPT was always going to kick in above 6%
Sir,

Lest the Government's negotiations to raise the rate at which the RSPT takes effect be seen as weakness on their part: the original "Australia's Future Tax System" report clearly stated that the industry needs to be compensated for "the time value of money (the risk-free return) and a premium for the risk associated with investment (the risk premium return for systematic risk)."

Dr. Henry confirmed as much in his post-budget address to the ABE, stating in an example, "The appropriate rate of return for a resource project will include an appropriate risk premium, say 9 per cent. With a risk free rate of 6 per cent, the required rate of return is 15 per cent."

The Government and the miners will now argue about how high the level of systematic risk is, and rightly so. But it seems clear from the report and Dr. Henry's remarks that the RSPT was always going to kick in at 6% + X.

I hold little hope that my letter will be read (or understood) by many, but I do hope I'm taken more seriously than the drongo whose letter followed mine.

N.B. The quotes were taken from the Australia's Future Tax System report and Dr. Henry's address.

Further reading:
Though I don't wish to turn this blog into merely an outlet for my economic and political views, I do find this topic particularly interesting because it's a) a rare public discussion of fairly "pure" economics and b) an issue of political importance, not simply because of the possible tax income but because it's an issue the Rudd Government needs to "perform" on and can't put on the backburner like the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. Success here could – this is my hope – give Labor the guts to engage on climate change again and submit something better than the crap that was their Emissions Trading Scheme.
In any case, I would like to recommend the following three articles by three well-respected economists:
None of them provide all the answers, and you can argue about whether they even ask the right questions. (For the most part, I'd say they do.) But wouldn't it be boring if they did?

Friday, May 21, 2010

Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT) for Dummies

Since the Australian Government announced its Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT) recently, based on one of the recommendations of the "Australia's Future Tax System" review (colloquially known as the "Henry review", after the head of Treasury, Dr. Ken Henry), it's become a big topic of discussion. Having had a chance to look at the actual proposal, I feel that much of the mainstream media coverage (including the Government's attempts to "sell" the tax) has been pretty poor, and am going to have a crack at explaining it:

Underpinning the tax is idea of what we're taxing: natural resources (i.e. minerals). These natural resources have the characteristic that they are non-renewable – once they've been dug up and sold, they're gone for good. This is quite different to most things produced in Australia, which are goods or services that to a greater (services) or lesser (some goods) extent can be produced again, and again, and again. You can milk a cow today, and milk it again tomorrow; milking it today does "rob" future generations. However, if we mine something today, we can't mine it again tomorrow: the resource is gone.
Further, natural resources aren't private. They aren't skills someone has learnt; they aren't objects someone has bought or created. They are parts of our country, and as such belong to all Australian citizens. As the Government says (PDF, 372 KB), "If the community undercharges for the use of their non‐renewable resources, it is akin to under‐pricing the sale of a public asset."
These two arguments – and there are others, which I won't go into because I consider this point to be the least debatable in the discussion – provide a strong case for "getting more" out of our natural resources when they are sold, i.e. taxing them more highly.

The question, then, is how to do it. At the moment the states have resource royalties, which are based on the quantity of resources extracted. This is silly, since if two people sell the same quantity of different things, but one makes more profit than the other, taxing them the same amount is clearly unfair. More importantly for our example, a "flat" royalty fee doesn't account for changes in value, so that we – the owners of the resources – aren't getting all we could should be.

What the RSPT does is the following: the Government pays 40% of whatever investments the mining companies make (e.g. on equipment & machinery), in the form of a tax credit. In return, the Government gets a 40% share of the profits.

BUT, the Government doesn't take 40% of all profits. Instead, the mining companies get to make a "normal" profit, to compensate them for the fact that they are running the thing, and taking account for the fact that they could be investing their money somewhere else. A "normal" profit is usually seen as the risk-free return(1) plus the level of systematic risk: in the case of the RSPT, I've heard the figure "6%" used a lot, but I suspect that's just the "risk-free" rate. Based on an example in Dr. Henry's post-budget address to the Australian Business Economists, I suspect the systemic risk is about 9%, which would imply a "normal" profit of about 15%. So it's only once the profits start going ABOVE 15% that the Government steps in and asks for their 40% share (of the excess).  
[EDIT] Based on comments made by Labor pollie Simon Crean today, it looks like the Government actually does intend for the RSPT tax to kick in at 6%. Given that's barely above the risk-free rate, it seems a little low... hmmm.[/EDIT]

Now, the miners still have to pay company tax - on everything: the normal and the super profits. Taxing the normal profits at the normal rate is hard to argue with (everyone else pays it!), and adding the company rate to the RSPT just gives you a higher marginal rate on the super profits. Again, you can argue about the level, but it's not really that high IMO.

The wonderful thing about a tax like the RSPT is that is has very little distortion (if any). That's pretty much the holy grail of public finance/tax policy, because it doesn't change the decisions the market would have made in absence of the tax: profitable mines are still profitable, unprofitable mines don't suddenly become profitable, and – because it only taxes "super" profits – prices shouldn't increase either... theoretically.

What's good for the mining sector is that the old royalty system didn't use to tax profits, but turnover, so even unprofitable mines were being taxed. The RSPT doesn't do that, so "marginal" mines – those on the cusp of making a profit – are benefited. Also, it's part of the proposal that the Government uses a portion of the RSPT to subsidise exploration, which is also good for the miners (and for us).

In short: the owners of the resources (us) get a more equitable return for selling them, resource companies get to make a fair profit before we start sticking out our hand, struggling resource companies aren't unfairly disadvantaged, and some of the proceeds are reinvested to benefit the whole sector.

Post-Script: The argument that implementing the RSPT damages Australia's reputation as a stable regulatory environment has some weight, though not nearly as much as the mining companies would have you believe. However, this is primarily a problem of how the Government has gone about announcing the RSPT (true to form), rather than with the tax itself.

Post- Post-Script: The comparison between the RSPT and the petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) is a furphy. The RPST gives the miners 40% of their investments back, regardless of whether the project makes a profit or not. The PRRT, on the other hand, only lets the industry use their tax deductions if they make a profit. As the RSPT credits are obviously worth more, the PRRT compensates by using a higher rate – Government bond rate + 5%, I think – than the RSPT to "uplift" the credits (when carrying them forward in time). If you don't understand this, it's okay: we're a little beyond the "for dummies" level here.

(1) The risk-free return is defined as the return on 10-year Government bonds, as you can't get much less risky than that. Currently that's a headline (coupon) rate of 4.5%, but the real return is closer to 5.3% given the coupon price. I don't know which is used, exactly – 5.36% seems the more sensible – but what's bandied about in the media is ~6%

Further Reading:
Post-Budget Address to the Australian Business Economists: http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1813/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=Secretary_address_ABE.htm