Friday, May 21, 2010

Vorne hui, hinten...

One of the first things I did when I got back to Australia was rejoin my old football team, the Eltham Eagles. I think less than a week after being back I was at my first training session, and registered soon after, just before the season began.

The club has changed a bit since last I played for it, and not much for the better. Our home ground is no longer the pitch at Eltham College – my old high school – which was one of the best grounds I've ever played on thanks to access to dam water and comparatively light usage; instead we play on a very new synthetic pitch – also good! However, for various reasons, we don't train on it, instead trekking over to what is basically a paddock in Ivanhoe with two wan floodlights.

More distressing – for me, at least – is the drop in the quality of the team since 2006. Before I went to Germany, we were a solid contender in the top half of the Victorian Churches Soccer Association (VCSA) Division 2, with occasional forays into Division 1. Almost everyone I used to play with has left the club, though, and we now play two divisions lower. Meanwhile, I have gotten much better during my time in Germany. In fact, had I had any concrete idea of where I would be in 6 months time, I would never have joined the club again. But I didn't, so I figured I might as well kick around with these guys until I know what my future holds.

Its depressing, though. Depressing, and frustrating. Our squad is full of young blokes, between the ages of 18 and 24. There's one or two around my age, and two in the their late thirties or early forties, but you can count the number of blokes with real football experience on one hand. Many of the young blokes have some decent skills (or at least show some promise), but the tactical understanding and mental attitude leave worlds to be desired. Know, dear reader, that my baseline of comparison is the lowest German division, and know also that the VCSA goes all the way down to Division 6. So these are by no means the worst of the bunch.

Having spent years as a bit player in Heidelberg, I am now (literally) in the centre of the team; the axis in midfield. I still don't have the best technical skills – that honour goes to our two young forwards, who really are quite good and whom I am incredibly glad to have – but I have "the run", as they say, a bit of tactical nous, and knowledge of how to use my body (all 60kg of it). Though I once aspired to playing in central midfield, in the holding or attacking midfield roles (auf der 6 bzw. 10, für die Deutschen), I've discovered I'm uncomfortable trying to carry a team. Not when I actually want to win things.

In Germany, I was a clown; a guy with a constant smile on his face. I joked around, making fun of everything and everyone: my teammates, the coaches, the club president Here, I yell at people. I yell at the wingers to run, I yell at defenders to push up, I yell at my midfielders to stay closer to their opposition.
In Germany, I didn't yell. In Germany, we'd do a parcour with a wooden bench to spring over; I'd do anything but. I'd do a dive roll, or a cartwheel, click my heels as I went over, or crawl underneath. We ran laps of 400m track to see how many we could do within, I dunno, 4-5 minutes, and every time we passed the 1sts, who were doing exercises near the last corner of the track, I'd send a few jocular insults over at their captain. After four laps one of my teammates yelled at me to shut up, and asked if there was some way of turning me off. Here, my midfielders tell me to shut up because I yell at the defence.

I don't like this role, but as long as the defence isn't doing what they're supposed to, I don't think I can stop yelling. I want to play well, and I want to play in a team that plays well, and if they're just dicking around I either have to change clubs, lower my expectations, or tell them what they're doing wrong. It's really frustrating when players with talent waste in by playing like nongs. Players with good ball skills, athletic builds, and good feel for the game, who just play shit because they're a metre or two too far way from their players and don't put in the effort to get there.
As a result, we lose games we should have drawn, or draw games we should have won. We score the most goals in the division – we really do have a good forward line, even if they are a little profligate now and again – but we also concede the most. That's where the title of this post comes from, actually: at the front "hui", and at the back "pfui" – that should be acoustically close enough for even English-speakers to figure out.

A few weeks ago I was looking through the player passports, and chuckled over mine: the 4:3 photo had somehow been stretched into 4:4, so that my face was both shortened and fattened. "Look at that!", I said to a teammate, "Looks a bit odd, doesn't it?".
"Yeah," he replied, "doesn't look like you all. You're never that happy."

This is my footballing life here, ladies and gentlemen: the ill-tempered German.
*sigh*

Thursday, May 13, 2010

Jedi Jack & Jill – blindfolded swing dancing

The swing dancing scene in Melbourne is awesome. Sometimes I forget that, and then we have a night like Wednesday. Wednesday was Melbourne's (and possibly the world's) first "Jedi Jack & Jill" – blindfolded swing dancing. The term "Jack and Jill" refers to the format of the event, in which lead and follows dancers – traditionally male and female, respectively; hence "Jack" and "Jill" – enter separately and are randomly assigned to one another. The idea is to test pure dancing talent rather than prearranged choreography.

Anyway, this J&J competition upped the stakes by blinding each couple before they danced – and they didn't dance by themselves, oh no! We had four couples on the floor at a time, meaning that the crowd offered significant aural support to help them navigate.

Dancing without visual cues is really difficult, especially in an "open" dance like Lindy Hop(1) (the dancers are connected only by one hand), and extra points were awarded for risky moves i.e. stuff you really shouldn't do blindfolded! I snapped what is probably my favourite, and possibly the best Lindy Hop photo of all time, which demonstrates one such move beautifully:

She's blindfolded, people!

Video of the finalists' dances and some more photos below:





That last song is fast, by the way. Just try counting along and think about taking a step on each beat (sometimes more).



Interested in swing dancing? Swing Patrol have you covered; Melbourne, Sydney, Geelong, Launceston, and even London. Blindfolds are free, but strictly optional. (And for the record: there were no injuries.)

(1) Technically Lindy Hop is both closed and open, because, in the basic step, the partners move together (into "closed" position ) and away (into "open" position) from each other.

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

Annuities, Superannuation, and Geometric Progressions

After a dinner-table discussion about superannuation – I know: the Jones family is craaazily exciting – I came away with two problems I wanted to solve:
  1. If, after I retire, I would like to be able to spend X dollars/euro/whatever every year for N years, what lump sum do I need at retirement to achieve that?
  2. If I start saving now, how much do I need to put aside each year to reach that lump sum?
The first step is to ask yourself what level of income you'd like to have when you retire. My Dad suggested somewhere between 60-80% of your last income before retirement, which seems reasonable: it's not what you really need, but you're probably used to that level of income, and it's what you'd get on a generous pension (see, for example, Greece).
Alternatively, we can just name a figure – I'm calculating in current dollars here, so that should be fairly easy. Let's, an an example, set a goal of AU$60,000 per year for 30 years. (Call me aspirational. *grins*)

A stream of income like this is called an annuity, and calculating their value is reasonably easy; every Commerce student should have covered it introductory Finance. Pretend, for a moment, that you needed to pay someone else $60k, today – how much money would you need? Well, $60k, obviously. Now pretend you only had to pay this amount in one year, and could invest the money until then. How much money would you need today? Only enough so that what you currently have plus the interest you earn equals $60k. If you invest one (1) dollar today, in a year you will have (1+i) dollars, where i is the (nominal) interest rate, e.g. 0.06 or 6%. Working backwards, we can divide our debt from next year by (1+i) and find out how much we need right now; this is called the present value (PV) of the debt.
In algebraic notation, it looks like this:


If we had two years to invest before paying the $60k, we could take advantage of compound interest: the $1 we invest today would be worth (1+i) in one year, and that would be worth that much again the year after – (1+i)x(1+i), or (1+i)2. Algebraically:


By extension, a debt paid three years from now is worth (1+i)3th of its future value, and a debt paid n years from now can be discounted (the technical term for what we're doing) by (1+i)n.

It should hopefully only be a short leap to realising that, from our retirement savings, we will be paying off a debt each year – to ourselves. So the question becomes: if I want to pay myself $60k now, and $60k next year, and $60k the year after that, and so on for n years, how much do I need today? Easy: just take the amounts we calculated above in (1) and (2) and add them together: $60k for today, plus $60k divided by (1+i) for next year, plus ...


The payments quite clearly change from one year to the next at the same rate: to get from one year's payment to the one after it, you divide the first year's payment by a further (1+i), and that's it! That makes these payments a geometric progression, and the rate each one changes by – (1+i) – is the common ratio. So we can also express the amount we need to save as:

Now we get to be clever, and reduce the number of terms. For the sake of abstraction I'm just going to replace "$60,000" with "x", but we'll put it back in at the end:
Before you get too settled with equation (6), we should account for inflation: after all, we don't just want $60,000 every year, we want that amount of purchasing power every year; if the price of everything we buy goes up by 10%, we'd need $60,000 x (1+10%) = $66,000 to buy it all. Sparing you the messy details, (6) becomes (7):
Engineers, physicists and the like will despair at my use of π as a variable, but I am an economist and do not care: here and now, π represents the rate of inflation.

Let's bring this back into a format that you, gentle reader, can more easily utilise. Below you'll find a table containing four variables for you to enter, with the fifth row (in bold) containing equation 7 adapted to use cell references. Simple paste the table into the indicated cells and you should be good to go:

Row/ColumnAB
1Desired annuity60000
2Number of years30
3Expected inflation0.025
4Expected interest rate0.05
5Lump sum needed=B1*(1-(1+B3)^(B2+1)/(1+B4)^(B2+1))/(1-(1+B3)/(1+B4))

I've chosen what I called an "aspirational" target of $60k per year for 30 years – aspiration both because of the level (the average Australian salary is currently around $50,000) and the length (assume a retirement of around 65-70: 30 years beyond that would be a fair effort!). The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has an inflation target of 2-3% over the medium term, so in this example I've pitched the expected inflation into the middle of that range, assuming the RBA will succeed. The expected interest rate is relatively conservative: I get more than that on my bank account. However, it's probably better to err on the side of caution when choosing these variables!

If you've copied the table into your spreadsheet and everything's worked, you should get a lump sum needed of $1,326,088 and change. This is the answer to Question 1, and will be the target of our next set of equations as we seek to answer Question 2.

This time, we're saving an amount every year of our working life – say, 40 years – so that, at the end, we've saved up $1.3 million (in current dollars). The money we invest at the start of of this period gathers more (compound) interest than the money we invest later on, so instead of discounting (dividing) our money figure x by the interest rate we'll multiply it. Conversely, inflation decreases the value of our savings, so that'll come into the equation as a divisor; essentially, the two terms (inflation and interest) have just changed places.

Equation 8 is basically Equation 5 with inflation added and the terms reversed because we're saving to achieve a future value (FV) rather than paying out from a present value.

Now the tricky part to this equation – and the reason I didn't posted this on, say, last Thursday – is accounting for wage increases. Why does that matter? Well, we've started off assuming that we're contributing a fixed amount x each year – but the reality is that, during our working lives, we can expect to earn less at the start and more at the end: it's going to be much easier to save money towards the end of our career than at the start.
The difficulty with accounting for wage increases is that their effect goes the other way to the inflation and the interest rate effects: your first salary will not have increased at all, but anything you save will be subject to a lot of inflation and interest; your last salary will (hopefully) have seen many wage increases, but the money you save from it won't earn any interest or be devalued by inflation. Observe:
The first term x · (1+w)n-1 is the amount (a percentage, perhaps) you're saving from the wage you've earned after 39 wage increases (n = 40 years). The second term is that same amount/percentage two years before retirement: only n-2=38 wage increases, but with one period of interest and one period of inflation effects. What took me a bit of time was converting that series into a neat expression


and figuring out the common ratio

Once you have it, it's not that difficult: (1+w) decreases in k (because we're counting last period to first period), so each progression needs to reduce that (1+w) term by one factor, but after working exclusively with terms that increased in k it took me a little while to figure out. On the plus side, I was proud when I did get there :-)

Anyway, multiplying both sides of (10) by [1-(11)], cancelling out, and then dividing again by [1-(11)] – analogue to what we did in Equation (5) to get to (6) – brings us to the final equation:

Bam. Isn't it pretty? A form only a parent could love, perhaps; be that as it may, it's still very useful! Technically, we can't actually answer Question 2 with the equation in its current form (it would need to be solved for x), but I promised you no more equations; instead I'll give you table with which to play around. You can figure out how much you'll save for various rates of contribution; once you've chosen values for inflation, interest, salary increase, and years worked, you can adjust the savings rate until you reach the lump sum calculated in Question 1:

Row/ColumnAB
11Starting annual salary50000
12Expected yearly salary increase0.025
13Years worked40
14Savings rate0.12
15Expected inflation0.025
16Expected interest rate0.07
17Lump sum at end=((B11*B14)*((1+B12)^(B13-1)))*(1-(((1+B16)^B13)/(((1+B15)^B13)*((1+B12)^B13))))/(1-(1+B16)/((1+B15)*(1+B12)))

I consider the starting values here to be reasonably realistic: the average current annual salary is $50,000; 40 years is a reasonable working life; the current superannuation contribution rate is 12% (in Australia); inflation is in the middle of the RBA's 2-3% band; a 7% interest rate is, I feel, conservative, taking the 10-year Government bond rate of ~5.5% as a baseline and looking to a "normal" long-term market investment return in the low double-digits. Yearly salary increases is not something I have a whole of knowledge about, but I've acted upon the assumption that we work in industries whose (relative) productive value does not decrease over time; that implies that our salaries would increase at least as much as the price level (i.e. by the rate of inflation).

This table is good for just plugging figures and seeing how big a difference various changes in the variables have – a change in the interest rate of 1-percentage point, for example, has almost as much effect as a 3-percentage point change in your savings rate. Lesson: choosing good investments is more important than just savings lots.

With the starting values, the expected savings lump sum is $918k-odd. That's obviously less than the $1.326m we're aiming for, but ratcheting up our savings rate to ~17.5% gets us there. If you think that's high, Germany has a compulsory superannuation contributions rate of roughly 20%; with the current Australian compulsory rate of 12%, another 6% of your post-tax income should do the trick.

Two final points:
  1. Yes, I have used "wage" and "salary" interchangeably here – it's bad, I'm sorry.
  2. I've not accounted for tax in my equations. This is an important omission. I'm not up to date on what the current tax scheme is for superannuation versus other forms on investment. The contributions (savings) themselves are tax free, as far as I know, as is the money you "pay" yourself once in retirement, but I don't know whether the interest you earn in the meantime is taxed, or at what rate. I have the vague recollection that there's a 15% tax in Australia when you withdraw your superannuation, but I'll have to look into that. If anyone knows the specifics, or can point me in the right direction, I'd welcome the assistance!
    Depending on where the tax falls it'll be more or less easy to integrate into the equation: a 15% tax on superannuation returns would simply involve replacing the term (1+i) with (1+i)·(1-t), which isn't too complex.

Friday, April 30, 2010

Paul Krugman: Building a Green Economy

It was written a few weeks back, but Paul Krugman has an excellent article in the New York Times covering basic environmental economics and the costs of action/inaction, with a few words on the validity of climate science and the domestic & international politics of the whole thing (though his strength lies obviously1 with the economic side).


1 Paul Krugman holds a Nobel Prize in Economics.

I thought middle-class people understood stats

I received a slight shock yesterday when I was having dinner with my parents. In the context of whatever discussion we were having I raised the observation that "everyone thinks they're middle class", a less-than-groundbreaking insight I intended merely to lead into some data from 1999 in which people were asked to place themselves into an income class.

What I essentially asked was this: "If you take all income-earning Australians and rank (order) them by the amount of income they earn, then separate them into ten equally sized groups, you get income deciles: the poorest 10%, the next poorest 10% (11-20%), the richest 10% (91-100%), etc. How many people do you think put themselves into the 51-60% decile/group?"
My dad is an engineer and my mum a high-school teacher, and both are intelligent people, so I figured I'd be alright with what was, really, not much more than high-school maths. The point I wanted to make was that, although only 10% of people are in the 51-60% range (by definition), about 26% of people put themselves into that group – 2.6 times as many as are actually in it! When my dad answered "70-80%", though, I was thrown. Did he really think Australians were that delusional about their income ranking?

It turns out dad was thinking of a bell curve (normal) distribution of incomes over the range 0-100% (of people) and was estimating how many people would fall into the middle of that distribution (i.e. where it peaks). What caused me concern, however, is that I wasn't able to shift him from his (engineering) model of the world to one in which you simply order people from poor to rich and put them into equally large groups; he thought terms like the "poorest 10%" or "richest 10%" of people were just not things anyone would want to talk about; couldn't see a use for the concept.

I love my dad and I don't think any less of him as a result of this episode – it's been 40-odd years since he passed his stats class at uni and since then has only had to use a sub-section of that knowledge. But my general assumption that "intelligent people" – broadly, those who went or could have gone to university – are able to understand (what I consider to be) basic statistics was shaken. More critically, I am now unsure to what extent I misjudge the common man and his ability to process information; if one were to print the following graph (from CORE economics.com.au – see link, above) in the newspaper and say that "within the top 30% highest-earning Australians, less than 1/6th think they're that rich", would the lay reader understand it?


I wouldn't really be all too concerned if I were living in a ivory tower – but I'd like to be aware of the fact!

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Steve Keen, Private Debt to GDP ratios, and the GFC

A little while ago I was asked my opinion about an article by Steve Keen, an Associate Professor at the University of Western Sydney and the founder of the Center for Economic Stability. Keen is apparently an expert in "the unconventional economic theory" called "The Financial Instability Hypothesis". This, in turn, was developed by the American economist Hyman Minsky, whose teaching have been making a resurgence of late. Keen apparently predicted a serious financial crisis as early as December 2005 – but, as the old joke goes, economists have predicted 7 of the last 3 recessions.

Though I'm not familiar with Minsky's work, I did read Keen's article and wasn't too impressed by his argumentation. Below is the original article, and my response.

Why the Debt to GDP Ratio matters
By Steve Keen


The main feature distinguishing my approach to economics from mainstream theory (known as "neoclassical" economics) is a focus upon the importance of credit in a dynamic, non-equilibrium framework. From this perspective I identify the ratio of debt to GDP — and the rate of change of that ratio — as the key determinant of the state of the economy, and this is what alerted me to the approaching Global Financial Crisis in late 2005. Debt to GDP levels in both Australia and the USA — the two countries for which I could get reliable data — were clearly on an exponential path that I knew had to break and cause a large economic breakdown.


This phenomenon was not taken seriously by conventional economists — which is why the crisis took them by surprise — and they continue to misunderstand why it matters, even as the crisis that they did not see coming continues. Some conventional economists have criticized me for focusing on what they call a "crude" private debt to GDP ratio; others allege that I am making a "schoolboy error" by comparing a stock to a flow. In response, I have developed a simple numerical example that hopefully illustrates why the debt to GDP ratio matters.
  • Imagine a country with a nominal GDP of $1,000 billion, which is growing at 10% per annum (real output is growing at 5% p.a. and inflation is 5% p.a.);
  • It also has an aggregate private debt level of $1,250 billion which is growing at 20% p.a., so that private debt increases by $250 billion that year;
  • Ignoring for the moment the contribution from government deficit spending, total spending in that economy for that year — on all markets, including assets as well as commodities — is therefore $1,250 billion. 80% of this is financed by incomes (GDP) and 20% is financed by increased debt;
  • One year later, the GDP has grown by 10% to $1,100 billion;
  • Now imagine that debt stabilises at $1,500 billion, so that the change in debt that year is zero;
  • Then total spending in the economy is $1,100 billion, consisting of $1.1 trillion of income-financed spending and no debt-financed spending;
  • This is $150 billion less than the previous year;
  • Stabilisation of debt levels thus causes a 12% fall in nominal aggregate demand.
What about if debt doesn't actually stabilise in the second year, but instead grows at the same rate as GDP? Then we get the following situation:
  • In the first year, total demand is $1,250 billion, consisting of $1,000 billion in income and $250 billion in increased debt;
  • In the second year, total demand is also $1,250 billion, consisting of $1,100 billion in income and $150 billion in increased debt;
  • Nominal aggregate demand is therefore constant;
  • But after inflation, real aggregate demand will have contracted by 5%.
This is the real danger posed by debt: once debt becomes a significant fraction of GDP, and its growth rate substantially exceeds that of GDP, the economy will suffer a recession even if the debt to GDP ratio merely stabilizes. This approach not only explains why the GFC was inevitable, but also gives a very different explanation to preceding crises, and it explains why, to date, Australia has successfully avoided the worst of the GFC while America has suffered from it very badly.
The next chart shows the annual change in the private debt to GDP ratio in Australia, and the changes in government in the last 65 years (blue for a conservative Liberal party victory, black for a progressive ALP victory, and green for one election that the ALP won against the odds). Note that between 1945 and 1965, the ratio rose as often as fell. Then for a decade the debt ratio only rose, before then falling very sharply. Its collapse from a peak rate of growth of 7% p.a. in mid-1973 to minus 3% in mid 1975 was the real caused the mid-1970s recession.

The same pattern repeats from late 1988 till early 1993 — from a growth rate of 7% to falling at 3.5% p.a. in early 1993 — and this gave Australia what its then Prime Minister Paul Keating called "the recession we had to have".

Now to our current crisis, which has been more severe than preceding crises, not because debt was rising more quickly (in fact the rate of growth of debt in the 1970s was much higher than now), but because the debt to GDP ratio is so much higher now. The growth rate peaked at 11.5% p.a. in early 2008, only to fall to minus 5% in mid-2009.


But notice how quickly that decline in Australia's debt ratio has turned into growth once more: whereas Australia experienced 33 months of falling debt to GDP in the 1990s recession, it had only 13 months of a falling debt ratio this time.
The overwhelming reason for this rapid turnaround was the First Home Owners Boost (which I prefer to call the First Home Vendors Boost). This government policy enticed 250,000 Australians into their first mortgage by the offer of an additional A$7,000-14,000 government grant. These new buyers levered this higher deposit into a far higher loan, driving up prices which then provided the vendors from whom they purchased with an additional $30-50,000.
These vendors in turn used this windfall as additional deposits in their own levered purchases. Mortgage debt, which was on track to fall 3% as a proportion of GDP prior to The Boost, instead increased by 6% of GDP — a 9% turnaround that was equivalent to an additional $100 billion stimulus to Australia's A$1.25 trillion economy.
This dramatic turnaround in mortgage debt more than countered deleveraging by the business sector, so that private debt levels rose. On top of that, the government's own debt-financed spending returned the debt contribution to demand to the average of 1996-2006, when the debt ratio grew at roughly 5% p.a. and financed an apparent boom.


So Australia has avoided the GFC by recreating the conditions that led to it. Needless to say, this is not entirely a good thing. We are potentially avoiding pain now by setting ourselves up for greater pain in the near future.
America, on the other hand, is clearly experiencing the worst of the GFC because it is deleveraging — reducing its debt to GDP ratio. Though this is painful, it at least addresses the cause of the crisis — too much private debt — by reducing it rather than increasing it once more.
Since America is even more of a Ponzi-dominated economy than Australia, this reduction in private debt — now that the Ponzi Scheme has collapsed — is the key cause of the USA's current slump. This next chart shows the relationship between the proportion of aggregate demand which is debt financed — which I define as the change in debt, divided by the sum of GDP plus the change in debt — and unemployment. The change in private sector debt has gone from boosting aggregate demand by over 20% to reducing it by almost 15%. Only a massive increase in government debt has attenuated the deleveraging.


Whether government spending can continue to counter private sector deleveraging is now a moot point. Some of my non-orthodox economics colleagues argue that a sufficiently large government deficit can return a country to economic prosperity. While I doubt this claim, it is undeniable that if the "deficit hawks" make the government reduce its own spending, then there will be no force standing in the way of accelerated private sector deleveraging.



What this Steve Keen bloke says has several problems:

In his example, the country takes up $250b of new debt in t0, while GDP "only" grows by $100b from t0 to t1. Now, in standard neoclassical theory, debt is used to invest, i.e., increase the productive capacity of a company/country. An investment of $250b for any return less than $250b is just not profitable. So, assuming the investors are rational and the investment thus yields a income of $250b + r + X in t1, then they can pay back the original debt, the interest r, and the GDP is better off by X.

"Now hang on", you might say, "this means there's $250b of (domestic) spending/demand in t0 that isn't there in t1, because that $250b is going externally to repay the debt. So domestic spending has fallen by $250b" Correct. However, this is where Keen's second trick comes in: he's used an example with a high existing baseline of debt, so that removing that debt stimulus drops the GDP considerably. HOWEVER, neoclassically, the debt itself should not be seen as the usual state of affairs: rather, t0 should be seen as a year with unusually high GDP.

The counterargument to this point is that this level of debt has crept up gradually. Well, okay: then lets reduce it gradually. Given that the investments are returning more than their face value, we should still be left with a greater growth rate of GDP than without the borrowing/investing strategy.

Let's now check my "investment for increased production" assumption: my (neoclassical) analysis has assumed borrowing by investors – what I'm going to call "good debt"; Keen's analysis has just talked about "private" debt. This could be "private" in the standard economic sense of "non-public", i.e. non-governmental, or it could be non-government and non-business, i.e. households. Households doesn't make a lot of sense, a) because it's a strange use of the term, and b) because the figures he uses in his example would be way out for just household debt. So I'm going to assume it's the standard economic non-government "private".

Okay, so, private-sector borrowing is not always used to finance investment: most household borrowing is, in fact, to finance consumption. Borrowing to consume now really means you're borrowing against future consumption (more now, less later), so excess levels of borrowing could well lead to a situation in which, to repay their debt, households have to reduce their future consumption to undesirable levels (perhaps to the extent that they declare bankruptcy).

This, while a (still existing) problem, is not the cause of the GFC. Most household debt is long-term (mortgages) rather than short-term (credit cards). The GFC was caused by problems with liquidity, mainly refinancing short-term credit by large companies & banks.
"Aha!", you might think, "Mortgages! Wasn't the whole GFC started by sub-prime mortgages going down the drain?"
Sure – but the problem with these mortgages wasn't that it was private debt, but that it was crap private debt – it wasn't being used to create any net value. Usually you buy a house with a mortgage, but the house values faster than the interest rate, so you come out in front. Sometimes you don't, but then the negative balance comes out of your consumption. (Owner/occupiers don't even realise the difference, since they don't sell their house). Now, these sub-prime mortgages are called that because they are crap - the houses didn't rise in value, and the borrowers couldn't finance their net losses by reducing their consumption, so the banks/businesses/whatever had to shoulder the burden. Lender confidence/risk preference falls, and we have liquidity problems.

The important thing is thus the character of the debt: whether it's good debt, like I described above, or crap debt. Just measuring the level of all private debt and pretending it's bad is a gross simplification – a criticism Keen appears to be aware of but does nothing to correct.

Since Keen's link between levels of private debt to GDP and the GFC were so tenuous I didn't bother reading any further. There still certainly exists the problem of servicing and, in future, reducing our levels of private debt, but, to repeat, this is a separate issue to the GFC.

Qualification: Keen's analysis is certainly more complex than he has laid it out here, and it's possible he really has discovered a relationship between private debt ratios and liquidity. If so, he's done a very good job of hiding it.

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Metallica - Enter Sandman (Smooth Jazz Version)

Syncing this with live convert footage and vocals is a master-stroke.

Wednesday, April 14, 2010

It's got my stomach all tied up in knots.


This is what Australian pretzels look like. Horrific.

Monday, April 12, 2010

Thursday, April 01, 2010